NATO key to countering disinformation---multiple warrants
Tomasz Chłoń, 5/16; Chłoń was the ambassador of Poland to Estonia (2005-2010) and to Slovakia (2013-2015), and the director of NATO Information Office Moscow (2017-2020); “NATO and Countering Disinformation The Need for a More Proactive Approach from the Member States”, GLOBSEC, 16-05-2022, https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/NATO-and-Countering-Disinformation-ver1-spreads.pdf / chuo
===[last part also talks about cohesion key!] Russian disinfo is high now b/c of the war & false narratives they’ve spread in the past, so it’s up to NATO’s cohesion (and coordinating capabilities), credibility, expertise, guidance, financial support, mandates, and the ability for them to create a global snowball to organizations and nations to counter it.
One of the founding myths of Russian foreign policy (developed below) relates to a betrayal by the West. Many in Russia are either unwilling or too scared to challenge the veracity of this tale since it has become national dogma. As the freedom of speech constitutes one of the fundamental and respected rights of democracies, this myth is also widely spread throughout the West. Moreover, the West’s culture of open debates, which respects differing points of view, puts Russian masterminds of false narratives in a privileged position when it comes to influencing Western societies and their decision-making processes. It also renders NATO and EU countries increasingly vulnerable to influence from pro-Kremlin propagandists spurred on by an unbridled sense of initiative and combined with active measures as well as armed conflicts. The matrix of the myth of Western betrayal and Russian self-victimisation is the “broken promise of not enlarging NATO to the East”. The Kremlin has also used this myth to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 – a move that has potentially incalculable consequences for European and even global security. This new stage in Russia’s confrontational policy has been further solidified with support from the increasingly belligerent Belarusian dictator although Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s standing has also been weakened through his complete dependence on Russia. Minsk, assisted in turn by Moscow, created a migration crisis on the Belarusian border with Poland, Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, Latvia, thereby opening an additional hybrid front. Increased tension on NATO’s entire eastern flank and the war waged by Russia against Ukraine have been exacerbated by Russian and Belarusian hostile disinformation activities, which are unprecedented in terms of scope, intensity and toxicity. In both Russia and Belarus, the highest political authorities, diplomats, state-controlled media, special services and their proxies have been actively involved in spreading familiar but intensified false narratives as well as new concoctions that are particularly harmful to the public in the Russian-language, state-controlled information environment. Unfortunately, some of these narratives fall on fertile ground in certain circles in the West and are cynically exploited in local political struggles. The goal of disinformation is to undo the cohesion of the transatlantic community, undermine the credibility of NATO and EU members and, ultimately, derail the existing rules-based international order. The “new-old” story is that: Russia, and now Belarus, are surrounded by foes, and the heightened security crisis is the fault of the West, which had been allegedly pushing Ukraine towards war. Having rejected the Minsk agreements, Ukraine had been preparing to launch military operations against the inhabitants of Donbas, occupied Crimea and regions in Russia itself; to this end, Kyiv had been concentrating its forces and resources (including weapon systems received from NATO countries) in the east of the country. Polish and American mercenaries were also operating and preparing armed provocations in the east of Ukraine; this means that not only Ukraine but also the West itself had been preparing to attack the Russian Federation and Belarus. Ukraine had been mobilising troops on the border with Belarus, against which Poland has been making territorial claims. Finally, Vladimir Putin justified his illegal assault on Ukraine with the need to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine. He did so despite the fact that the Ukrainian nation lost 8 million people in World War II fighting Nazi Germany and is a country led by a Jewish president who won the popular vote in a free, fair and democratic election; an election which showed the Ukrainian neo-Nazi parties having less support than probably anywhere else in Europe.
Although it is not easy to measure, the pernicious nature of Russian disinformation and interference abroad has been “tested” positively in several cases, with prime examples including the attacks against Ukraine, the U.S. and French presidential elections, as well as the Brexit referendum. The extent to which social polarisation and internal political fights are causal effects of Russian (and others) meddling in the West could be discussed elsewhere, but what is of importance for this paper is that such frictions are certainly being exploited and amplified by the opportunistic organisers of external disinformation. In any case, the cumulative result can be seen, for example, in Slovakia where a significant part of the society blames the Alliance for the current Russian crisis (at least that had been the case before the full-scale war against Ukraine started) or in Croatia where the president has been questioning the Alliance’s Eastern policy. The actions of candidates for the highest political positions in France who propagate anti-NATO slogans are even more concerning. Sympathy for the Russian regime is shown by representatives of ruling or co-ruling parties in NATO and EU member states, including Fidesz in Hungary and Podemos in Spain (which should be particularly sensitive to disinformation following the Kremlin’s interference in the Catalan independence question). Moscow uses other tools to exert its influence in Western countries, but their effect may be more prevalent in countries with elected parties that have pro-Kremlin inclinations (e.g., AfD in Germany). Russia has been known to drive political corruption, use blackmail tactics and even resort to acts of terrorism. The growing popularity of conspiratorial and pro-Kremlin narratives in Germany, France and Spain that are spread through encrypted social channels linked to Moscow have become a fact of everyday life. While it is challenging to fully assess how effective countermeasures to tackle foreign interference have been, examples from countries that have taken them up with determination show that the fight against foreign meddling can have a genuine impact. Most ways and means of counteracting disinformation in this political warfare fall under the responsibility of sovereign states (and the European Union due to its legislative prerogatives). It is predominantly their responsibility to build resistance to disinformation and to respond to it with both deterrence and punishment. NATO’s role in this regard is limited. At the same time, the Alliance – as an organisation at the centre of false accusations and hostile propaganda – knows how to defend itself, which is evidenced by the overall high level of public support for NATO among its members. Nevertheless, it seems that the Alliance’s potential to combat disinformation is not fully utilised by its individual members, which could benefit from NATO’s expertise and coordinating capabilities to a greater extent than they have thus far.
Tackling disinformation remains an essential part of NATO’s communication strategies and day-to-day operations, which includes media monitoring, analysis of the information space and proactive communication in a coordinated and fact-based manner. Its goal is to inoculate or “pre-bunk” the mediasphere rather than debunk each false claim, i.a. through “Setting the Record Straight” narratives and activities which counter the Kremlin’s myths about NATO. In 2019, NATO adopted an updated and systematic package of appropriate objectives and measures to combat disinformation. The following year, NATO’s Response to Disinformation on COVID-19 became realised in an Action Plan issued to Allies by the Secretary General. This document sought to bring together multiple strands of work on countering hostile disinformation surrounding COVID-19. In 2021, NATO’s Toolbox for Countering Hostile Information Activities was created; it reflects the Alliance’s twin-track model to respond to hostile information activities: “understand” and “engage”, underpinned by “coordination”. The document aims to provide Allies with a toolbox to assess hostile information activities, including disinformation, and to assist in determining possible courses of action. Furthermore, NATO IS staff holds biweekly briefings on Russian and other disinformation activities at various relevant committees. Within the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, as part of a long-term effort, and covering resilience baselines – spanning across many domains including communications – Allies share information about how prepared they are to face various key civil security challenges, including disinformation. The organisation supports member and partner states by providing guidance as well as co-financing for social and scientific projects that strengthen their resilience to disinformation. Rapid-reaction teams have been made available to member states as part of NATO’s strategy to fight hybrid threats. The organisation is also cooperating more closely with the European Union to ensure that NATO benefits from the EU’s Rapid Alert System set up to counter disinformation.
At the same time, the West has yet to prepare a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated response to Russian disinformation. It is up to nations to fully utilise NATO’s potential. A response practice has been developed and seen partial success within some states and Euro-Atlantic institutions, but it has not yet been translated into a real common policy or strategy. At national levels, political declarations and agreed action plans are still not fully implemented in too many instances. Western states approach disinformation in varied ways due to differences in history, regional security, wealth, education, media quality, political and legal culture and – most importantly – the current state of their relations with Russia. As a rule, some states prefer bilateral approaches that safeguard national prerogatives. This may change now following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the challenge of disinformation has begun to attract higher political attention. In the European Union, this has transpired through the adoption of the European Democracy Action Plan and the presentation of new regulations on digital services in December 2020. These regulations aim to address the core issue of the business model developed by disinformation organisers who instrumentalise social media platforms. The report by the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the EU, including Disinformation (INGE), has also promised that other means of influence will be addressed5 . In an effort to combat disinformation, the Digital Services Act (DSA) is a breakthrough legal instrument that will fundamentally change the rules of the game for the information environment in the European Union, member states and partner countries; it will also have an impact on national approaches worldwide. The DSA will impose numerous legal obligations on operators of online platforms that are more demanding than the previous voluntary commitments outlined in the Code of Practice for Fighting Disinformation. Companies will be obliged to cooperate with independent researchers and allow them to access their data. They will also participate in complaint and appeal procedures regarding content moderation and dispute resolution. The DSA will provide for the companies’ obligatory consultations, including with civil society organisations. It will also introduce the institution of trusted whistle blowers, who, among other things, will notify the companies about suspected crimes online. The act will correspondingly establish a European Digital Services Council and advisory body made up of national digital service coordinators responsible for implementing legislation at the national level. It will impose specific additional duties on exceptionally large online platforms with more than fortyfive million users per month. These obligations will include assessing systemic risks resulting from their services, identifying actions to reduce such risks, conducting independent audits, setting appropriate conditions for algorithmic recommendations of user content and ensuring additional transparency in advertising (including political ads). Among international organisations and institutions, the European Union plays a leading role in counteracting disinformation and introducing new effective measures against it. The future regulations on transparency in financing political parties and election campaigns gives hope for limiting corruption and external influence in the affairs of the member states. NATO and the EU share similar membership compositions and were created based on comparable value systems, so it is reasonable to assume that counteracting disinformation will be more prominently reflected in NATO’s new Strategic Concept. A need for this has been suggested by the authors of the NATO2030 expert group report prepared ahead of the Madrid Summit in June 2022. As a result, countering disinformation could be given a more visible place on the agenda of NATO ministerial meetings and summits, and more proposals with clear commitments by member states to tackle disinformation may be unveiled. NATO also has the opportunity to strengthen the mandates of existing committees to better coordinate national efforts.
In light of the current security environment in Europe and worldwide, traditional threats are still a priority, and collective defence will remain one of NATO’s core missions, even more so than in the 2010 document. Among the tasks supporting this existing mission, there will also be development of a full range of instruments aimed at neutralising new risks, including disinformation. As experience has shown, threats evolve in terms of intensity, goals, methods and means. The challenge for the negotiators of NATO’s new Strategic Concept will therefore be to provide for adequate flexibility when crafting current and future countermeasures that will guide the Alliance’s activities for years to come. Overall, NATO’s (and the West’s) coherent response and efforts against foreign disinformation, both nationally and internationally, should focus on: (i) their civic resilience, (ii) their offensive capabilities as much as their defensive ones and (iii) minimising the differences in how individual Western countries approach disinformation in practice. In other words, deterrence must be pursued through both punishment and denial. The following recommendations apply specifically to NATO but also to other organisations that can cooperate more with the Alliance as well as the member states themselves, for which NATO can act as a catalyst in the development of national policies and practices.
Therefore, where appropriate, Allies should overcome any remaining reluctance and uncooperative tendencies that limit the role of NATO in combating new threats, especially hybrid ones. First, tackling disinformation should gain greater political attention among all Allies. National countermeasures undertaken in some member states (e.g., France, Germany, the Baltic States and the UK) or partner countries (e.g., Finland and Sweden) testify to the importance they attach to the problem of falsehoods in international politics. When allowed, NATO could better serve as a coordinator and multiplier of good practices (of which these countries are, to a significant extent, a model). Second, there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The work ahead can be built on the existing acquis and institutions without substantial additional resources, which is important given budgetary constraints. Third, there is clearly more scope and possibility for NATO to foster synergies with other organisations – most notably the EU – in helping each other and partner countries to fight foreign disinformation. Overall, NATO and the West must take a more offensive approach in tackling this ever more dangerous scourge.