Increased information guarding with NATO’s resources is the linchpin of countering Russian, Chinese, and COVID disinformation
Dale F. Reding and Bryan Wells, 22, Reding and Wells are from the office of the chief scientist, NATO headquarters; “Cognitive Warfare: NATO, COVID-19 and the Impact of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies”, Springer, 05-04-2022, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-030-94825-2_2.pdf/chuo
===can be used as not just NATO key but also the actions they do---if the warrants & solutions the card mentions aligns w/ the aff then this card can be used
===definitely not the best card (unless the strat specifically focuses on the cognitive warfare side of things) but talks about NATO’s strategy in the past and how NATO can work on this w/ disinformation increasing moving forwards
As NATO moves towards the future, it finds itself confronting the challenges of a changing world. As noted in the NATO2030 process (Maizière et al., 2020; NATO, 2021a), NATO will need to address a host of returning and emergent challenges such as Russia’s aggressive actions, the threat of terrorism, cyber-attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies, the security impact of climate change, and the rise of China. The solutions to these challenges require a delicate blend of political and military action married with the deep collective wisdom contained within the Alliance. Within the three core missions specified by NATO’s 2010 strategic concept (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security) (NATO, 2020d), the Alliance is focused on five operational imperatives: cognitive superiority, layered resilience, influence and power projection, cross-domain command, and integrated multi-domain defence (NATO, 2021c). These imperatives and the overarching challenges outlined in NATO2030 have led NATO to expand its operational domains from three (air, land, sea) to include cyber (NATO, 2019) and space (NATO, 2021b). However, a school of thought exists that has strongly advocated that the cognitive domain should be given equal importance and noting that it is an area where Alliance nations are particularly vulnerable (Cole & Le Guyader, 2020). Recent examples of the ever-growing threat presented by disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda, including actions taken during the COVID-19 crisis, would support such an assertion.
NATO’s approach, honed over seventy-two years of information conflict, is based on a traditional approach of highlighting concrete actions, verifiable facts and credible communication. This approach relies on clear and consistent narratives passed through conventional mass media, public engagements and social media. Such an approach is based on the Alliance’s ideals and core values. Trust, once broken, is hard to regain, so clarity and consistency are central aspects of this approach. For example (NATO, 2020b), in support of the Alliance and its partners, “NATO and Allied armed forces have played a key role in supporting civilian efforts to fight COVID-19, with some 350 flights delivering hundreds of tons of critical supplies, the construction of almost 100 field hospitals, and almost half a million troops across the Alliance securing borders, transporting patients and helping with testing [and vaccine delivery].” It has also built over twenty-five field hospitals, provided over twenty-five thousand beds to the Allied nations, and supports sharing medical supplies and logistics through the NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) (Ozawa, 2020).
Responding to specific attacks, NATO provides widely available refutations, briefings, talking points, statements, and corrections. In response to the COVID-19 infodemic, NATO intensified its communications across a wide range of platforms and media, engaged in an increasing number of online engagements with a broad range of audiences. Also, it expanded outreach within Russia through various media products. However, this has not been enough, and NATO has reached out to academia, industry, NGOs, think tanks, and media watch organisations to encourage discussion. This can reduce the susceptibility to disinformation and support a more resilient society. An engaged, independent, and empowered fourth estate is a necessary part of this resilience. Only by constant engagement with old and new media across the Alliance, partners and where possible, social groups/countries that are the sources can one hope to ensure that disinformation is successfully countered.
The response to disinformation has been coordinate through the Strategic Communication Task Force, led by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division (PPD). An example of NATO’s approach may be found in its straightforward debunking of Russian myths on NATO and COVID-19 (NATO, 2020a). This strategy faces the recurring issues raised in Russian disinformation efforts and attempts to answer the accusations in a forward-leaning fashion.
In the end, NATO has faced the COVID pandemic in two ways (Ozawa, 2020). The first is by leveraging the power of the military Alliance to support a global medical emergency, and the second by addressing the infodemic head-on. The efforts of the S&T community have successfully been brought to bear on both issues.
No single strategy will work all the time, nor will counter-narrative strategies be universally successful, as exemplified by the continuing existence of “flat earth” societies despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary. NATO’s engagement strategy, therefore, relies on proactive and rapid communication, highlighting flawed reasoning (debunking), identifying familiar sources and methods of disinformation, countering disinformation on the platform or via the media on which it is found, adapting to the evolution of such disinformation, being selective in which attacks to counter and consistent in overall messaging. Not all disinformation can be countered, if for no other reason than the sheer volume of such occurrences, so selecting those attacks that can do the most harm or are starting to gain significant attention is a critical step. Earning the trust of Alliance societies through consistent communication and provision of information will help slow or marginalise the remainder.
Fourth, NATO needs to better adapt to hybrid, grey zone and cognitive warfare. The battleground of today and the future includes the sixth operational domain, the cognitive or, more generally, the human, domain. Russian and Chinese approaches to disinformation have been successful to some degree, impacting the lives of citizens in the Alliance and with allies. In a manner consistent with the values and ethics that underlie the Alliance, mastering this domain will be essential to maintaining the Alliance’s effectiveness and reducing the risk of strategic errors with potentially disastrous repercussions.