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Authoritarian states will take advantage of social media as a means to deck Soldier morale – Daesh proves.

Childs 16, Sean Childs Major Sean V. W. Childs is a serving member of the regular Australian Army. He holds a Bachelor of Science from Macquarie University and a Master of Arts (Strategy and Security) from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Prior to joining the Australian Defence Force in 2010, Sean was a video journalist and senior producer based in London covering global security conflicts for US-based The Associated Press Television News, a policy adviser for Free TV Australia and an account director with the media intelligence corporate, the iSentia Group.“Soldier Morale: Defending a Core Military Capability” Institute for Regional Security https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26465606.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7f42224105cd423760bc254a143296ab&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=, Accessed 7-14-22, BVW-RB

Australia and the West’s soldiers of today are part of a globalised information age which is resulting in the West’s continued detribalisation.34 In other words, by today’s soldiers accessing and processing knowledge from across the world they are facilitating for themselves more diverse views and opinions that challenge dominant Western paradigms and which serve to erode a consensus. Put another way, their actions potentially serve to erode the will to fight, a will which relies on a “sense of identity, belonging and cause”.35 Quite simply, the already dynamic process of human relations and discourse is becoming even more dynamic. Daesh, seizing on the phenomenon, is making expert use of social media in its propaganda efforts by using it as an information weapon, and in the realm of stated war aims, social media is extenuating the strategic debate. The main allegation commentators level against the international coalition’s fight against Daesh in Iraq and Syria is its lack of strategy or, to put it another way, the purpose of its stated war aims. This is in the context of perceived previous politicomilitary failures in the Middle East, which many argue have resulted in the rise of Daesh. In a theoretical sense, what this means is that an already detribalising West along with its soldiers are afforded access via social media to an ever expanding, dissenting discourse which serves to lower morale. The important effect social media has here stems from the realm of memory studies and the way in which meaning is created. Put simply, meaning is created in the space between history and imagination, which in the present spectrum of modern conflict is a recipe for a decrease in the West’s will to fight for their ideals and values. In other words, the history of past failures coupled with proliferated online content makes for the questioning of the ends and a greater potential for dissent, with all of its attendant consequences. For example, the potential drop in voluntary military recruitment numbers and increase in military separations (people quitting or worse, disserting). Social media’s detribalising effect in the spectrum of modern conflict certainly requires further research. Turning to morale’s exogenous situational factor one can argue that in the spectrum of modern conflict social media has the greatest practical impact. Well before the notion of social media was fathomable, David Galula, a leading military and academic figure of counterinsurgency warfare, provided a prescient warning in 1968 which typifies the threat to morale posed by Daesh’s use of social media today when he said, “the insurgent [is] judged by what he promises, not by what he does ... the counterinsurgent [is] judged on what he does, not on what he says”.36 Certainly the increase in the amount of information available is synonymous with the information age and social media. Certainly also the quality and authenticity of much of that information is questionable—all of which feeds the potentiality of rumour and friction in the context of success and failure. From the Australian Defence Force’s force protection perspective, two practical examples of social media’s likely impact on the morale of the men and women of its Air Task Group (ATG) conducting combat operations against Daesh in Iraq and Syria are available. I say likely as this is an area also requiring further research. Force protection relates to the identification of threats to the force, and the mitigation and control of those threats, which is a process of risk management. In this sense then, it is not difficult to appreciate that defending morale falls within the remit of force protection. First, take the horrifically barbaric February 2015 burning-alive of the caged and conscious Jordanian pilot by Daesh in Syria, subsequently disseminated by social media and widely reported on by the Western media. That, more than likely, had a material impact on the ATG’s exogenous situational factor of morale. In an already heightened force protection state it is not hard to imagine that social media’s transmission of the act would have caused a high degree of increased ‘home-front’ friction for the families of the ATG’s aircrews. In other words, an increase in the ATG’s families’ associated levels of concern and worry. The impact too in turn potentially feeds back into morale’s political factor of the stated war aim, spurring the debate surrounding the question of ‘is this really worth risking lives for an apparently uncertain end?’ Daesh’s use of social media in this case, as with their media content from their victories in Mosul and Ramadi, is an example of degrading the West’s situational factor of morale by highlighting their perceived victory and the coalition’s failure. Separately, although related in the realm of morale, was Daesh’s so called ‘Hacking Division’s’ August 2015 publication via social media of a “hit list” containing, supposedly, around 1,400 peoples’ details, including mobile phone numbers, credit card details, online passwords and private emails. Of those 1,400 the Australian Government confirmed the leak included the personal information of Australian Defence Force (ADF) employees.37 If the ATG and their families were not already overly apprehensive, one imagines their perception of Daesh’s domestic threat and potential reach increased somewhat if not dramatically. How does the ADF Presently Defend and How Might It Better Defend against Social Media’s Threat to Morale? From a force protection perspective, the ADF has measures in place to defend against social media’s threat to morale. Personnel are educated on the use of social media and on what personal security measures should be followed and what operational security (OPSEC) measures must be followed. These are important and necessary requirements for defending the military capability of morale. From a technical perspective, however, there is not a lot else one may implement short of banning social media’s use,38 which like our existing approach would fall within the realm of information as data and commodity.39 Put another way, this relates to the military’s traditional approach to OPSEC and “the information security triad of confidentiality, integrity and availability”.40 The important point here is that that approach, although important, fails to acknowledge the greater power of information as image and perception in the world of social media.41 Information as image and perception means information must be seen as a resource for shaping perception and imagination, which in turn is a more potent way of defending and, more importantly, strengthening morale.42 In the realm of modern conflict, social media and morale; attack is the best form of defence. Rather than being overly shielding we must facilitate and encourage soldiers to take up social media and get deep into the discourse it richly enables. Soldiers must go ‘waist-deep’, get personal, communicate the reality, create bonds, expand networks and proactively contribute to the collective shaping of perception and image. Our soldiers need to be outfront. With clarity, simplicity, common intelligibility and realistic interpretation,43 their authentic first-hand social media content should evoke identities and perceptions that create meanings, which in turn serve to boost morale. Such an approach’s strength lies in the content’s authenticity. In this way, akin to a constructivist approach within security studies, the will can be positively influenced through “behaviour [which] is always socially constructed, historically determined, and culturally contingent”.44 Conversely, a weakness of such an approach will stem from the tension between the opportunity for the soldier to engage independently and the strategic imperative dictated by policy, which is inherently political.Conclusion Social media has and will continue to change the character of morale or the will to fight in the spectrum of modern conflict. More significantly, the West’s ‘rules-based’ democracies and their body politics’ will to uphold and defend international norms is being challenged by the proliferation of social media and its detribalising effect. What this means is that the role of the individual within the military institution and its use of social media is vital in order to defend the military capability of morale. Crucially, information as image and perception must be privileged above the twentieth-century’s mentality of information as data and commodity. Information is the resource for shaping perception and imagination, and is the most potent way of defending and strengthening morale.

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