Absent collective action against ISIL’s information operations, ISIL will exploit divisions within NATO
Eirik Hognestad 17 – Hognestad has a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (“NATO Cohesion: The Threat Posed by ISIL,” US Army Command and General Staff College, 06-14-19, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1105114.pdf, Accessed 07-10-22, LASA-KK)
ISIL does not have the military power to pose a military threat to NATO. However, as earlier discussed and reflected in the COG analysis, NATO’s weakness is within the organization itself. The question is therefore if ISIL has the capability and intention to exploit the internal critical vulnerabilities directly or indirectly. Different narratives of the threat from ISIL and threat priorities feed into the different member states national strategies, and therefore the political will to commit military and diplomatic power to fight ISIL. Therefore, if ISIL should exploit one of NATO’s critical vulnerabilities, the most dangerous Course of Action (COA) is to use ways and means that will drive a wedge between the different national strategies among the member states. One way of doing this will be to target the narrative of the threat perception of the terror organization. An approach leaning against the “near enemy” strategy may thus be a wise strategy from ISIL’s view because the further away the threat is, the less dangerous it is felt. Thus, it affects the dynamic relationship between the government, the military forces and the population of the different member states. As a result, political will may thus be affected in three ways: 1) the perseverance to continue to send troops and military hardware to ISIL’s core areas when ISIL is not a threat towards the member states, 2) legitimacy to priority funding for a threat that is felt less dangerous than others, and 3) legitimacy of the risk involved in taking casualties. Even though one may argue that reduced political will to fight ISIL is not a threat towards NATO itself, failed concurrence of threat priority is because it affects the cohesion that the alliance is built upon as a source of power. Hence, if one or more member states fails to recognize the threat towards other member states, and thus refuse to commit to the common defense, the alliance may start to disintegrate. Therefore, if ISIL targets one particular member state and focuses all its power against it, the narrative of ISIL as a threat may differ. It may lead to a decline in the mental interoperability that NATO’s cohesion depends on because other member states are more concerned by nearpeer threats such as Russia, China or Iran. This leads to different priorities for use of NATO’s power among the member states and thereby creates internal friction in the alliance. To illustrate; the Eurobarometer survey of 2018 showed a decrease in support for combating terrorism from 41% in April 2018 to 30% five months later, which is a significant reduction from the previous surveys where terrorism issues were at the top of Europeans’ concerns (European Parliament 2018, 68). Only the United Kingdom believed that the fight against terrorism should be one of Parliament’s #1 priority (38%). Among the other member states, “results show a general and significant decline of the number of respondents asking for this policy to be a top priority, led by Italy -19 (29%), Portugal -18 (28%) and Spain -18 (25%)” (European Parliament 2018, 68). As the example shows, NATO members differ widely in the perception of the priority to combat terrorism. Further, the feeling of an unequal share of the burden through participation and funding/investment creates tension within the alliance that may be exploited. The feeling of threat relates to the passion in the population and thus political will to prioritize resources to reduce the threat, to include both human resources (troops), military capabilities, and economical funding. These national resources need to be prioritized against other national strategies on the political agenda. Therefore, a feeling of inequality and unfair share of burden within NATO creates friction and discontent because all 81 member states need to balance their resources to reach their strategical ends to develop their nations according to their political programs and policies. The core of the NATO alliance is common defense, and thus if the feeling of “common” is not met, the passion to support the NATO alliance in the population is reduced which affects political will. By targeting the feeling of inequality of the Alliance, ISIL may disturb the internal cohesion of NATO. Means such as Information Operations directed at specific member states to affect the narrative of the threat from ISIL may lead to different threat perspectives within the Alliance. Further, selectively targeting certain military capabilities and soldiers to increase casualties for a specific member state may affect the population’s support and political will to maintain the use of resources for CT purposes. With the strategic shift to operate within the framework of the “Near Enemy” strategy, and by increasing IO campaigns to include poetry, community projects and religious preaching in contrast to the brutal propaganda acts the world witnessed between 2014-16, ISIL may change the narrative of the group with regards to both the global Muslim community and NATO members. The reduction of violent and bloody propaganda may be appealing to Muslims that, until now, have shied away from ISIL’s brutality, and it may affect the different member states’ perception of the group as a threat. Hence, exploitation of NATO’s critical vulnerabilities related to threat perception may result in different national narratives and priorities of political will and support of the populace. As a result, NATO’s attitude related to perseverance and legitimacy may differ within the different member states, leading to different national strategies prevailing above NATO’s political will. This may lead to a break of the trust upon which 82 the alliance rests, and ultimately the cohesion among the member states. Hence, the COG of NATO may be affected by ISIL.