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Populism is inevitable and a structural cause – drastic changes in social and economic affairs means misinformation is not key to its buildup in European politics – the aff won’t solve populism with the plan

Sheri Berman 19 – Berman teaches political science at Barnard College at Columbia University and writes scholarly articles of the political landscape of Europe. ("Populism is a Symptom Rather than a Cause: Democratic Disconnect, the Decline of the Center-Left, and the Rise of Populism in Western Europe," Polity, 9-26-2019, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/705378?journalCode=pol, Accessed 7-21-2022, LASA-KS)

How can we understand the rise of populism in Europe? Perhaps the most common approach is to look at the demand side, or the long-term structural changes that are said to have caused growing dissatisfaction with democracy and growing support for populism. This debate is primarily between those who stress economic factors and those who stress social factors. The former camp emphasizes the disruptive effects of globalization, neoliberalism, and technological change. In this view, increasing trade openness, the rise of non-Western economic powers, diminished government regulation, and growing automation have made life more insecure for the working and middle classes, have privileged highly educated and urban dwellers over less-educated and rural ones, and have made capitalism more of a zero-sum game.' These forces have also aggravated divisions within societies and between them. Over the past few decades, the economic winners have been the rising mid die classes in developing countries such as India and China and the wealthy in the West. The losers, meanwhile, have primarily been the lower and middle classes in the West, which explains their resentment of emerging economic powers as well as of elites in their own countries. The impact of these changes was exacerbated by the financial crisis of the late 2000s, which deepened social divisions and economic fears. A different narrative stresses social change as the root cause of populism. Over the past years, the foreign-born share of the population has reached historic heights in most European countries. The impact of this demographic shift was aggravated by the refugee crisis of 2015 and the fear generated by high-profile terrorist incidents, such as the November 2015 Islamist attacks in Paris, which killed over 400 people, and the December 2016 Islamist attack in Berlin that left a dozen people dead. The growth in the number of foreign-born residents, particularly of non-European backgrounds, occurred against the backdrop of an assault on traditional values that began the 1960s. According to this narrative, the cumulative impact of these change is that many citizens, particularly white males, have come to feel like strangers in their own countries. In this view, social change has led to a nativist or even racist backlash, with citizens growing dissatisfied with liberal democracy for allowing the decline of national cultures, traditions, and sovereignty. More recently, scholars have focused on the interaction between social and economic change. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that, during the postwar period, prosperity prompted a generational shift towards post-materialist values in the advanced industrial world that in turn prompted a reaction among more materialist voters. But this reaction exploded onto the political scene only when rising economic insecurity activated traditionalist and xenophobic attitudes that were already present. In a different analysis, Noam Gidron and Peter Hall stress the intraction of economic and social grievances, arguing that the decline of wellpaying, secure, respected jobs and the growing prominence and mobilization of women and minorities has combined to threaten the dominant status of white males in Western societies, leading to dissatisfaction with the political establishment and growing support for populist parties championing what they claim are"traditional" national identities and romanticizing an earlier status quo.' As real and as consequential as these economic and social changes have been, a focus on them alone can only reveal so much about the problems facing liberal democracy today. Populism is a symptom or reflection of growing dissatisfaction with democracy, and that dissatisfaction emerges when citizens believe that elites, parties, and governments are unwilling or unable to respond to their needs and demands. Change alone, in other words, is not destabilizing--it becomes so only if political institutions do not manage or mitigate it. To understand populism, inshort, one must examine how (or whether) elites, parties, and governments haven responded to the challenges that European societies have confronted over the last few decades. In democracies, unlike in dictatorships, when citizens become dissatisfied, they can express that dissatisfaction by voting to change their leaders and governments. But if citizens believe their votes do not matter-if their leaders and governments do not respond to their needs and demands--then their willingness to vote for parties critical of "the establishment" and of democracy more generally will grow.

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