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Turkey builds alliances and goes to war

Baba and Onsoy 16 – Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Social Science University of Ankara & King’s College London, Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University. (Baba, Gürol and Önsoy, Murat, “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, No. 51, 2016, pp. 9-20.) //RSG🌳

After the Second World War, Turkey significantly advanced its tangible (as seen in Tables 1-3) and intangible capabilities. During this period Turkey’s modus operandi was clearly different from the 1930s. Two definitive examples of Turkey’s middle power attitude have been selected for elaboration. These are the Cyprus issue and the March 2003 memorandum. In the first example, Turkey objected to the Greek Cypriot threats to the status quo on the island after the British withdrawal in 1960. Turkey believed its legal rights to be acknowledged by the Treaty of Guarantee and unilaterally intervened to rebuild the status quo disrupted by the Greek Cypriots throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.69 In the second example, Turkey’s rejection of the March 2003 memorandum granting American troop’s access to Iraq through Turkish territory was another significant pro-status quo move.70 In both cases, Turkey acted to influence the final outcome of an issue, in the process endangering its position within a Western alliance. It was motivated by regional stability but did not avoid conflict, asserting its position as an autonomous middle power.71 Turkey, as a middle power, also believed in using multilateral schemes to deal with international issues. On the Cyprus Question, particularly during the 1960s, Turkey consistently brought the issue to the guarantor powers72 for consultation, and to the US as well. Yet in the post-Cold War era, it no longer expected help from multilateral schemes, aiming instead to use them to improve its international position. A clear example is Turkey’s role in peacekeeping, observer missions and police operations in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East including Afghanistan,73 and particularly in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL).74 In all these operations and missions Turkey strived to increase its individual significance and esteem. As a clear example, Turkey employed the OIC to increase its foreign policy outreach and amplify its voice. Turkey, with the new millennium, began to take more direct roles via creating multilateral schemes in its neighboring regions. The Caucasus Peace and Stability Pact proposal in 2000 – covering Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Azerbaijan, and relying on the 1997 Balkan Stability Pact’s main principles – is a clear example.75 Turkey attempted to strengthen the common interests of the Pact’s prospective members in order to foster cooperation for security and development, as well as to cultivate regional and multilateral cooperation projects. Turkey worked with local middle powers to construct bridging alignments. In the mid1950s, Turkey’s efforts to create a defense pact – as a “requirement” of its leading role in the implementation of Northern Tier strategy with Iraq, Iran and Pakistan – is one example. The efforts were initiated as the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and died as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1979.76 Although CENTO did not really deliver what it originally aimed to do, it provided a foundation for Turkey to build a bridge between its members and NATO.77 In 1985 Turkey, along with Iran and Pakistan, founded the Economic Cooperation Organization, which was later expanded to include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Ankara aimed to create a synergy to provide sustainable development by making full use of available resources in the region.78 In 1992, Turkey was the key actor in the formation and the implementation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme for regional economic cooperation and development.79 The Scheme’s integration model was looser and more flexible than that of the EU, which would open up “a formerly closed or semiclosed market of more than 350 million people” to Turkey.80 All these efforts exemplify Turkey’s go-between attitude towards international economic coalition building. Turkey was also a go-between for political/security disputes, although not very successfully. It aimed to play a major role in the dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The political constraints exerted by the West – i.e. Turkey’s reliance upon US military aid to fight the PKK in the 1990s, its need to de-escalate the situation with the EU and its priority of maintaining good relations with Moscow regarding private business interests in Russia – constrained Turkey from involving itself too deeply in Karabakh.81 Turkey was also one of the founding members of the non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative in 2010,82 where it came together with similar-sized and like-minded states to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda, as well as greater transparency in the fulfilment of disarmament commitments among nuclear states. How helpful that initiative will be remains to be seen. These examples show the complementarity between capabilities and the foreign policy limits of middle powers. In the economic domain, middle powers have more maneuvering space to take the initiative on collaboration/cooperation. In the political and security domains, they are still restricted by alliance networks and the perceptions and interests of great powers. Therefore, the less their foreign policies conflict with those of the great powers, the more effective the middle state can be – or, in other words, the less ambitious, the more successful. In early 2007, Turkey’s sincere efforts to prevent Iraq from descending into chaos, and from being divided into Shia and Sunni groups,83 is an example of good international citizenship and its pursuit of stability and balance. Another recent example of this is the MIKTA collaboration, an acronym for Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia, established in 2013. The five members’ major aim has been to amplify their voice on various platforms, especially the G20, with the particular aim of achieving regional and global peace and stability.84 This also shows that good international citizenship by middle powers is better received and results in greater leverage than adventurist political moves that cause conflict with great powers. Conclusion The ambiguity in IR literature between small powers and middle powers has been the terminus a quo of this article. By focusing on ambiguities in definition and differentiation, the article offers an amalgamated methodology of combining capabilities with foreign policy behavior. This combination assumes not only that there is a relationship, but also a complementarity between capabilities and foreign policy. The rise in national capabilities not only lifts a country’s status but also opens up foreign policy maneuverability. Yet this is not so straightforward. Since national capabilities have intangible elements, i.e. how various countries perceive and value the capabilities of other nation-states, this complementarity may have unexpected results. A small power could be seen as a very valuable asset, which amplifies its own foreign policy outreach, while a middle power might not be able to achieve a seemingly basic objective due to restrictions imposed by great powers. Turkey’s experience since the 1930s exemplifies both straightforward and non-straightforward cases. In the 1930s, Turkey counterbalanced its vulnerabilities with resilience and constantly recalibrated its self-image, and in doing so, Ankara reconciled multiple identities depending on the major power it was tilting towards. A Russia-friendly foreign policy went hand-in-hand with an anti-Communist domestic policy; similarly, a non-pro-Western foreign policy was not an obstacle to a close partnership with Britain, and an anti-fascist stance did not hinder an economic partnership with Germany and Italy. Turkey’s foreign policy “pivots” show that a resilient small power is able to manage the strategic calculations of great powers. Its national capabilities determine its status and its foreign policy outreach, but intangible elements in its capabilities could complement resilient foreign policy objectives. Since the end of the Second World War, Turkey has increased its tangible national capabilities drastically. This has not only elevated its status internationally but has also given it a much larger arena in which to conduct foreign policy. Yet this has not removed all of its constraints, particularly in the security and political spheres. Turkey is still limited by great powers. Therefore even boosted national capabilities do not always complement the ability of middle powers to attain political and securityrelated objectives, especially if they skirmish with great powers.

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