NATO and EU checks – empirics prove
Neophytos Loizides, 2011, Professor in International Conflict Analysis at University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations, Escalation of Interstate Crises of Conflictual Dyads: Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Result-of-the-diversionary-theory-of-war_tbl1_44792522, BradAs
Although Greece and Turkey escalated their crisis behaviour, crisis escalation was actu-
ally inhibited at lower levels by NATO and the EU. The empirical evidence from the
Greek–Turkish crises demonstrates that the presence of regional organizations which
cover states in a conflictual relationship is conducive to inhibiting a higher escalation of
interstate crises or the use of force/war for two reasons. First, for the most part, the EU
Table 4. Intervening factors and the extent of escalation
No. Event crisis Causal
pathway
Regional
organizations
Nuclear
weapons
Incomplete
democracy
Extent of
escalation
1 G-CyprusS30098 – 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
2 T-CyprusS30098 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
3 G-AegKardak96 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
4 T-AegeanImia96 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
5 G-AegeanOil87 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
6 T-AegeanOil87 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
7 I-Kalchak02 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
8 P-Kalchak02 SD & DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
9 I-Parliament01 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
10 P-Parliament01 DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
11 I-Kargil99 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
12 P-Kargil99 DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
SD is the security dilemma, DT is diversionary theory, TOW is the threat of war, SOF is the show of force
and UOF is the use of force.
Suzuki and Loizides 31
and NATO contributed to mitigating the Greek–Turkish crises through socialization and
third-party mediation (Tsakonas, 2010). Mitchell and Hensel (2007: 724) argue that
third-party intervention by regional organizations can reduce the security dilemma by
providing conflictual dyads with assurances that long-term cooperation will benefit their
national interests. Specifically, the incentives and disincentives of the EU/EC discour-
aged Greece and Turkey from going to war. Neither side, nor their leaderships, could
play the nationalist card to such an extent as to harm relations with the EU/EC. Greece
was in a vulnerable position within the Union because of its endemic economic crises,
while Turkey was anxious to make progress in its EU/EC membership (Loizides, 2002;
Rumelili, 2003: 223). While Mitchell (2006: 26 f.) demonstrates that joint regional
organization membership increases the probability of militarizing disputes, this is only
partly true for Greece and Turkey, since the two countries reached the brink of war in
multiple crises but never fought one in the past few decades, unlike other conflictual
dyads.
One possible explanation for the low intensity of the Greek–Turkish conflict is
Greece’s refusal to endorse Turkey’s EU accession unless the latter ceased its occupation
of Cyprus and resolved the Aegean issue. Although, at times, Turkey considered a com-
promise, it opted to escalate conflict, putting pressure on Greece and the EU. However,
it never caused confrontation to such an extent as to irreversibly terminate its EU ambi-
tions. Likewise, Greece’s limited confrontational attitude has derived from its precarious
position within the EU, aiming for negotiation gains but minimizing the possibility of
major Turkish or EU reprisals. In other words, in the case of the Greek–Turkish dyad, EU
accession dynamics led to low levels of conflict instead of conflict resolution between
the two countries.
The Greek–Turkish crises provide insights for a discussion on international institu-
tions between neo-realism and liberal institutionalism. Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 1995)
argues that international institutions do not prevent states from going to war. They do not
independently affect state behaviours and are the outcome of state behaviours based on
self-interested calculations. Based on this assumption, Mearsheimer argues that interna-
tional institutions do not cause peace. Taking the opposite point of view, namely, liberal
institutionalism, Keohane and Martin (1995) and Wallander et al. (1999) argue that inter-
national institutions affect the calculation of national interest and promote reciprocal
cooperation between states, and are therefore an element of a lasting peace.
In the case of the Greek–Turkish crises, liberal institutionalism seems to reflect crisis
behaviour better than neo-realism. Although Mearsheimer (1995: 87) argues that empiri-
cal evidence does not support the institutionalist argument that institutions can cause
peace, the empirical evidence of this article demonstrates that regional organizations can
prevent high levels of escalation even in the presence of acute security dilemmas and
diversionary environments. More specifically, two regional organizations, the EU and
NATO, contributed to mitigating – although they admittedly did not completely eradi-
cate – Greek–Turkish crises. Thus, for our cases, Mearsheimer underestimates the role of
international institutions in limiting escalations by overlooking the mediating role and
values of regional organizations.
Nor does liberal institutionalism fully explain relations between conflict and interna-
tional institutions, because, as Krebs (1999) and Rumelili (2003) demonstrate in the
32 Cooperation and Conflict 46(1)
Greek–Turkish conflict, regional organizations sometimes have negative influences on
conflict rather than promoting cooperation. In the more recent literature, liberal institu-
tionalists appear to admit this point (e.g. see Wallander and Keohane 1999: 42 f.).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that liberal institutionalism explains the role of regional
organizations in recent interstate crises more precisely than neo-realism, because the
former expects that international institutions can cause peace through security manage-
ment roles (Wallander and Keohane, 1999), whereas the latter does not. In fact, both
Krebs (1999: 369) and Rumelili (2003: 217) admit that the negative influences of the EU
and NATO do not mean that the Greek–Turkish conflict would have been more easily
mitigated if these regional organizations had not been involved. The validity of their
argument becomes evident if one considers the gradual improvement in Greek–Turkish
relations in the past decade, especially following the 1999 earthquakes, and if one com-
pares Greece–Turkey with parts of the globe lacking cross-country regional institutions,
such as the Indian subcontinent
Although Greece and Turkey escalated their crisis behaviour, crisis escalation was actu-
ally inhibited at lower levels by NATO and the EU. The empirical evidence from the
Greek–Turkish crises demonstrates that the presence of regional organizations which
cover states in a conflictual relationship is conducive to inhibiting a higher escalation of
interstate crises or the use of force/war for two reasons. First, for the most part, the EU
Table 4. Intervening factors and the extent of escalation
No. Event crisis Causal
pathway
Regional
organizations
Nuclear
weapons
Incomplete
democracy
Extent of
escalation
1 G-CyprusS30098 – 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
2 T-CyprusS30098 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
3 G-AegKardak96 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
4 T-AegeanImia96 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
5 G-AegeanOil87 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
6 T-AegeanOil87 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
7 I-Kalchak02 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
8 P-Kalchak02 SD & DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
9 I-Parliament01 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
10 P-Parliament01 DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
11 I-Kargil99 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
12 P-Kargil99 DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
SD is the security dilemma, DT is diversionary theory, TOW is the threat of war, SOF is the show of force
and UOF is the use of force.
Suzuki and Loizides 31
and NATO contributed to mitigating the Greek–Turkish crises through socialization and
third-party mediation (Tsakonas, 2010). Mitchell and Hensel (2007: 724) argue that
third-party intervention by regional organizations can reduce the security dilemma by
providing conflictual dyads with assurances that long-term cooperation will benefit their
national interests. Specifically, the incentives and disincentives of the EU/EC discour-
aged Greece and Turkey from going to war. Neither side, nor their leaderships, could
play the nationalist card to such an extent as to harm relations with the EU/EC. Greece
was in a vulnerable position within the Union because of its endemic economic crises,
while Turkey was anxious to make progress in its EU/EC membership (Loizides, 2002;
Rumelili, 2003: 223). While Mitchell (2006: 26 f.) demonstrates that joint regional
organization membership increases the probability of militarizing disputes, this is only
partly true for Greece and Turkey, since the two countries reached the brink of war in
multiple crises but never fought one in the past few decades, unlike other conflictual
dyads.
One possible explanation for the low intensity of the Greek–Turkish conflict is
Greece’s refusal to endorse Turkey’s EU accession unless the latter ceased its occupation
of Cyprus and resolved the Aegean issue. Although, at times, Turkey considered a com-
promise, it opted to escalate conflict, putting pressure on Greece and the EU. However,
it never caused confrontation to such an extent as to irreversibly terminate its EU ambi-
tions. Likewise, Greece’s limited confrontational attitude has derived from its precarious
position within the EU, aiming for negotiation gains but minimizing the possibility of
major Turkish or EU reprisals. In other words, in the case of the Greek–Turkish dyad, EU
accession dynamics led to low levels of conflict instead of conflict resolution between
the two countries.
The Greek–Turkish crises provide insights for a discussion on international institu-
tions between neo-realism and liberal institutionalism. Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 1995)
argues that international institutions do not prevent states from going to war. They do not
independently affect state behaviours and are the outcome of state behaviours based on
self-interested calculations. Based on this assumption, Mearsheimer argues that interna-
tional institutions do not cause peace. Taking the opposite point of view, namely, liberal
institutionalism, Keohane and Martin (1995) and Wallander et al. (1999) argue that inter-
national institutions affect the calculation of national interest and promote reciprocal
cooperation between states, and are therefore an element of a lasting peace.
In the case of the Greek–Turkish crises, liberal institutionalism seems to reflect crisis
behaviour better than neo-realism. Although Mearsheimer (1995: 87) argues that empiri-
cal evidence does not support the institutionalist argument that institutions can cause
peace, the empirical evidence of this article demonstrates that regional organizations can
prevent high levels of escalation even in the presence of acute security dilemmas and
diversionary environments. More specifically, two regional organizations, the EU and
NATO, contributed to mitigating – although they admittedly did not completely eradi-
cate – Greek–Turkish crises. Thus, for our cases, Mearsheimer underestimates the role of
international institutions in limiting escalations by overlooking the mediating role and
values of regional organizations.
Nor does liberal institutionalism fully explain relations between conflict and interna-
tional institutions, because, as Krebs (1999) and Rumelili (2003) demonstrate in the
32 Cooperation and Conflict 46(1)
Greek–Turkish conflict, regional organizations sometimes have negative influences on
conflict rather than promoting cooperation. In the more recent literature, liberal institu-
tionalists appear to admit this point (e.g. see Wallander and Keohane 1999: 42 f.).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that liberal institutionalism explains the role of regional
organizations in recent interstate crises more precisely than neo-realism, because the
former expects that international institutions can cause peace through security manage-
ment roles (Wallander and Keohane, 1999), whereas the latter does not. In fact, both
Krebs (1999: 369) and Rumelili (2003: 217) admit that the negative influences of the EU
and NATO do not mean that the Greek–Turkish conflict would have been more easily
mitigated if these regional organizations had not been involved. The validity of their
argument becomes evident if one considers the gradual improvement in Greek–Turkish
relations in the past decade, especially following the 1999 earthquakes, and if one com-
pares Greece–Turkey with parts of the globe lacking cross-country regional institutions,
such as the Indian subcontinent
Although Greece and Turkey escalated their crisis behaviour, crisis escalation was actu-
ally inhibited at lower levels by NATO and the EU. The empirical evidence from the
Greek–Turkish crises demonstrates that the presence of regional organizations which
cover states in a conflictual relationship is conducive to inhibiting a higher escalation of
interstate crises or the use of force/war for two reasons. First, for the most part, the EU
Table 4. Intervening factors and the extent of escalation
No. Event crisis Causal
pathway
Regional
organizations
Nuclear
weapons
Incomplete
democracy
Extent of
escalation
1 G-CyprusS30098 – 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
2 T-CyprusS30098 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
3 G-AegKardak96 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
4 T-AegeanImia96 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
5 G-AegeanOil87 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (TOW)
6 T-AegeanOil87 SD & DT 1 0 0 Low (SOF)
7 I-Kalchak02 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
8 P-Kalchak02 SD & DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
9 I-Parliament01 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
10 P-Parliament01 DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
11 I-Kargil99 SD & DT 0 1 0 High (UOF)
12 P-Kargil99 DT 0 1 1 High (UOF)
SD is the security dilemma, DT is diversionary theory, TOW is the threat of war, SOF is the show of force
and UOF is the use of force.
Suzuki and Loizides 31
and NATO contributed to mitigating the Greek–Turkish crises through socialization and
third-party mediation (Tsakonas, 2010). Mitchell and Hensel (2007: 724) argue that
third-party intervention by regional organizations can reduce the security dilemma by
providing conflictual dyads with assurances that long-term cooperation will benefit their
national interests. Specifically, the incentives and disincentives of the EU/EC discour-
aged Greece and Turkey from going to war. Neither side, nor their leaderships, could
play the nationalist card to such an extent as to harm relations with the EU/EC. Greece
was in a vulnerable position within the Union because of its endemic economic crises,
while Turkey was anxious to make progress in its EU/EC membership (Loizides, 2002;
Rumelili, 2003: 223). While Mitchell (2006: 26 f.) demonstrates that joint regional
organization membership increases the probability of militarizing disputes, this is only
partly true for Greece and Turkey, since the two countries reached the brink of war in
multiple crises but never fought one in the past few decades, unlike other conflictual
dyads.
One possible explanation for the low intensity of the Greek–Turkish conflict is
Greece’s refusal to endorse Turkey’s EU accession unless the latter ceased its occupation
of Cyprus and resolved the Aegean issue. Although, at times, Turkey considered a com-
promise, it opted to escalate conflict, putting pressure on Greece and the EU. However,
it never caused confrontation to such an extent as to irreversibly terminate its EU ambi-
tions. Likewise, Greece’s limited confrontational attitude has derived from its precarious
position within the EU, aiming for negotiation gains but minimizing the possibility of
major Turkish or EU reprisals. In other words, in the case of the Greek–Turkish dyad, EU
accession dynamics led to low levels of conflict instead of conflict resolution between
the two countries.
The Greek–Turkish crises provide insights for a discussion on international institu-
tions between neo-realism and liberal institutionalism. Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 1995)
argues that international institutions do not prevent states from going to war. They do not
independently affect state behaviours and are the outcome of state behaviours based on
self-interested calculations. Based on this assumption, Mearsheimer argues that interna-
tional institutions do not cause peace. Taking the opposite point of view, namely, liberal
institutionalism, Keohane and Martin (1995) and Wallander et al. (1999) argue that inter-
national institutions affect the calculation of national interest and promote reciprocal
cooperation between states, and are therefore an element of a lasting peace.
In the case of the Greek–Turkish crises, liberal institutionalism seems to reflect crisis
behaviour better than neo-realism. Although Mearsheimer (1995: 87) argues that empiri-
cal evidence does not support the institutionalist argument that institutions can cause
peace, the empirical evidence of this article demonstrates that regional organizations can
prevent high levels of escalation even in the presence of acute security dilemmas and
diversionary environments. More specifically, two regional organizations, the EU and
NATO, contributed to mitigating – although they admittedly did not completely eradi-
cate – Greek–Turkish crises. Thus, for our cases, Mearsheimer underestimates the role of
international institutions in limiting escalations by overlooking the mediating role and
values of regional organizations.
Nor does liberal institutionalism fully explain relations between conflict and interna-
tional institutions, because, as Krebs (1999) and Rumelili (2003) demonstrate in the
32 Cooperation and Conflict 46(1)
Greek–Turkish conflict, regional organizations sometimes have negative influences on
conflict rather than promoting cooperation. In the more recent literature, liberal institu-
tionalists appear to admit this point (e.g. see Wallander and Keohane 1999: 42 f.).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that liberal institutionalism explains the role of regional
organizations in recent interstate crises more precisely than neo-realism, because the
former expects that international institutions can cause peace through security manage-
ment roles (Wallander and Keohane, 1999), whereas the latter does not. In fact, both
Krebs (1999: 369) and Rumelili (2003: 217) admit that the negative influences of the EU
and NATO do not mean that the Greek–Turkish conflict would have been more easily
mitigated if these regional organizations had not been involved. The validity of their
argument becomes evident if one considers the gradual improvement in Greek–Turkish
relations in the past decade, especially following the 1999 earthquakes, and if one com-
pares Greece–Turkey with parts of the globe lacking cross-country regional institutions,
such as the Indian subcontinent
Although Greece and Turkey escalated their crisis behavior, crisis escalation was actually inhibited at lower levels by NATO and the EU. The empirical evidence from the Greek–Turkish crises demonstrates that the presence of regional organizations which cover states in a conflictual relationship is conducive to inhibiting a higher escalation of interstate crises or the use of force/war for two reasons. First, for the most part, the EU Table 4. Intervening factors and the extent of escalation. Event crisis Causal pathway Regional organizations Nuclear weapons Incomplete democracy is the security dilemma, DT is diversionary theory, TOW is the threat of war, SOF is the show of force and UOF is the use of force. Suzuki and Loizides 31 and NATO contributed to mitigating the Greek–Turkish crises through socialization and third-party mediation (Tsakonas, 2010). Mitchell and Hensel (2007: 724) argue that third-party intervention by regional organizations can reduce the security dilemma by providing conflictual dyads with assurances that long-term cooperation will benefit their national interests. Specifically, the incentives and disincentives of the EU/EC discouraged Greece and Turkey from going to war. Neither side, nor their leaderships, could play the nationalist card to such an extent as to harm relations with the EU/EC. Greece was in a vulnerable position within the Union because of its endemic economic crises, while Turkey was anxious to make progress in its EU/EC membership (Loizides, 2002; Rumelili, 2003: 223). While Mitchell (2006: 26 f.) demonstrates that joint regional organization membership increases the probability of militarizing disputes, this is only partly true for Greece and Turkey, since the two countries reached the brink of war in multiple crises but never fought one in the past few decades, unlike other conflictual dyads. One possible explanation for the low intensity of the Greek–Turkish conflict is Greece’s refusal to endorse Turkey’s EU accession unless the latter ceased its occupation of Cyprus and resolved the Aegean issue. Although, at times, Turkey considered a compromise, it opted to escalate conflict, putting pressure on Greece and the EU. However, it never caused confrontation to such an extent as to irreversibly terminate its EU ambitions. Likewise, Greece’s limited confrontational attitude has derived from its precarious position within the EU, aiming for negotiation gains but minimizing the possibility of major Turkish or EU reprisals. In other words, in the case of the Greek–Turkish dyad, EU accession dynamics led to low levels of conflict instead of conflict resolution between the two countries. The Greek–Turkish crises provide insights for a discussion on international institutions between neo-realism and liberal institutionalism. Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 1995) argues that international institutions do not prevent states from going to war. They do not independently affect state behaviours and are the outcome of state behaviours based on self-interested calculations. Based on this assumption, Mearsheimer argues that international institutions do not cause peace. Taking the opposite point of view, namely, liberal institutionalism, Keohane and Martin (1995) and Wallander et al. (1999) argue that international institutions affect the calculation of national interest and promote reciprocal cooperation between states, and are therefore an element of a lasting peace. In the case of the Greek–Turkish crises, liberal institutionalism seems to reflect crisis behaviour better than neo-realism. Although Mearsheimer (1995: 87) argues that empirical evidence does not support the institutionalist argument that institutions can cause peace, the empirical evidence of this article demonstrates that regional organizations can prevent high levels of escalation even in the presence of acute security dilemmas and diversionary environments. More specifically, two regional organizations, the EU and NATO, contributed to mitigating – although they admittedly did not completely eradicate – Greek–Turkish crises. Thus, for our cases, Mearsheimer underestimates the role of international institutions in limiting escalations by overlooking the mediating role and values of regional organizations. Nor does liberal institutionalism fully explain relations between conflict and international institutions, because, as Krebs (1999) and Rumelili (2003) demonstrate in the 32 Cooperation and Conflict 46(1) Greek–Turkish conflict, regional organizations sometimes have negative influences on conflict rather than promoting cooperation. In the more recent literature, liberal institutionalists appear to admit this point (e.g. see Wallander and Keohane 1999: 42 f.). Nevertheless, it can be argued that liberal institutionalism explains the role of regional organizations in recent interstate crises more precisely than neo-realism, because the former expects that international institutions can cause peace through security management roles (Wallander and Keohane, 1999), whereas the latter does not. In fact, both Krebs (1999: 369) and Rumelili (2003: 217) admit that the negative influences of the EU and NATO do not mean that the Greek–Turkish conflict would have been more easily mitigated if these regional organizations had not been involved. The validity of their argument becomes evident if one considers the gradual improvement in Greek–Turkish relations in the past decade, especially following the 1999 earthquakes, and if one compares Greece–Turkey with parts of the globe lacking cross-country regional institutions, such as the Indian subcontinent.