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Cyber deterrence fails

Whyte 20 Christopher Whyte, 11/25/2020, assistant professor of homeland security and emergency preparedness in the L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs at Virginia Commonwealth University; Strategic Studies Quarterly, "Poison, Persistence, and Cascade Effect," https://www.jstor.org/stable/26956151 //EZJ

In terms of the strategic logic of engagement in the domain, the PE strategy largely emerges from the work of Richard Harknett and Michael Fischerkeller during their time as scholars attached to Cyber Command. The authors argue that the unique character of cyberspace means that traditional deterrent approaches are doomed to failure.36 Given that deterrence involves strong demonstrations of defense or meaningful statements of punishment, they contend, prospects for developing a sustainable deterrent posture online are limited (or so the architects of the new approach hold).37 It is extremely difficult to demonstrate defensive capabilities at the scale demanded by a national cyber deterrent strategy, and punishment rarely works in the way it is intended. Communicating specific meaning in retaliation is difficult, particularly where the diversity of activities that constitute cyber conflict is immensely high. Moreover, response options are often not ready to execute in the time frame required by policy makers that seek to deter. And conceptual agreement on the significance or role of certain elements of the domain is not easy to come by, with poor understanding of what might be meant—if anything—by sovereignty online being a hallmark of the digital world.

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