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No Impact – Diversionary Peace

Diversionary peace, not war

Holger Albrecht, 2020, Professor at the University of Alabama in Comparative Politics, Diversionary Peace: International Peacekeeping and Domestic Civil-Military Relations, , BradAs

This article introduced the theory of diversionary peace, which improves our understanding of the link between foreign policy making and contentious civil-military relations. Contributing to peace abroad can have coup proofing effects at home quite like the decision to go to war. A thick description of Tunisia served as an empirical plausibility probe of the mechanisms linking peacekeeping to coup-proofing. Participation in peacekeeping establishes feasibility obstacles for coup coordination, the allocation of economic resources to officers, the institutionalization of the military apparatus, and a professionalized ethos in the officer corps. In an emerging research programme on the interplay of peacekeeping and domestic politics, studying Tunisia reveals three novel findings. First, coup-proofing can be the unintended outcome of dynamics in civil-military relations where political incumbents did not design specific strategies to keep officers in the barracks. In Tunisia, it was the military leadership pushing for peacekeeping participation more so than the Ben Ali regime. Second, the Tunisian case reveals that coup-proofing through peacekeeping is particularly effective in countries with small armies, where battalion strength mission participation immediately introduces a high percentage of officers into a career trajectory contributing to individual and collective professionalization. It is in larger armies, with larger officer corps, where military 96Author interview with Tunisian journalist, Tunis, 17 May 2017. 608 H. ALBRECHT leaderships and political incumbents remain more selective on mission participants. Greater competition creates winners and losers for the perks of peacekeeping and hence individual grievances among those officers deprived of opportunities at professional advancement. Third, and relatedly, Tunisia shows which mechanisms prove particularly effective in advancing coup proofing. While peacekeeping contributes to institutional professionalization and the development of a professional ethos, these remain slow-moving facets of a military’s social fabric. Other dynamics and events, such as international support for military training, the effect of economic development on recruitment and procurement, and a military’s deployment in domestic or external conflicts certainly have an impact on military professionalism as well, perhaps at a higher degree than the provision or troops for international peacekeeping. Rather than such corporate factors, it is the individual-level mechanisms highlighted in this article – feasibility obstacles and the provision of material resources – where peacekeeping generates the most significant impact on coup-proofing. These findings have important empirical and theoretical implications for scholars in various thematic fields across Comparative Politics and International Relations. Experts of Middle East politics and civil-military relations will note the empirical blind spot in the works on coup-proofing in Tunisia and beyond. Peacekeeping participation has so far not been fully addressed as an important element of the Tunisian military’s engagement and helps us better understand why, for instance, the military returned to the barracks in 2011, that is, at a point in time where it could have assumed power through the post-Arab Spring transition period. Scholars interested in the theory and empirical practice of diversionary war may consider a limitation to the theory’s applicability for weak armies. While war may not always be an option, contributing to peace can be equally attractive for its positive effects on civil-military relations. In turn, the theory of diversionary peace offers a contribution to the research programme on international peacekeeping in that it proposes novel ideas about the rationale for troop commitments beyond geostrategic considerations. Further research will be necessary to explore the external validity of the findings from the Tunisian case. The broader applicability of the diversionary peace appears to be particularly promising for civil-military relations during democratic transitions, such as in Latin America, and the post-conflict environments of small states in sub-Sahara Africa. In fact, initial observations appear to reveal the explanatory power of the diversionary peace in multiple cases including Ghana, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. While the diversionary peace should be seen as an important component in the toolbox of foreign policy making, it remains a medium-range theory with its explanatory power subject to important context factors. For one, the theory works well for small armies in authoritarian regimes that, at the time of increased coup threat, would entertain opportunities for participation in peacekeeping missions. Perhaps more importantly, participation in peacekeeping missions is not a coup-proofing strategy equally available to authoritarian incumbents across time and space. The very existence of a peacekeeping mission along with the mission sponsor’s invitation to participate come as necessary conditions for incumbents to consider sending troops abroad. These constraints ultimately limit the applicability of diversionary peace to post-Cold War international politics for the dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions after 1990. Yet, since the number of interstate wars has declined quite considerably during that same period, diversionary war becomes less likely and diversionary peace merits greater attention in contemporary international politics

Turkey prioritizes cooperation with great powers and defense, no risk of attack

Baba and Onsoy 16 – Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Social Science University of Ankara & King’s College London, Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University. (Baba, Gürol and Önsoy, Murat, “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, No. 51, 2016, pp. 9-20.) //RSG🌳

In the same era, Turkey followed “a passive strategy of renunciation” and stayed in the nonrevisionist camp.59 Turkey increased its defense expenditures (see Table 2) but its defenses were still only effective for limited regional warfare. Turkey could not face a major threat, such as the Italian or German Air Force.60 Ankara remained passive in the hope that the threat would disappear. Turkey also used international regimes, particularly when the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention started with Turkey’s application to the League of Nations in April 1936. During the process, Turkey had pro-status quo tendencies carried out via multilateral diplomacy and international law.61 It managed to win the support of greater powers, i.e. Britain, to reshape other parties’ demands. Turkey invoked the rebus sic stantibus principle to terminate the Straits Convention.62 With these maneuvers, Turkey, through the Montreux Convention (1936), managed to offset Russia, and to achieve control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as regulatory authority on the transit of naval warships. Turkey then started shifting between varying alliance structures against Italian expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean, which increased its value as a counterweight between antagonistic alliances.63 Against Italian armaments in the Dodecanese islands and Mussolini’s Mare Nostrum rhetoric, Turkey successfully cooperated with the British within the League to impose sanctions on Italy after the invasion of Abyssinia and the signing of the Balkan Entente of 1934. Once the Abyssinia Crisis cooled down, Italy tried to reharmonize relations with Turkey by revoking its claims over Turkish lands.64 In its relations with the Soviets, Ankara glossed over its anticommunist tendencies65 to test the opportunities for economic and security partnerships. Moscow contributed 8 million USD towards Turkey’s first five-year economic development plan after the Great Depression of 1929.66 Turkey, with Russia, proclaimed its opposition to Western dominance in the international economy but at the same time became a League member, which it considered to be of Western design.67 Turkey also rejected Stalin’s quest for security against Hitler via the joint Turkish-Soviet defense system on the Straits.68 Turkey managed to accomplish these relations while maintaining the framework of neutrality. In the 1930s, Ankara made a special effort to not be on either side of the polarizing international system, but did not completely detach itself either. Turkey did not conclude agreements with any one side, which could potentially have restricted its revenues from the other. Two clear examples were Ankara’s rejection of Stalin’s offer for a joint defense system of the Turkish straits against Germany and its non-conclusion of an agreement with the Germans for chrome, which could cut down on sales to the Allies.

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