Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

4---Epistemology comes first---IR constitutes itself through linguistic and discursive practices like the aff---policy cannot be disentangled from its epistemological justifications

Ringmar 14 – Erik Ringmar is professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey; 2014 (“Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory”, Performativity and Agency in International Politics, Available online at https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/6266345/7512005.pdf, Accessed 03-08-2021)

When applied to the study of international politics, this position turns into a critique of the state, or rather, a critique of sovereignty. There is no state, say post-structural international relations scholars such as Cynthia Weber and David Campbell, at least if we take the state to constitute a pre-existing subject to which sovereignty can be attached as an attribute.9 Focusing on “institutions,“ the “people,“ or perhaps on the state as a transcendental idea, mainstream accounts always presuppose that which they intend to prove. Instead sovereignty must be understood as the process through which political subjects come to constitute themselves as such. “I suggest,“ says Weber, “that sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but in process and that all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted.”10

Weber's idea of “performatively enacted practices” needs further elucidation.11 Even if we reject the idea of a pre-given self, there is certainly the illusion of such a being, and the question thus becomes how that illusion arose. According to poststructural theory, the self is created through reiterative linguistic practices. Language precedes the human subject, they explain; we are born into language, and language is best understood as a semiotic structure where the meaning of each word is constituted by its difference from other words. It is, as Ferdinand Saussure once argued, the structure as a whole that ultimately determines what things mean. According to performativity theorists, in other words, structure is to practice as langue is to parole; as the abstract rules that make possible the production of grammatical sentences, that is, are to the production of an actual sentence.12 A structure, like langue, is a complex of rules with a virtual existence whereas practice, like speech, is an enactment of these rules in space and time.

But a semiotic structure is not yet a sovereign self. We move closer to the subject once we realize that words do not only mean things but also do things in the world. Words have what John Austin's in How to Do Things with Words, 1962, called a “perlocutionary force.”13 The proverbial example is the “I do” of the wedding ceremony. By speaking the words, you are not merely conveying meaning, you are also doing something, you are constituting a marriage. The words are performed and thereby enacted.14 Adding to Austin's conclusions, Derrida emphasizes what he calls the “citational” quality of even the most pragmatic forms of language use. That is, the texts we invoke always cite seemingly absent contexts from which they ultimately derive their meaning. “Could a performative utterance succeed,” Derrida asks,

if its formulation did not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”?15

This is how the subject comes to constitute itself. “The subject is inscribed in language, is a 'function' of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform … to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences.”16 The human subject is “a being devoid of Being until it is organized by a system of codes.”17

This is an argument further developed by Judith Butler.18 Our identities take shape, she says, through the perlocutionary force of the discourse we apply to ourselves. Talking about the being that we take our selves to be, we quote statements that connote normalcy and imply acceptance much as a lawyer might cite supporting precedents in a court of law. By making performative statements, and applying them to ourselves, a certain person comes into being; performativity is “a compulsory reiteration of those norms through which a subject is constituted”; “subjectivity is performatively constituted by the ritualized production or codified social behavior.”19 These statements, says Butler, are not only repetitive and ritualistic but also socially determined. If we misquote the established discourse and fail to construct an appropriate self for ourselves, we are punished through various, often surprisingly severe, social sanctions.20

This is the argument which Cynthia Weber and David Campbell apply to the study of international relations. “There is no sovereign or state identity behind expressions of state sovereignty,“ Weber summarizes. “The identity of the state is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results.”21 States, Campbell concurs, are “unavoidably paradoxical entities which do not possess pre-discursive, stable identities.”22 Foreign policy discourse is “a persistent impersonation that passes as the real”; states state and through their statements they instate and reinstate themselves as sovereign actors. This is a constantly ongoing process. “For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death.“23 Weber talks about sovereignty as a form of simulation, but while simulations usually are defined through their likeness to the real, the world politics which she describes contains no originals.24

As an illustration, consider Thomas Hobbes' solution to the problems of life in the state of nature.25 By handing over their right to self-defense to a common power who guarantees their security, individuals no longer threaten each other. Yet prior to the signing of this contract, there was no people; the people literally declared itself into existence.26 Derrida analyzes the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 in the same terms.27 The authors of the declaration, he says, referred to themselves as the “Representatives” of “the good People of these Colonies,” but these people did not exist prior to the issuing of the declaration itself. It was only through the signatures that the people came to constitute itself as such. “The people” who authorizes their representatives to make the declaration is invented by the declaration they authorize.28

Or consider the case of military interventions, as discussed by both Weber and Campbell. Interventions are violations of independence, but as such they exemplify the power of the same performative practice. Military interventions, we might say, constitute a discursive boundary along which the principle of sovereignty breaks down. By analyzing where and how this boundary is drawn, we learn where and how sovereignty is produced.29 It is for that reason interesting to see how military interventions have been justified. In Writing Security, Campbell discusses a striking example: the Requerimiento, the short proclamation which the conquistadors read to the native populations of the New World before they took possession of their land and imposed European laws on them.30 “Therefore I beg and require you as best I can,” the conquistadors declared, in Spanish, to the puzzled locals, “...

we will not compel you to turn Christians. But if you do not to it … with the help of God, I will enter forcefully against you, and I will make war everywhere and however I can, and I will subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and His Majesty, and I will take your wives and children, and I will make them slaves ...31

As Weber shows in Simulating Sovereignty, the right to violate sovereignty has continued to be a privilege of the most powerful states. At the time of World War I, national self-determination was enshrined as an absolute principle; absolute, that is, as long as it did not run up against the fundamental interests of the leading states — compare the invasion in support of the Whites after the Russian Revolution of 1917. Sovereignty continues to be the core principle of the international system to this day, except when it is in the interests of the United States and its allies to violate it ― witness Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 (and, we might add, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003). As Campbell points out, the sovereign state continues to be defined through its opposite ― the “failed states” which exist outside the peaceful, democratic and prosperous core administered by the Americans.32 It is consequently only by extending U.S. hegemony that problems such as terrorism can be addressed. This too is a performative practice: interventions are a way of specifying “the way the world (now) is,” and like all similar geopolitical descriptions it contains a prescription for how to “put the world right.”33

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.