China threat discourse is a self-fulfilling prophecy---securitization legitimizes colonial occupation to create the conditions for miscalculation and militarization
Grydehøj et al 21, Adam---Research Center for Indian Ocean Island Countries, Michael Lujan Bevacqua---University of Guam, Megumi Chibana---Faculty of Business Administration at Kanagawa University, Nadarajah---School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Aká Simonsen---University of Greenland, Ping Su---Research Center for Indian Ocean Island Countries, Renee Wright---School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Sasha Davis---Keene State College (“Practicing decolonial political geography: Island perspectives on neocolonialism and the China threat discourse,” Political Geography, vol 85, 2021)
The China threat discourse is linked to a bipolar worldview. Through the workings of Western historical analogy, China replaces past enemies, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as the ‘Other’ against which the West defines and understands itself (Kopper & Peragovics, 2019). Western and metropolitan states frequently contrast their own benignity with the China threat. As a result, despite arguments that engagement with China threatens islanders' ability to act in their own interests (due to ‘debt traps’), threatens island ecosystems (due to environmental destruction), and threatens the demographic dominance of islander populations (due to large-scale immigration), such island-centred arguments rapidly recede in the face of assertions of Western superiority.
The China threat discourse is not merely a means of distancing an island or archipelago from China but also a means of bringing an island or archipelago into closer relation with its existing colonial or metropolitan state. The USA is prominent here both because it has militarised numerous island territories worldwide and because other Western and metropolitan powers (e.g. Japan relative to Okinawa, Denmark relative to Kalaallit Nunaat, Australia relative to Papua New Guinea, France relative to New Caledonia) cannot represent themselves as equal competitors with China in a multipolar world and must position themselves as allies of the USA and potential alternatives to China. Such a bipolar perspective is unhelpful for islanders, who are cast as “pawns in a geopolitical chess game between larger powers,” included within this or that sphere of influence, rather than as actors in their own right (Davis, Munger, & Legacy, 2020).
5.2. Choosing sides
Western and metropolitan powers frequently seem more concerned with islands’ locations than with islanders (Flint, 2021). All our narratives involve instances of forced relocation. These are not exceptional. For example, between 1967 and 1973, the British government undertook the wholesale eviction of the Chagos Islanders to Seychelles and Mauritius, making way for a joint British-USA military base. Similarly, the histories of USA and French nuclear testing in Oceania illustrate the impact of remoteness from the metropole: it is easy to ignore the welfare of distant Indigenous populations.
In the past, “loss of land in one colonial site precipitated the extraction of labourers from another and vice versa” (Banivanua Mar, 2016, p. 46). The same is true today, when the time and place of USA military presence depends on constantly shifting geostrategic factors. Plans are made to move US Marines from Okinawa to Guåhan at the same time as plans are made to construct new military facilities at Henoko Bay on Okinawa. The Japanese government's attentiveness to conditions on Okinawa's smaller islands seems largely driven by military concerns in Tokyo. Kalaallit Nunaat is now at the centre of discussion in both Denmark and the USA, Jamaica feels itself under military pressure from the USA, and the USA and Australia plan to strengthen their military presence in Papua New Guinea by expanding Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island—not due to any obvious Chinese military threat to Western and metropolitan interests but instead due to a Chinese economic challenge to Western and metropolitan dominance. As Davis (2011, p. 221) notes of USA overseas military bases in Oceania and the Caribbean, “the imposition of bases on these islands comes with a painfully obvious political irony. The US is using territories denied basic rights of freedom and self-determination to use military force that, ostensibly, is being used to promote these same values.”
It is not lost on island governments that heavy military or economic engagement with a Western or metropolitan state is prone to be interpreted as a wholesale rejection of military or economic engagement with China—and vice versa. Thus, Kalaallit Nunaat's acceptance of Danish and USA investment is widely seen as a promise that Chinese businesses will not be permitted to play a major role in Kalaallit Nunaat's economy, and the Jamaican government must constantly weigh the potential economic benefits it receives from China against the risk of being deemed a threat to USA security. Similarly, it is suggested that long-term maintenance of aid and development assistance from New Zealand to Niue and the Cook Islands and from Australia to Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands is contingent upon these island territories pulling back from engagement with China. Western engagement in Oceania appears increasingly “reactionary,” with New Zealand and Australia playing catch-up on aid and the USA explicitly highlighting the China threat as the key reason for boosting its presence (Szadziewski, 2020, p. 3). The bipolar perspective on international politics seeks to force island states and territories to choose sides between China and the West.
5.3. A USA threat?
In our island narratives, militarisation by colonial or metropolitan powers is explained in part by the threat of Chinese aggression. This argument is circular, given that it is precisely the presence of Western military installations and USA colonial outposts that could make these islands sites of military conflict. At heart are “competing securities” (Davis, 2020, p. 42), with the metropolitan state's “national security” often existing in tension with islanders' own conceptions of ‘security’. “Danger is not an objective condition” (Campbell, 1992, p. 1), and “viewing continental geographies from the perspective of the sea” (Bremner, 2016) can clarify aspects of both island-mainland and mainland-mainland relationships.
Some colonisers and metropolitan powers seek to entrench their interests in island territories by deploying the USA as a bogeyman: while China in all cases remains the primary discursive threat, the governments of Denmark and Japan have warned their respective colonised islands that engagement with China or failure to accede to metropolitan desires risks the USA just doing what it wants regardless. In the case of Okinawa, this involves building and retaining military bases despite local protests, and in the case of Kalaallit Nunaat, it involves warnings of USA military intervention should the island open itself up to Chinese businesses. Even though the only actual military presence on these islands belongs to either the USA and/or the coloniser (China currently possesses one overseas military base, located in Djibouti), and even when metropolitan politicians hint of USA military invasion in the face of Chinese business activity, it is China that is the primary enemy in the discourse.
5.4. Neocolonial entrenchment
When China is discussed in relation to colonised islands, it is often as a monolithic state entity, with little or no distinction between individuals, private companies, state-owned enterprises, universities, and central and local government bodies. Furthermore, island perspectives on China tend to focus on triangular (Guåhan-USA-China or Jamaica-USA-China) or four-sided (Kalaallit Nunaat-USA-Denmark-China or Okinawa-USA-Japan-China) power relationships, with little reference to other colonised peoples and territories. Despite the bonds of transnational Indigenous activism, regional cultural and business bodies, regional governance institutions, etc., islanders largely remain within colonially structured understandings of their islands’ places in the world. Some islanders believe the USA is acting oppressively, but we find little evidence of islanders seeking to use the expansion of Chinese economic activity to challenge the USA. In Kalaallit Nunaat, however, engagement with China and the USA is seen as a means of challenging the coloniser, Denmark (Kwong & Wong, 2020). Colonised societies may be open to wielding whatever decolonial tools are at their disposal, even when this means navigating conflicting sources of and responses to colonial power (Harrison & Popke, 2018).
The existential nature of the purported China threat—with its military conflict, violently extractive environmental devastation, and population replacement—is used to justify neocolonial entrenchment by the coloniser or metropolitan power. Traditional methods of maintaining influence in and reaping benefits from former colonies are coming under increasing critical scrutiny. As colonisers struggle to portray tied aid, immigration schemes, and modernisation programmes as purely beneficent, the China threat discourse presents an opening for continued privileged influence. Metropolitan essentialisations of Indigenous peoples as part of nature and thus as fundamentally irrational and non-modern (Chandler & Reid, 2019) furthermore preclude Indigenous peoples from making their own decisions on matters within the realm of rationality and modernity, thereby justifying Western paternalistic policymaking.
Optimistically, we may speak of places such as Niue, Barbados, the Maldives, and the Solomon Islands being able to weigh the options and choose the partners that best suit their strategic needs. Often though, this means using the China threat that has been deployed by the coloniser to extract further economic support from the coloniser, which may be what the coloniser wanted all along. Although the acquisition of funds to pay for islander priorities is positive, it remains in the interests of the colonial or metropolitan state to use such funds to maintain influence.
For example, Kalaallit Nunaat certainly benefits from having Danish investment in its airports, but Denmark uses this investment to reinforce the idea that Kalaallit Nunaat cannot survive without Danish support. The Danish and USA governments are actively driving away potential Chinese investors and business partners and then offering to fill the subsequent funding gaps. This follows a wider pattern of Western and metropolitan governments simultaneously 1) affirming islanders' rights to make their own decisions, 2) presenting island-metropole economic linkages as indicative of the former's negative dependence on the latter, and 3) working to prevent islands from forming alternative or parallel dependencies (Grydehøj, 2020b).
Western warnings that China engages in ‘debt trap diplomacy’ and that Chinese loans, grants, and investment should be avoided at all costs thus seem self-serving. For many islands, the choice may be between making deals with Chinese actors or making even worse deals with other actors. Jamaica's indebtedness, for example, long predates its receipt of Chinese aid and investment, with the island state being placed under heavy financial and political obligations to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular. In fact, funds derived from Chinese investments in Jamaica have been crucial to repaying Jamaica's IMF debt (Johnston, 2015). Across Oceania, openness toward engagement with China has partly been in response to the impacts of Western aid contingent upon neoliberal structural reforms and other burdens (Rodd, 2020; Szadziewski, 2020). Guåhan receives an increasing number of Chinese tourists, but the territory's fortification and militarisation have been so thorough as to raise the question of what would become of the island without a Chinese or other existential threat. Alternative futures are difficult to envision when one's whole island has been conceptualised as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” (Perez Santos, 2019). Island dependence becomes self-reinforcing.
One advantage to economic engagement with China is precisely that, although strings may be attached, these strings are not colonial. The governments and peoples of Guåhan, Kalaallit Nunaat, Okinawa, and Jamaica struggle with dependence on economic actors that gain and maintain leverage by insisting on the necessity of following Western or metropolitan practices and relying on Western or metropolitan expertise. Islands should always exercise caution when engaging with powerful external economic actors. However, Chinese corporate focus on profit and state focus on expanding trade and exercising soft power may be a relief for island societies with long histories of outsiders coming in, destroying Indigenous cultures and/or populations, devastating ecosystems, extracting resources for the benefit of the metropole (frequently through enslaved or coerced labour), and then blaming islanders for failing to more closely resemble their colonisers. Chinese business engagement (whether with positive or negative effects on island communities) simply lacks this emotional baggage in most parts of the world. One author of this paper has herself experienced this paternalism in Kalaallit Nunaat, where the Danish system and thought processes are presented as the only proper way of doing things: failure at adapting to these systems is regarded as ineptitude, while desire to try other methods is regarded as a wholesale rejection of Danish people, culture, and influence. In this context, warnings emanating from Denmark regarding both China and the USA and the purported incompatibility of their cultural and political systems with Kalaallit Nunaat reinforce the idea that Inuit are incapable of making their own reasoned decisions.
Across our island narratives, it is warned that increased Chinese tourism and the entrance of Chinese business ventures risk overrunning, overwhelming, or outcompeting island populations. The spectre of Chinese political and economic domination looms large in the discourse of Western and metropolitan political actors. Yet for many colonised islanders, colonisation and domination by a foreign people is already a fact of life. The epistemic privilege through which the West takes for granted its own centrality has contributed to island engagement with China being conceptualised as a form of neocolonialism in the absence of prior colonialism. A concept that arose in the context of subaltern revolt against Western domination has been repurposed into a Western tool for buttressing its privilege—a privilege that is largely invisible to the West itself but is omnipresent in the eyes of the colonised.