3---Realism is a white supremacist fantasy---that turns case by creating a cycle of paranoia that generates tensions
Agathangelou and Ling 9 – Professor at York University that specializes in Postcolonial Theory, Feminist Political Economy, STS and decolonial justice movements [Anna Agathangelou]
Professor of International Affairs at the Julien J. Studley Graduate Programs in International Affairs, The New School [L.H.M. Ling]
Anna Agathangelou and L.H.M. Ling, “Transforming World Politics: From empire to multiple worlds,” Routledge, 2009, 49-54, https://www.routledge.com/Transforming-World-Politics-From-Empire-to-Multiple-Worlds/Agathangelou-Ling/p/book/9780415772808
THE ROLE OF THE ACADEMY
IR, we argue, operates like a colonial household. This House of IR shouts to the world: it’s “I vs You!” Like the singular, patriarchal, and colonial household that stands for the colonial state, the field theorizes about itself from a position of imperial sovereignty. Staking out “civilization” in a space that’s already crowded with local traditions of thinking, doing, and being yet proclaimed, in willful arrogance, as a “state of nature” plagued by fearful “anarchy” and its murderous power politics, the House of IR aims to stave off “disorder” by imposing “order.” Directing Others with declarative statements, the House of IR assumes to know both the problem (i.e., “power for the few over the many”) and its solution (“more power for the few over the many”). Such suffocation of Self and Other leaves a multi-generational legacy similar to the actual colonial household’s. That is, erasures and violences that flip the household’s original intent: order turns into disorder, repulsion into desire, purity into hybridity. In the House of IR, especially, another practice rules: the treatment of the academy’s institutional power as an extension of political power, regardless of empire’s devastations and/or secret indulgences.
IR HOUSEHOLD RELATIONS
Our understanding of the colonial household comes from Ann Laura Stoler (2002). Her study of colonial management in Indonesia and Indo-china under Dutch and French rule, respectively, tracks the “genealogies of the intimate.” She asks: how do racialized categories of identity emerge and become naturalized into the lexicon of colonial governance? Given the potent politics of categorizing identities, Stoler examines “the histories of their making, the exclusions they enabled, and violences they condoned.”
The House of IR exhibits a similar politics of exclusion and violence. It clearly identifies who’s “in,” who’s “out,” and who’s precariously “on the border.” It also stratifies who’s “upstairs” and who’s “downstairs.” This hierarchical division of space reflects the House’s participation in and complicity with material relations of production and its uneven distribution of social wealth.
Inside the Household
Pater realism
As its “founding father,” realism heads the House of IR. Though labeled a peculiarly “American social science” (Hoffman 1995), realism claims an intellectual lineage that dates to ancient Greek history, especially that recorded by Thucydides (5 bc) (cf. Lebow and Strauss 1991; Garst 1989; 5 Jansson 1997; Monten 2006). Subsequently, realists have added luminaries of power politics like Machiavelli and Hobbes to their roster. But it was a generation of scholars from post-World War II Europe, Britain, and the US that gave realism its distinctive voice. Power, they asserted, reflects objective laws of calculated (sometimes amoral) self-interest for all states across time and space. John Herz, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Hans J. Morgenthau each saw “political realism” as the cure to what they considered the fateful cause of war among nations: “legalism,” “utopianism,” and “idealism” (Keohane 1986: 9). Abstract individualism pivots realism’s understanding of the world. Primordial individual units (states) struggle in eternal competition over resources that confer power and wealth. In this way, realists justify instrumental reasoning and behavior. But then how do realists explain the existence of an interdependent international political economy in a world of conflicting nation-states? Hegemonic stability theory comes to the rescue (Kindleberger 1973). It posits a dominant state or hegemon that willingly bears the asymmetrical cost of global leadership so the inter-state system may survive peacefully and prosperously despite anarchy and competition. Game theoretic models explain such cooperation under anarchy as a prisoner’s dilemma. Still, these approaches preserve realism’s basic premise in abstract individualism. They place outside the realm of realist inquiry issues like ideology, the social bases of state power, its practices, political struggles, and strategies for reproduction (Rupert 1995).
Yet realists openly accept their origin in the white colonial/imperial state. They invoke and canonize Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War as the genealogical text for IR. The book details Athens’ struggle against Sparta for hegemony in the ancient world, interpreted by realists as a cautionary tale on the uses and abuses of state power. This teleological and political move disciplines IR, in effect, by deciding who and what counts in not just the study of world politics but also its practices through statecraft. Accordingly, some are included, recognized, and legitimized at the cost of the many. Realists constantly echo what they claim to be Thucydides’ key lesson in power: “The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must.” In this way, realists rationalize empire’s brutal legacy, turning it into an ideological and political commitment. Expect violence and colonization, some realists trumpet, for it is integral to empire. And empire, they add, is what international politics is all about. Conveniently silenced is another reading of this text that tells of empire as a crisis not only for world politics but the empire itself.
Realism stems from another lineage, rarely acknowledged: i.e., the global capitalist economy. It accounts for realism’s birth into the world and its growth, sustenance, and eventual dominance in the House of IR. In turn, realism generates an ideational infrastructure for global capitalism’s public, political face: the modern, capitalist state. What is all this warring imperialism for if not more wealth and resources for national elites? Global capitalism delivers what the white colonial/imperial state seeds.
Mater liberalism
Liberalism naturally allies with realism. They share common roots in the white colonial/imperial state and its relationship with global capitalism, albeit with a conceptual division of labor. Whereas realism commands the House of IR by focusing on the state (“power”), liberalism organizes, manages, and reproduces it by emphasizing the market (“interest”) (see Gilpin 1987). Liberalism started out as a proud tradition of defiance against authority, such as Martin Luther’s fiery repudiation of Catholic Church hegemony in sixteenth-century Europe. Since then, it has evolved into an ideological instigator of “free trade,” “open markets,” “instrumental rationality,” and other pillars of global capitalism (Polanyi 1944; Hirschman 1977).
Realism and liberalism work in tandem by drawing on the mirage of “politics” and “economics.” Publicly, they convince “contemporary statesmen [like] the mercantilists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [that] power is a necessary condition for plenty, and vice versa” (Keohane 1984: 22). Privately, realism–liberalism maintains an infrastructure of elite, bourgeois rule by seeming to care about democratic peace, prosperity, and freedom – but not really. Realism–liberalism’s abstract, ahistorical conceptions of the state, the market, and the individual are bound by particular cultural expressions (Western, white, male) that result from concrete political struggles (bourgeois, colonial). Yet both the “world” (materiality, structured inequalities) and “politics” (practices, discourse) disappear from world politics (Agathangelou 1997). Classical liberals like Kant, Locke, and Woodrow Wilson, for instance, advocated a legally-based “perpetual peace,” “limited government,” and a “league of nations” to forestall global warfare that, by extension, preserves the realist–liberal inter-state, commerce- based system, in principle, if not in form. Similarly, contemporary liberals like Hedley Bull (1966) and David Held (1995) talk of an “international society” or “cosmopolitan democracy,” respectively, but without regard to the worldviews or participation of Others in these processes.
Today, liberalism reinvents itself into a new family of arguments labeled neoliberalism. Without losing the liberal logic of public vs private, individual vs collective, Self vs Other, neoliberalism professes good intentions for the masses while complying with elite demands for new ideas for and methods of preserving colonial–patriarchal–capitalist structures and their necessary subjectivities. Take the treatment of “third-world” women, for example. Liberal and standpoint feminists end up colluding morally and politically when they seek to “protect” brown women from brown men by helping them become more like “white” women.
Still, nothing is what it seems. As we see below, mater liberalism and daughter neoliberalism each has sought to convert Others with missionary zeal but ended up, instead, with hybrid progeny...
… Heir apparent: neorealism
Son #1 intrigues the most. Heir apparent to the House of IR, neorealism springs not from the union of realism and liberalism but an open affair between realism and its gold-digging neighbor, economics. Mistress of her own house but impatient with opportunistic ambitions, economics merges almost giddily with realism to produce neorealism. Waltz (1979), for instance, constructs the international system as a market and states as individual firms, magically accounting for “order” without an “orderer” in an international system that is posited, a priori, as anarchical. On this basis, Waltz infers that only great powers matter since they alone account for change and consequence in world politics.
Similarly, neorealists and their cousins, rational choicers, have stormed the House of IR. Like Jimmy Cagney’s dying psycho gangster in White Heat (1949), they crow manically: “Look, Ma, I made it! Top of the world!” They find no contradiction in denying legitimacy and rights to others, be these involving intellectual debate, hiring/promotion/grants, or publications, while failing to deliver on their own golden promises of, among others, “prediction,” “law-like” regularities, and “causal explanations” (Green and Shapiro 1994).
Yet neorealists remain insecure. Their own zero-sum logic induces a paranoid worldview that treats Others as competition only for legitimacy and resources – in this case, in the House of IR. As Stoler notes for colonial governance in southeast Asia, “it was not the progeny of [cross- category] unions who were problematic but the possibility that they might be recognized as heirs to a European inheritance . . .” (Stoler 2002: 39). For this reason, tensions between neorealism and the other progeny of the House of IR remain severe.