The aff isn’t reflexive---it does not change the fundamental nature of security
Steele 7 (Brent, Professor of Political Science – University of Kansas, “’Eavesdropping on Honored Ghosts’: From Classical to Reflexive Realism”, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10, p. 284-285)
This skeptical view of the eschaton means that rather than being biased, like neorealism, toward the status quo,30 reflexive realism is instead perpetually skeptical of the authority exercised by state elites, and specifically the ‘big ideas’ that become a part of elite discourse which can lead to dangerous policies.31 Rather than reifying power, reflexive realism asks us to challenge the manner in which power is projected. Scan the words used in this reflexive presentation of realism. Far from being the dominant, mainstream, status quo monolith that we were trained to recognize in graduate school, it is instead ‘inevitably antagonistic toward political power y [a] rebellion against the seduction of prevailing structures of power, identity, and knowledge’ (Williams 2005a: 179, emphasis added).32 Budding IR scholars may tend to forget that what motivated especially the post (World War II) realists in their seemingly contrarian positions was their concern for the republics in which they wrote. Morgenthau was attempting to ‘perform’ a ‘service for his adopted country’ (Lebow 2003: 242). With reflexive realism, we look back at classical realist writings for evidence of such contemplation about contemporary problems. Morgenthau and Niebuhr not only buck the common portrayal of ‘hawkish’ realists, they provided some of the most insightful arguments against the Vietnam War. Writing in 1969, Morgenthau stated that his: concern is justified not only historically, in view of the shortcomings of our [American] foreign policies, but also pragmatically, with a view toward avoiding the mistakes of the past. It is now generally admitted that our Vietnam policy has failed, but, if we were to let it go at that, we would risk applying the same faulty assumptions and principles that have brought the Vietnam disaster upon us to other situations with similarly disastrous results (1969: viii). According to Jace Weaver (1995), Niebuhr was a proponent of American exceptionalism until this war. Despite the fact that Niebuhr recognized how certain religions and patriotism blinded nation-states from their own limitations, he still viewed the US’ mission as one of necessity during the Cold War. Yet this view would quickly change,33 so that by 1967, ‘The contradiction between our [American] ideal aims of a peace of conciliation and such an imposed peace, which only a defeated enemy would accept, can be understood only in the light of an ironic self-deception — ironic because we are the victims of our own ideology’ (Niebuhr 1968: 11, emphasis added). And by 1969, Niebuhr would assert that anti-communist ‘fanaticism y ha[d] caused [the United States] to stumble into the most pointless, costly and bloody war in [its] history’ (Niebuhr, quoted in Reinitz 1980: 120). Like the classical realists they resource, reflexive realists now provide a particularly salient, effective critique of contemporary foreign policy, but one that is unique when compared to that made by mainstream realists. The current debate over the Iraq War between neoconservatives and mainstream realists in the US has appeared in various forums, most notably in the neoconservative publication Commentary (Rosen 2005). Stephen Walt (2006: 4) stated in a future issue thAT Realists were in the vanguard of the opposition to war with Iraq in 2003y Today, with thousands of Americans and Iraqis killed and wounded, a price tag that will eventually exceed $1 trillion (!), and no end in sight, which group seems to have the clearest vision of our national interest? For all its limitations, realism remains a more valuable guide to U.S. foreign policy than the idealistic fantasies offered by its primary intellectual opponents. Walt’s is a cost/benefit analysis of policy, one echoed in the ISG report noted at the beginning of this article. However, it fails to comprehensively challenge the philosophy that has driven the Bush administration’s Iraq policy. A critique of the Iraq War set in the mold of Niebuhr and Morgenthau’s critique of Vietnam would begin by asserting how hubristic impulses for American hegemonic expansion actually hastened American demise. The inability to recognize the limits of power in international politics was a strategic miscalculation — demonstrating the cyclical pattern of human history rather than the linear trajectory assumed by eschatologies. The abnormal (and thus imprudent) behavior, according to reflexive realism, was to invade Iraq.