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Jackson, professor of IR – American University, ‘15 (Patrick Thaddeus, “Must International Studies Be a Science?” Millennium - Journal of International Studies vol. 43, no. 3, p. 942-965, June)

These diverse methodologies have different approaches to causation, to case comparison, and to explanation in general; those differences, in turn, mean that different scientific methodologies generate different kinds of valid claims with different epistemic statuses, and should not be regarded as poor approximations to or deficient forms of one another. While neopositivists look for cross-case covariation as the truest mark of causation, critical realists look for dispositional causal powers, analyticists apply ideal-typical models to disclose the specific features of individual cases, and reflexive scholars ground their claims in their own social locations. There is no reason why this plurality has to lead to relativism, but neither should it be misunderstood as creating a simple, homogenous account of the world; translation challenges persist, and the result of a pluralist science is a variety of warranted knowledge-claims.22

But for all of this internal diversity, there are important commonalities among these varieties of scientific methodology that serve to distinguish them, as a group, from other forms of knowing. Following Max Weber, we might characterise all four of these scientific methodologies as aiming at a ‘thoughtful ordering of empirical actuality’,23 or, to put it another way, as participating in a form of knowing that emphasises systematic claims, public criticism intended to improve those claims, and a specific kind of ‘worldliness’ that excludes references to divine commands and magical forces. This is not to say that a claim has to achieve some specific level of systematicity, publicity, and/or worldliness in order to be regarded as ‘scientific’; the commonality I am highlighting here is not a candidate for a demarcation criterion that would allow us to distinguish science from non-science in any kind of definitive fashion.24 Instead, I am suggesting that in the space marked out by these methodologies, questions about a claim’s systematicity, its susceptibility to public criticism, and its worldliness are in some sense appropriate questions to ask. In effect, to regard ourselves as being engaged in scientific inquiry is to invite these questions, and to submit our claims to evaluation in terms of these criteria.

The kind of knowledge that is supposed to be produced by efforts to be as systematic, public, and worldly as one can be is knowledge of a particular kind: factual, propositional knowledge, or what we might call ‘knowing-that’.25 This is the kind of knowing that Wittgenstein had in mind when he suggested, in the opening sections of the Tractatus, that the world ‘is all that is the case…the totality of facts, not of things’.26 It is what Aristotle called epistemic knowing: ‘universal, invariable, context-independent’ and ‘based on general analytical rationality’.27 It prizes relative impersonality in connecting claims to their warrants, in that the validity of a claim is not subject to idiosyncratic impressions but is instead articulated in a way that is understood as generally established.28 In Weber’s formulation, the goal of this kind of knowing is to produce a set of factual claims that even someone who did not share our values would find compelling.29

Here again it is important to note that this is not some kind of absolute standard that these methodologies necessarily meet. It is unclear to me that we ever have perfectly impersonal knowledge, or that any claim whatsoever achieves anything like universal generality. But this is not the point. Instead, the point is that epistemic claims advanced in the methodological modes of neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism, and even reflexivity are accompanied by standards of validity that purport to be something other than an arbitrary whim binding only on the speaker. The logical condition of possibility for Sandra Harding’s suggestion that the accumulated body of what we call ‘scientific knowledge’ is thoroughly marked by cultural particularity and a colonial past, and her call for a ‘strong objectivity’ that brings previously marginalised perspectives back into the conversation, is precisely the notion that there is something illegitimate and untenable about this unacknowledged partiality.30 And the claim that some account of things is Eurocentric or androcentric is no more and no less reliant on similar definitions and procedures shared by a community of speaker and audience than is the claim that dyadic democracy and war frequency are inversely correlated—and as such, the very form of the claim opens the possibility of questioning just how impersonally, epistemically valid it is. ‘Epistemically valid for me/for us’ does not make any sense, because the very idea of epistemic knowing implies validity independent of any conceptual scheme, even if the vocabulary within which the claim is made is itself local and contingent.31

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