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Intro to China view on AI

Sullivan 10/4/2021

Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM

In his book Sentient Machine, Amir Husain defines AI as “the overarching science that is concerned with intelligent algorithms, whether or not they learn from data.”5 This paper centers on competition within the scope of narrow AI and not artificial general intelligence (AGI).6 Rapid breakthroughs in machine learning (ML) resulted from an open ecosystem that encourages collaboration across platforms, unconstrained by national boundaries. The extent to which those collaborations should continue when the transfer of data, algorithms, and other dual-use technologies directly impact national security, is a central question facing AI competition with China. AI (人工智能) allows China to innovate and surpass the capabilities of other nations rapidly, often referred to in Chinese research as “overtake by changing lanes” (换道超车).7 Rapid innovation and focusing on emerging technologies without established global leadership is a way to build comprehensive national power to preserve domestic social stability, create economic and military strength, and protect core interests (核心利 益).7F8 China’s core interests extend beyond borders and into cyberspace (网络空间) via the pursuit of AI norms that promote cyber sovereignty.9 Protecting sovereignty for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that appears fragile and insecure, increasingly relying on AI as a means of promoting stability and growth within China to bolster the CCP’s legitimacy. As prominent Beijing scholar Wang Jisi notes, the CCP’s legitimacy to govern is linked to performance and “the current mainstream view in China emphasizes – party, government, military, then the people….and the Party leads everything.”10 Diverging values and competing national interests between democracies and the CCP amplify AI competition and challenge the U.S. and China to compete below the conflict threshold. Despite breakdowns in bilateral relations, zero-sum conflict is not predestined, as Shanghai scholar Wu Xinbo notes, “promoting pragmatic cooperation and constructive competition, effective management, control of risks, and prevention of major conflicts between China and the United States remains the basic direction of China’s diplomacy with the United States.”11 Several U.S. scholars and leaders such as Elizabeth Economy and Graham Allison also advocate cooperative approaches to competition by promoting coopetition, coevolution, or rivalry partnerships.12 Such strategies are hard to imagine in a period of increasingly strained bilateral relations and diverging values, and are likely to fail if the leaders of both nations maintain a binary approach to engagement. This paper explores competition through the lens of values, cohesion, influence, and legitimacy to better understand each nation’s positional advantages and identify possibilities for cooperation in bilateral or multilateral engagements.

AI strengthens the CCP’s ability to preserve power through expansions of its targeted population programs (重 点人口)·and increased surveillance of its people.13 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the Army of the Party and plays an essential role in domestic security. AI’s role in surveilling and suppressing society for the benefit of a ruling entity represents a values conflict and the most significant single obstacle to cooperation on AI norms, rules, and procedures between our nations. As China seeks to export surveillance technology and gain access to international data, a sense of urgency emerges over China’s efforts to legitimize its authoritarian governance model and to secure its interests through promoting standards and norms in international institutions. The “China Standard 2035” plan was not released in 2020 as expected. However, the focus on protecting core interests, strengthening emerging industries, pursuing leadership positions in international institutions, and extending global influence in the emerging world order by giving voice to developing nations, appear throughout the current 14th five-year plan (2020-2025), seeking to ensure the international order better represents China’s interests, including the Party’s values. This paper offers that the U.S. leads the overall AI competition with China, but that China retains the edge in both perceived utility and adaption of AI across society, a result of central planning efforts which better organizes China to promote AI applications at scale. China’s competitive advantage results from vast amounts of data generated from mobile payments, the pursuit of digital currency, and the widespread installation of cameras that feed predictive algorithms controlled by the CCP.14 In contrast, Americans remain mostly distrustful of authority, and mobile payments are less widely accepted. The concern over misinformation and the ethics of algorithms that reinforce desired content for users and increased partisanship will bring AI to the forefront of American discussion but will do little to encourage robust AI adoption. Without significant adoption the U.S. should increase investments in research into alternative means of synthetically generating data or techniques allowing deep learning (DL) to train effectively on smaller amounts of data.15 Achieving such success requires increased investments in basic research and a cohesive approach to policy and strategy that encourages domestic collaboration and R&D spending while strengthening international partnerships to address gaps or inefficiencies within the U.S. AI ecosystem effectively.

China views national strength as the foundation for global AI competition and Chinese scholars put forward the idea that “without national strength, how can we talk about standards.”16 Military-civil fusion (军民融合 战略) represents a cohesive approach to organizing talent and resources around a strategy to address domestic deficiencies, build national strength, and close the overall U.S. advantages in AI. The collaborative nature of AI research and reciprocal interaction by university scholars of AI and related techno-subjects present examples of “win-win” competition for both the U.S. and China. However, the Chinese military’s close relationship with many of China’s leading universities and AI-focused companies presents significant challenges to the notion of AI cooperation between the U.S. and China. In particular, the PLA’s exploration of brain science and pursuit of “brain control” (制脑权), which they consider the “new high ground” (新的高地), results from collaborations with industry and universities.17 Coupled with the concerns over intellectual property (IP) theft, espionage, visa restrictions, and export controls, the cohesion chapter explores the inherent risks to U.S. national security of pursuing collaboration and cooperation with China. The Chinese military directly benefits from working with national high technology enterprises such as Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei (BATH) and prestigious universities across China. Many U.S. companies and universities also work with those same Chinese universities through research centers and joint laboratories, generating U.S. national security concerns. China understands its second adapter advantages are dwindling.18 The open-source nature of AI research could likely end, threatening future Chinese AI development nearly as much as their hardware vulnerabilities and reliance on international firms within the global supply chain. The Chinese 19th National Congress in 2017 directed the requirement to strengthen “basic research” (基础研究) and “applied basic research” (使用基础研究), making universities the focal point of this effort.19 With a large population and a focused government driving investments, quantity is not the issue in China, but quality remains a concern. Quantity superseding quality applies to the number of sciences, technology, engineering, math (STEM) graduates, patents, research papers, and supercomputers. China is closing the gap, but the U.S. is well-positioned to maintain its advantages, provided America recognizes the importance of attracting top foreign talents and reinvest in STEM and research and development (R&D).

China’s approach to AI utilization presents nations of the world with an alternative model to the democratic prosperity narrative. AI also allows Beijing to project its alternative views on power abroad and nurture China’s influence among developing nations, which will prove critical when the time comes for China to push for acceptance of Chinese standards and norms. However, influence focuses on China’s competing models in overseas markets and AI’s role in providing security, economic development, and improved livelihoods for nations. Global concerns over Huawei and regional concerns over Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represent just some of the problems facing China’s overseas forays. The use of AI at home and abroad, while attractive to some autocratic leaders, creates a significant cause for concern in other countries regarding ethical concerns or applications of AI. Lack of transparency in BRI projects and handling of COVID does little to demonstrate to other nations that China will act in good faith or adhere to the standards and norms of most countries. Detention camps in Xinjiang and repression of dissidents in Hong Kong continue to impact Xi’s global favorability ratings. However, China’s core interests, particularly sovereignty and territorial integrity, remain red lines that stoke conflict rather than competition. The U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and refusal to participate in Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or other China-led initiatives leads one to believe that competing for influence is an area of zero-sum competition; however, the lack of international standards and norms concerning data and ethical applications of AI extend beyond the ability of the U.S. or China to unilaterally impose solutions. Competing for influence gives rise to input from other nations. While the U.S. would appear to possess an advantage based on standing alliances and shared liberal democratic values, data privacy concerns among democratic nations differ widely and offer opportunities for both the U.S. and China to collaborate with other nations on a global solution.

With domestic stability and its emergence as a global power, Beijing hopes to parlay increased international influence and legitimacy to pursue global standards that better represent Chinese values and norms. With the publication of the “Beijing AI Principles” and “Global Initiative on Data Security,” the competition for AI norms is underway.20 China’s antagonism toward the U.S. as a “technological hegemon” (技术霸权) and Beijing’s explicit support for multipolarity highlights the CCP belief that “multipolarity is more sustainable than unipolarity, while less divisive and antagonistic than bipolarity” and that “multipolarity could be less predictable than both unipolarity and bipolarity.”21 Thus, China may continue to pursue AI norms through the existing global framework but will prepare for the prospects of decoupling if Chinese standards fail to gain acceptance. The idea of “two systems, three worlds” (两大体系, 三大世界) goes beyond 5G, and Chinese initiatives on satellite navigation and digital currency are other examples where decoupling could occur. 22 The importance of shared values and the role of soft and hard power will significantly influence the Sino-American competition over AI norms in the standing liberal, multipolar order. Competition, not conflict, is most likely to occur at a variety of levels. China, and the U.S., for that matter, remain dissatisfied with the current liberal world order. The Chinese perceive a decline in the U.S. desire to lead and an opportunity to reform existing organizations from within. All indications are that China views the UN as central to preserving a liberal order. As a nation that benefitted greatly from the current Westphalian order, China seems unlikely to pursue significant revisions in the structure or composition of the current world order for now. Seeking to work within the framework of the UN and World Trade Organization (WTO), China will promote a governance model that emphasizes sovereignty above all else, and minimize significant value conflicts by pursuing leadership positions and relying on support from sympathetic nations to block unfavorable or undesirable resolutions or actions. In an anticipated multipolar world order, Beijing will champion initiatives such as AIIB, BRI, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as alternative models for collaboration and non-binding alliances that better represent developing nations. These organizations demonstrate an inclusive approach to membership, which Beijing hopes will validate their legitimacy to lead in an increasingly multipolar world.

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