Haenel 18
June, Fabio Haenel currently works at the Global and European Studies Institute, University of Leipzig. Fabio does research in Information Technology and Politics, Human Rights and Foreign Policy. “The Prospects and Dangers of Artificial Intelligence on International Security: The Case of a Sino-American Arms Race.”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325542003_The_Prospects_and_Dangers_of_Artificial_Intelligence_on_International_Security_The_Case_of_a_Sino-American_Arms_Race – ECM
In contrast to US-American pluralism fragmented between industrial and political interest groups in the ace of being torn at from both public debate and the deep state among the intelligence community, China’s growing centralization of its one-party government has recognized and internalized the of set potential of emerging technologies under the rule of President Xi more than any other nation-state. Nominally, the United States are holding an advantage in the numbers o high-tech startups and global corporations developing AI, an environment also nourished by long attracting the most eager and intelligent Chinese students to seek education at American campuses and thus feeding the need or talent in Silicon Valley and across the US to fill the telecommunications companies’ well-paid and highly competitive positions.136 But Beijing’s long-term attempts to push back US-American influence in the Greater Pacific region and to install China not only as a global economic power but a strategic power as well has recently been catalyzed by both heavy domestic and foreign investments in emerging technologies.
These include the rapid modernization of its naval and air force to gradually expand China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial zone away from its coastal borders,137 diversifying their domestically manufactured and designed state-owned civil and military satellite systems and pioneering cutting-edge quantum telecommunications in space,138 as well as boosting Chinese telecommunications companies with favorable budget plans and topdown state policy changes to cater to the needs o their research and development departments but also by continuously denying foreign corporations to enter and capitalize on the quickly growing middle-class within China.
The growing volume of Chinese foreign investment in US-American high-tech startups and publicly-held telecom corporations led the Trump administration to tighten regulatory oversight to shield US-American intellectual property:140 “The Chinese have found a way around our protections, our safeguards, on technology transfer in foreign investment. And they’re using it to pull ahead of us, both economically and militarily,” James Lewis from the Center or Security and International Studies argues.141 China’s two-fold strategy to use its vast capital means to gain influence within foreign AI developers while cradling and catalyzing its own AI industry within China’s barred domestic economy accumulated in “The Internet Plus and Artificial Intelligence Plan (2016-18),” the world’s most broadly state-supported policy plan calling or breakthroughs in AI development and its “expansive applications, including in unmanned systems and cyber-security,” clearly exemplifying the securitized assessment o AI technology in the eyes of the Chinese government.
As part of the 13th Five-Year-Plan or the years 2016-2020 the Chinese governments’ Artificial Intelligence Plan represented a stepping stone between prioritizing its development on ministerial level as the sixth most important task or the country and enshrining it as part of China’s self -identity: The 2017 government work report, the Chinese Premier’s annual report to the People’s Congress on the past years’ economic performance and the coming years’ challenges featured Artificial Intelligence or the first time, stressing the need to divest funds into its adoption, followed by President Xi enshrining AI development as a key driver to China’s hegemonic ambitions to become a “science and technology superpower” in his opening speech to the 19th Party Congress in November 2017 ending with his reaffirmation as President.143 Precisely, the plan sets the national goal o expanding its AI industry to RMB 150 billion ($23.8 billion) gross output by 2020, a ten- fold increase from 2016, in an overall plan to be the world’s leader in AI development by 2025.144 By 2030, the plan envisions, the target gross output is set at RMB 1 trillion ($150 billion) in core AI industries innovating and developing the software architecture and hardware infrastructure and RMB 10 trillion ($1.5 billion) in adjacent AI-enhanced industries developing applications of automation in all sectors, e.g. self -driving vehicles. In context to various analyses of the global AI market these targets all are within the high end of market forecasts.
Experts argue that only the recent defeat of Korean Go master Lee Sedol in 2016 and the Chinese world-champion Ke Jie in 2017 at the hand of AlphaGo, Google’s own and arguably the world’s currently most powerful Artificial Intelligence, offered the Chinese officials as much a “Sputnik moment” as the first successful launch of a space probe by the Soviet Union posed to the US administration in 1957, calling or the immediate refocusing of funds and energy into the US space program thereafter.146 The Wuzhen Institute reported the biggest surge o searches on Baidu, China’s pendant to Google, on topics of AI immediately after the 2016 and 2017 Go-matches,147 followed by an increase in conferences and workshops held both in academia and in the military on the impact of AlphaGo’s victory on Chinese interests, including the People’s Liberation Army’s strategic planners.
In accordance with the monumental effort to modernize the PLA’s capabilities, in particular by researching, developing and producing nuclear-powered submarines, operational aircraft and helicopter carriers, as well as China’s first domestically produced passenger and cargo jet on top of its already successful modern generation of fighter jets, its leadership has closely studied the US Army’s concentration on autonomy and the Defense Department's proposed “Third Of set” strategy.149 In act, China’s efforts in researching and developing its own swarming-capable or solitary UAVs, semi-autonomous missile guiding systems, and the growing frequency and scope o the PLA’s practical mission experience borrow heavily from the strategic idea of asymmetrically of setting an otherwise quantitatively too powerful competitor through technological superiority.150 The government’s work report cites Lieutenant General Liu Ghuozhi, the Director of the Central Military Commission’s Science and Technology Commission, saying that whichever nation is “on the eve of a new scientific and technological revolution” not prepared to engage in developing Artificial Intelligence applications for its military “will be disrupted.