Put away your LIO defense – China actions in AI are both offensive and defensive. China DOESN’T SEEK to replace LIO BUT its actions are signs that China intends to establish a multipolar world
Sullivan 10/4/2021
Ryan Sullivan Army pilot studied at the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar graduate-level work in the field of Artificial Intelligence to deliver an in-depth study of the critical elements of U.S.-China competition in Artificial Intelligence, “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors”, – ECM
Very few countries benefitted more from the current international system than China. Many in the West worry about China’s efforts to undermine or replace the current system with one that better represents Chinese values and interests. Those concerns are warranted, though it is important to highlight that China purportedly does not seek to replace the current liberal world order or promote an alternative structure. Reviewing Chinese declarations about the standing world order indicates that the CCP reportedly finds its key elements more than acceptable, desiring to emphasize some key features that traditionally have been underplayed by the U.S. and other western countries. However, these claims or reports should not be accepted at face value, given the CCP and Xi’s history of backtracking on promises not to militarize the SCS. Rather, a prudent approach would be to assume that China is unwilling to disrupt the current world order at this point in history; however, as China strengthens its economy and pursues legitimacy on the global leadership stage, China could pursue a restructuring of the present world order from a position of greater strength.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi acknowledged the legitimacy and value of the current international system, which “is like a well-designed building with multilateralism as its cornerstone and the UN and other international organizations as important pillars” which plays “an irreplaceable role in promoting world peace and development.”387 Wu Xinbo adds that “China has been a strong supporter of Westphalian norms,” which he defined as “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state, sovereign equality among states, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs.”388 Wang, like other Chinese leaders, finds value in the aspects of the system that constrain world dominance by the United States or any single dominant state. China does value the system but feels it is suffering under U.S. leadership, as CASS researcher Xu Xiujun wrote in the lead-up to the National People’s Congress’s recent two sessions. Xu wrote,
“With the emergence of global problems and the rise of emerging economies, this system is increasingly difficult to meet the needs of the international community, and it seriously lacks in representativeness, fairness, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Under the obstruction of the United States and other Western powers, it is difficult for the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other traditional global multilateral mechanisms to make substantial progress in reforming and cannot adapt to the emerging fields of digital trade, digital finance, digital currency, and digital development.”
Xu adds the need for improved global governance mechanisms to effectively enable the G20 to play a constructive role and overcome “a small number of Western powers who ignore rules…and shirk their responsibilities” by promoting unilateralism and rely on small groups to resolve global problems.390 China’s willingness to co-opt certain aspects of international norms and laws while selectively ignoring others that run counter to their interests is a common practice. As China expert Elizabeth Economy points out, “Xi’s objective in promoting a China model and calling for reform of global governance institutions are both defensive – to protect China from international criticism – and offensive – to ensure that international norms and values align with and serve Chinese values and political and economic priorities.”391 However, China will not rush into reform and is very strategic where and when they apply their influence and pursue their values and interests. As Wu Xinbo notes, China wants to be a “rule-maker, not a rule-taker,” prioritizing “international economy and finance, regional cooperation, and emerging areas” such as AI, to further its international organization voting rights, to promote various forms of regional economic and security cooperation, and to establish mechanisms that serve Chinese interests and preferences.392 China’s desire to make the rules on AI demonstrates its clear desire to establish legitimacy beyond economics, pursuing political and technological power through influencing norms and standards globally.