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Zarnett 17

(David, University of Toronto, “What Does Realist Foreign Policy Activism Tell Us About Realist Theory?”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 13) DB

Mearsheimer’s critique of Waltz’s is premised on the idea that international outcomes cannot be explained without explaining state behavior, especially the behavior of six great powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Japan from 1868 to 1945, Germany from 1862 to 1945, the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1991, Italy from 1861 to 1945, Great Britain from 1792 to 1945 and the United States from 1800 to 1990. In examining the policies of these great powers, Mearsheimer finds that they consistently select offensive policies, taking advantage of opportunities to increase their power and achieve regional, and potentially international, hegemony. In distinguishing his view from other realist theories, Mearsheimer explains that offensive realists “believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate goal is to be the hegemon in the system” (Mearsheimer 2001:21). In other words, the dominant pattern in international politics is not a recurring balance of power but rather the constant drive for hegemony by great powers. By pursuing offensive strategies, states act in concert with what the system demands of them. Mearsheimer claims that his theory is “mainly a descriptive theory.” Depicting Waltz’s theory as a theory of how states ought to act enables him to present offensive realism as a more empirically valid substitute. But Mearsheimer does not leave it there. He also notes that his offensive realism “is also a prescriptive theory.” That is, it not only asserts that great powers are “primed for offense” but also that they are right in doing so. The more powerful a rational state is relative to the other states in the system, the less likely it is that a reckless state would attack it. There is no guarantee that a state prone to foolish behavior would not start a losing war, but it is less likely if that potential aggressor is badly outgunned. Plus, if deterrence fails and there is a war, the rational state would be well positioned to win it quickly and decisively. Finally, a rational state that is the preponderant power in the system is likely to be able to contain a misguided aggressor by itself and not need a balancing coalition to do the job. This takes the problem of inefficient balancing off the table, as the rational state no longer has to worry about unreliable allies. (Mearsheimer 2009:252) Noting that states can act in foolish ways, Mearsheimer writes that “states should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous world” (Mearsheimer 2001:11–12). If his goal were to develop a scientific theory of how states do behave, a different approach to state behavior would have been taken based on identifying the conditions under which states act offensively or defensively (Snyder 2002:173). But, Mearsheimer’s goal was to provide a realist theory of state behavior which, to remain consistent with realist tradition, includes a prescriptive component. In this tradition, theorizing is not simply for explanation’s sake. While good explanation is important, it is often sacrificed for good prescription. The result is a theory of international politics that uses a selection of state behaviors to identify the types of policies and strategies that increase the chances of success. While Mearsheimer’s prescription raises question about his theory’s empirical validity, as well as its methodological and ontological positions, it is overall remarkably consistent with the realist tradition. As Robert Gilpin explains, it is a “dual commitment, to practice and to theory, that sets realism apart from idealism and the abstract theorizing that characterizes so much of the contemporary study of international relations” (Gilpin 1984:303).

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