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Cyber ambiguity is prevents attacks – clarifying cyber redlines undermines deterrence

Davis 19

(Susan, US General Rapporteur, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE”, 148 STC 19 E rev. 1, October, ) DB

28. Although cyber security and defence capabilities continue to improve, most experts argue that the offence has the advantage in cyber space and that this is unlikely to change soon. Given sufficient time, skills, and resources, attackers can perpetrate a cyber attack, finding the targeted system’s vulnerabilities, gaining access, and delivering their payload. This is a key reason why the Alliance must complement dissuasion with strategies of deterrence by punishment. In other words, they must try “to prevent an attack by threatening unacceptable damage so that in the attacker’s cost-benefit calculations the best choice is not to attack” (Morgan, 2009). It should be noted some experts would argue that offence is not as dominant. For example, the more sophisticated cyber weapons are, the more opportunities the defender has to stop an attacker and the more errors the attacker is likely to make. Additionally, continued organisational deficiencies could be a key reason why attackers have had the advantage thus far (Slayton, 2017). 29. NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages. If the Alliance were to set a clear threshold, the opponent would better understand how to stay below that threshold. This would strengthen deterrence of threats above the threshold but would encourage the opponent to increase attacks just below the threshold. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers to tread lightly. A similar deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War. 30. However, ambiguity on where the threshold lies could indeed lead an opponent who is sufficiently comfortable with taking risks to continuously exploit the “grey zones”, test the defender’s resolve, and conduct ever more daring cyber attacks. Arguably, the solution for such attacks cannot be found in deterrence alone, but rather in a clearly defined policy response for hybrid operations. Allied nations, individually and collectively, continue to develop such options. This is where the United States military saw a need to shift to an innovative strategy of Persistent Engagement. The Rapporteur encourages Allies to explore if and how such a strategy can be most effectively embraced together. 31. NATO’s ambiguity also extends to the type of punishment it threatens were it to suffer a cyber attack. The Alliance has made clear that it neither limits punishment to similar cyber attacks nor excludes them. Instead, it keeps the option open to use the full range of Allied capabilities to deter and counter cyber attacks. Once again, this introduces useful doubt in an opponent’s mind. A more technical reason for the difficulty of restricting retaliation to cyber attacks is that it is hard to credibly threaten the assets of the attacker in a similar fashion. If an attacker shuts down a power plant, would the Alliance have cyber options to attack an opponent’s power plants or similar infrastructure? Would NATO even want to if it could, as it complies with the principle of proportionality and international law in all its activities? NATO’s ambiguity on the type of retaliation serves a convincing purpose. It produces doubts in the would-be attacker’s mind and presents more options to tailor and scale a response to re-establish deterrence. 32. A key feature of a stable deterrence situation is the ability to signal retaliatory capabilities and resolve to enforce the deterrence threat. However, such signalling is difficult when it comes to cyber deterrence. States can hardly display malicious codes at a military parade or a defence exhibition. They must, therefore, find different ways to signal capabilities and resolve impending conflicts. For example, demonstrating capabilities in real-world situations typically makes deterrence threats more plausible (Nye, 2017). Indeed, many experts argue that recent, limited cyber attacks should, at least in part, be seen as such demonstrations (Lewis, 2018). Additionally investing in cyber capabilities in a way visible to an opponent “generally can help to signal resolve” (Lindsay, 2015). In other words, transparency on cyber security and defence measures also serves as a deterrence signal. In the limited way they can signal their cyber security and defence capabilities, NATO and individual Allies appear to be making progress. In the public realm, NATO should therefore remain as transparent as possible when it comes to its cyber capabilities. In areas where public disclosure is not an option, communicating with potential opponents through non-public channels should happen as frequently as possible.

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