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Friedberg 2018

[Aaron L, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Competing with China”, Survival, Vol. 60, No. 3]

The sources of Chinese conduct While novel in certain respects, the policies now being pursued by Xi Jinping are a response to the same forces, and to a similar blend of ambition and anxiety, as those that shaped the policies of his predecessors. Indeed, rather than being a radical departure from the past, Xi’s approach is actually a lineal descendant of the one put in place under Deng in the early 1990s. Before turning to a brief description of current Chinese strategy and the process through which it evolved, it is important to identify the underlying factors that have been central in shaping it. Three, in particular, stand out. Geopolitics Like virtually every other fast-rising power in history (including the United States), China seeks to reshape the international environment, starting with its immediate neighbourhood, in ways that better reflect its strength and serve its interests. The nation’s rulers want to secure China’s ‘place in the sun’: they aim to alter geographical boundaries, institutional structures, rules, norms and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when their country was relatively weak, and which they therefore regard as illegitimate and, in certain respects, threatening. History China is not just any rising power; it is a nation with a long and proud history as the leading centre of East Asian civilisation and a more recent, inglorious experience of domination and humiliation at the hands of foreign intruders. China’s leaders see their country as not merely rising, but rather returning to a position of regional pre-eminence that it once held and which they (and many of their people) regard as natural and appropriate. Regime China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian regime that is determined at all costs to retain its exclusive grip on political power, and which feels itself to be constantly under threat from enemies, foreign and domestic. These facts have a profound impact on every aspect of policy, internal and external. A democratic China would no doubt have its differences with other countries, including the United States. But the illiberal character of the current regime shapes how it perceives threats, and how it defines its interests and goes about pursuing them. CCP leaders believe that the United States and its liberal-democratic allies are implacably opposed to them on ideological grounds and that the US, in particular, seeks not only to encircle and contain China but to undermine its current regime by promoting ‘splitism’ (that is, separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan) and ‘peaceful evolution’ (that is, the spread of liberal-democratic beliefs among the Chinese population).24 Warding off these threats requires that Beijing exert greater control over events around China’s periphery and in the international system as a whole, while continuously refining its capabilities for domestic surveillance and repression. In addition to coercion, the regime has sought to guard against ideological subversion and to bolster domestic political support; it has done this by managing the national economy in ways intended to sustain growth and employment, and by promulgating a distinctive, state-manufactured form of popular nationalism. China’s pervasive (and still expanding) system of domestic propaganda and ‘patriotic education’ emphasises the wrongs done to China by foreign powers during the ‘century of humiliation’ and the essential (and as yet unfinished) role of the CCP in righting those wrongs. Together with the promise of continuing improvements in living standards, nationalism is the primary prop on which the regime relies for its legitimacy. In recent years Beijing has also made increasing use of crises and confrontations over issues of history, territorial control and national pride to mobilise popular sentiment and deflect the frustrations of the Chinese people outwards, toward alleged foreign enemies, including Japan and the United States. Especially if economic growth falters, militant nationalism and ‘standing up’ to foreign enemies are likely to become increasingly important parts of the CCP’s strategy for retaining its hold on power. Insecure about their own legitimacy, China’s rulers believe that the stronger their country appears abroad, the stronger the regime will be at home.

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