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Pursuit of heg isn’t inevitable – grand strategy moderates based on relative US power

Kitchen 20 (Nicholas, Department of Politics, University of Surrey, Guildford, United Kingdom, “Why American Grand Strategy Has Changed: International Constraint, Generational Shift, and the Return of Realism”, Global Affairs, Vol. 6) DB

From this review of the strategic postures of the last four US administrations, it’s striking the extent to which each defined itself in contrast to what had come before: if the post-Cold War period really was characterised by continuity, this certainly wasn’t the image incoming administrations had of themselves. Rather, they not only sought, but succeeded, in changing course: we can see significant variation in both second order adjustments to the instruments used to pursue US interests, and also third order shifts in terms of how US interests ought to be constituted. The first two post-Cold War administrations differed in how they understood the goal of primacy, and enacted second-order changes in the means by which the United States pursued it. But the last decade has seen an even more fundamental rethinking in terms of the logics of American foreign policy. Ben Rhodes’ characterisation of the foreign policy establishment as ‘the Blob’ points to the Obama administration’s claim to have recast American grand strategy in ways that explicitly rejected what consensus there was between liberal internationalist democrats and republican neoconservatives. That consensus revolved around the idea that American leadership was indispensable in the world, that hegemonic management should be activist, and that the continued flourishing of the United States at home required liberal democratic governance and open markets abroad. The questioning of this consensus reveals divergent ideas about both how the world works and what policies are most likely to succeed, but also more fundamentally about what it means for the United States to be powerful (Quinn & Kitchen, 2018). Whilst employing very different ideas about the question of what constitutes American power, both Obama and Trump’s foreign policies might be cast as declinist, in that they seek to respond to an international system that is less permissive of the direct application of American power (Kennedy, 1992, pp. 239-240). Obama’s response to perceived decline might be characterised as politeness (Quinn, 2011). Reaffirming commitments to multilateral institutions, reinvigorating alliance partnerships, and above all, seeking to steer clear of policy choices that might further hasten decline – the administration-endorsed bumper stick was “don’t do stupid shit” (Rothkopf, 2014) – were all designed to slow the pace at which the United States’ unipolar position was inevitably eroding, and to extract greater returns from structural power (Kitchen & Cox, 2019). Trump’s response to perceived decline is the opposite, not least because in his dystopic rhetoric Trump used decline as a political strategy, as Oz Hassan highlights in this issue. In a thoughtful reflection on Kennedy’s Rise and Fall thesis in 1991, the Australian historian Neville Meaney wrote that “no treatment of American decline is adequate which does not face up to the problem of American nationalism and its impact on American social psychology.” (Meaney, 1991) It is not simply the nationalist and reactionary character of Trump’s rhetorical response to decline: his mercantilism, alliance backsliding, and focus on great power relations over institution-building has echoes of Nixon’s foreign policy in a former period of economic malaise and status anxiety (Cha & Seo, 2018). Indeed, the United States’ strategic approach during the course of the last decade has echoes of American grand strategy in times when American power was less obviously dominant. Through the nineteenth and early twentieth century, before Washington’s post-war ascension to the position of ‘leader of the free world’, American foreign policy was steeped in realism: geographically focused, cautious, and suspicious of grand designs. In this sense, the Cold War period is an outlier, characterised by ideologically fuelled global ambition. Now that the generation of foreign policy establishment that experienced the Cold War is fading away, replaced by a younger coterie animated by the damage caused by American adventurism in the post-Cold War period, the cognitive frameworks of US foreign policy have changed. For all Trump’s particular capriciousness, a sense of realism is returning to the heart of American grand strategy.

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