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Independently, science diplomacy solves regulation of emerging biotech

K. Ravi Srinivas 2019. Consultant, RIS. He is a doctorate in Intellectual Property Law from National Law School, Bangalore. “Global Governance of Emerging Biotechnologies and Role of Science Diplomacy” In SCIENCE DIPLOMACY REVIEW, Vol. 1 | No. 3 | July 2019, https://www.ris.org.in/sites/default/files/2021-09/SDR%20July%202019%203-min.pdf IZP)

In the early 1970s concern was expressed over threats and impacts of advances in biology, particularly on the impacts of genetic engineering, and Issues related to biosafety and regulations were discussed. As genetic engineering was getting established as a novel technology that had huge potential to benefit and harm, scientists themselves were concerned about biosafety and issues arising out of recombinant DNA research. So in the Asimolar Conference, convened by scientists themselves a Declaration was adopted and scientists decided that they would adopt self-regulation as at that time there was no national level legislation/regulation in the USA. The rules adopted by the scientists laid the foundation stone for modern biotechnology regulation. Over the next few years, it became clear that fears were exaggerated and recombinant DNA research was crucial in biotechnology research. Today about four decades and a half have passed. Still the Asimolar conference is regarded as a pioneering conference, not just for the technical issues discussed there, but also for the decision to adopt self-regulation and minimize potential risk. Scientists thus responded to public concerns and concerns within the scientific community. What was novel once often turns out be routine and an ordinary matter over a period of time. The same has happened to the techniques and technologies discussed in Asimolar Conference, as recombinant DNA research soon became a routine affair in biotechnology. It became clear that fears were exaggerated and technology resulted in applications, many of which were not envisaged then. A criticism of the Conference was that it ignored ethical, legal and social impacts (ELSI) of the technology and focused solely on technical issues and concern for environment and health. Yet the key lessons from Asimolar were that developing consensus was critical and prudent action in light of uncertainty was important.1 Today, we have technologies/ applications such as synthetic biology that confer to scientists far more power than genetic engineering or recombinant DNA technologies did.2 But they have such a wide-ranging impact that discussion on ethical, legal and social implications are part of the debate among scientists, National Academies of Science and regulators. In case of human genome project, a specific percentage of money as allocated for ELSI research and governments and scientists made efforts to reach out to the public and allay their fears as well as to learn from the public about their concerns, values, fears and expectations. But governing human genome mapping was relatively easier as the number of countries was limited and they had come to an understanding among themselves. So, except for a few issues like intellectual property rights and data management models, human genome mapping did not emerge as a challenge for governance at the international level. At the national level, countries had revised their regulations based on regulation of biotechnology/genetic engineering. In case of human reproductive cloning while there was a UN declaration on banning human reproductive cloning, progress could not be made on a binding international treaty on human reproductive cloning. Although efforts were made to build a consensus and move towards a binding treaty it did not go beyond a point, because consensus did not emerge. Thus while. In 2005, the United Nations adopted Declaration on Human Cloning, a binding treaty is nowhere is sight. Still it is suggested that a global governance framework may still be possible. Synthetic biology is not governed by any international treaty or convention. In the last few years it has been discussed in Convention on Biological Diversity and many studies have been done. The forthcoming COP-MOP to be held next year in Kun Ming, China is likely to make some progress on this. But given its implications for biosafety and biosecurity, whether the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the right forum is a question. At the same time as it has ramifications for other sectors ranging from health to agriculture, its governance at the global level raises new challenges. These range from whether the precautionary principle is the right principle to govern synthetic biology to whether products of synthetic biology are treated as Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) / Living Modified Organisms (LMO) or their equivalent. In December 2017 the ad-hoc technical experts group created by Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity , decided that organisms developed or being developed under current methods of synthetic biology , including the ones containing gene drives will fall under the category of LMOs. LMOs are regulated under Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB). CPB has been ratified by most countries in the world and has 171 Parties to it. CPB has an elaborate mechanism to handle LMOs and invokes the Precautionary Principle. So negotiating further under CBD/CPB seems to be a better option but some of the countries that are innovators in Synthetic Biology and Gene Drives are not Parties to CBD or CPB. For example, USA is not a Party to CBD while Australia, and, Canada are not parties to CPB. Noting that broader shifts in global biodiversity governance are happening, Rabitz points out that a broader package deal with specific provisions on Gene Drive Organisms (GDO) can be arrived at the forth coming COP-MOP (Rabitz, 2019; P.9). But in the case of Synthetic Biology there is a strong and growing Do It Yourself Biology (DIY Bio) movement that has become global and the DIY Bio community is also an important contributor in terms of innovation and events like iGEM incentivize students to work on Synthetic Biology. This diffusion of technology among those who do not work under the typical biosafety regulatory regime and the diversity in their uses and applications is a challenge to governing Synthetic Biology. Most of the DIY Bio groups are aware of biosafety concerns and adopt safety procedures and take precautionary measures. How to regulate and govern DIY Bio is a key issue because DIY Bio promotes citizen science and enables better understanding of science and hence has to be supported but as it raises questions on biosecurity, biosafety and bioterrorism, it cannot be left entirely to DIY Bio groups. Will self- regulation combined with monitoring by a government agency is enough or should this also be regulated as a regular scientific activity? Genome Editing is a novel technology that has emerged since 2012 or so, and is revolutionizing the way scientists handle and manipulate genomes. While human genome mapping enabled scientists to explore and understand the genome better, Genome Editing, offers them tools and protocols to edit the Genome, or, ‘to rewrite the genetic code’. There are some common features among Synthetic Biology, Genome Editing, Gene Drives and GM Mosquitoes from a governance perspective: • There is no clarity on applicability of any convention/treaty for their governance globally • Although nations have been trying to develop frameworks and regulatory norms, there are many unresolved issues ranging from categorization/ classification to identifying appropriate governance principles. For example should Gene Drives be classified as LMOs? Should Genome Edited Crops be treated as similar to crops bred in traditional plant breeding programs or as GMOs for regulatory purposes. • Are principles like precautionary principle adequate to develop regulatory regimes • Traditionalriskassessmentsmaynotbe sufficient to fully understand the long terms environmental impacts of these • Given the gaps in knowledge about impacts, issues on impact assessment methodologies, there are uncertainties on assessing their impacts • They raise concerns about biosafety and biosecurity and some of these are new and arise out of their unique and novel features, and, this includes concerns about DIY bio.3 • Given the wide-ranging applications in different sectors, is it possible to develop coherent governance frameworks, which can adapt in tune with technological developments. The good news is that different stakeholders are aware of these and are trying to understand the implications. Thus, whether it is National Academies of Sciences or WHO or professional bodies representing scientists or Parties to different Conventions/Treaties there are many initiatives on debating about governance issues and to develop a common understanding, if not a consensus. For example WHO has established a “expert advisory committee on Developing global standards for governance and oversight of Human Genome editing” and it has started functioning. Parties to The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are discussing the implications of advancements in science and technology, including genome editing for BWTC. A paper submitted by Switzerland states (BWTC, 2018): “CRISPR technology can reasonably be expected to surprise us with new twists and turns impossible to predict. This is likely also true for many other areas, including the above discussed nucleic acid origami, but also for synthetic biology or the neurosciences. In this context, it will be important to keep track of scientific and technological advances, and their potential bearings on the Convention. At the upcoming MX2, we should hold a technical discussion on genome editing technologies, and especially CRISPR technology, to then take the next step towards an assessment of their implications for the Convention by putting them into the broader context of the ‘new era of biology’. In doing so, we should broaden our traditional focus of ‘pathogens causing disease’ to the wider prospects and implications that developments in the biosciences as a whole may have. Furthermore, technical discussions should also take into account any intangible aspects (e.g. ‘tacit knowledge’) of advances in science and technology, which may significantly shift initial perceptions about benefits and risks. All of this will allow for a holistic and more realistic understanding of the benefits and risks to the Convention” The figure 1 illustrates some of the concerns on the potential of recent developments in science and technology. (figure 1 omitted) According to Diane DiEuliis and James Giordano (2017): “‘Neurohacking’ will increase, and biotechnology, such as CRISPR/ Cas and novel gene editors, will provide tools to realize production of novel neuroagents with dual-use potential. Simple acknowledgment of these facts, however, is insufficient. It will be essential to pursue and obtain a deeper and fuller understanding of the ways that genetic pathways to human cognitive and behavioral modification can be engaged for dual and direct use as neuroweapons, to formulate policies based on this level of understanding, and to engage surveillance of the use of these technologies in various silos of development and application, so as to afford both preventive and more preparatory capabilities” (Pp. 300-301) For obvious reasons, ‘creating’ babies through genome editing with enhanced traits or similar application have created a mixed feeling, from awe and wonder, to repulsion and shock. Even as nations struggle to regulate genome editing in health sector, the absence of international norms for governance can result in tricky situations and unanticipated turn of events. While giving an example of such a tricky situation, Dounda and Sternberg (2017), suggest that international governance is a better solution, by pointing out: “A cautionary tale on the risks of inaction can already be seen with a related assisted reproductive technology known as mitochondrial replacement therapy, which is being developed but is not yet clinically approved in the US. In a recent case, however, a New York physician exported genetically modified embryos to Mexico for implantation, specifically to evade US restrictions. Imagine the type of industry that might result if the intent were not to produce an embryo free of genetic disease, but an embryo with a genetic enhancement enabled by CRISPR. Robust international governance could discourage this kind of medical tourism, assure equal protection for the citizens of all nations, set international gene editing standards for scientists and companies, and help prevent trade disputes with gene-edited foods. The challenge is determining what mechanism of international convergence is actually possible, given the substantial legal differences that are already in place across the globe on issues like GMOs and genetic modification of human embryos.” Given the challenges in developing governance norms and principles for these emerging technologies is there a role for Science Diplomacy in helping countries to develop governance frameworks and arrive at commonly agreed principles, if not a consensus? The answer is YES. Science Diplomacy can play key role as ‘Science for Diplomacy’ and ‘Diplomacy for Science’ can play a vital role in bringing together scientists, regulators and policy makers by acting as interfaces and help in building bridges. It is not important that countries should start with a common understanding or with shared objectives. But through deliberations, countries can at least find out points they agree fully, points they totally disagree and points they agree and disagree with a give and take attitude. Science diplomacy can help countries in identifying these points and identify how their respective positions are shaped by these points. For example with respect to human genome editing for reproductive purposes, countries can at least agree on what they want to prohibit at all costs and how they will ensure that, In arriving at such a common position, science diplomacy can play a vital role when scientists and diplomats work together towards this. While scientists can rely on positions taken by National Academies and ethical guidelines in vogue in the respective countries, diplomats can negotiate on developing flexible positions and norms that are beyond any bargain or compromise. Mutual interactions among them will enable a better understanding that can be used to arrive at a shared understanding for further deliberations. Through track II diplomacy, other stakeholders can contribute to further progress on developing such an understanding. On the other hand Science Diplomacy can be part of track II diplomacy although it may not be very visible. If we conceptualize that Science Diplomacy is a broad activity that goes beyond closed doors of forums for negotiations, and, activities of scientists and diplomats, then we have to consider the role of, inter alia, non-state actors, and, civil society in activities related to developing norms for governance. Given the importance of public engagement and public participation, Science Diplomacy can facilitate that by engaging with other stakeholders directly or indirectly. For example while in many of the Conference of Parties and Meeting of Parties (COP- MOP) , civil society groups and others that are recognized, can participate as observers , their influence among the public and their role in shaping public opinion also has to be taken into account. Science Diplomacy can be useful in engaging with them as observers as well as interfaces between public on one hand, and, scientists and policy makers, on the other hand. Obviously the tasks are not easy and there are many challenges. Although there can be a consensus translating that into a binding agreement or treaty is not easy. As these technologies have biosafety and biosecurity concerns, it is likely that Parties to BWTC will address those concerns as far as BWTC is concerned. Similarly some of the concerns relating to environmental impacts, long term impacts, and risk assessment can be addressed through deliberations by Parties of CBD/ CPB, which might result in changes/ additions/revisions in CBD/CPB. The WHO’s expert advisory committee can develop guidelines to regulate genome editing for health/population related purposes. Dounda and Sternberg have identified some relevant initiatives in governance of genome editing. Thus there is scope for using health diplomacy, environmental diplomacy and perhaps innovation diplomacy in moving towards governance norms for these technologies. But this will not happen on its own. Until countries realize that Science Diplomacy is essential to address tricky questions in international governance of these technologies and understand that some nudging including persuasion is required through Science Diplomacy and create forums and spaces for diplomats and scientists to interact and work together, Science Diplomacy will not have an effective role in this. As many of the Science Academies are active in addressing issues relating to governance, in each country, a small team from representatives of these Academies, negotiators can be formed to develop a coherent negotiating strategy across different forums, COP-MOPs etc. One hopes that the countries will seize the opportunities for Science Diplomacy to play a positive role and give it the importance it deserves in this challenging task. Having said that, we should not expect that Science Diplomacy will be the saviour or a factor that could override all other factors in moving towards a consensus. Perhaps developments in this year and the next few years will indicate the directions in which the world is moving in governing these technologies.

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