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The 1AC’s call to integrate AI into military operations accelerates the efficiency of warfare while relying on racist stereotypes to construct and identify threats – that increases instability and generates the justification for endless war – voting neg challenges calls to militarize AI and invests instead in diplomacy to de-escalate tensions

Suchman, 2020

(Lucy, professor of the anthropology of science and technology at Lancaster University, “Algorithmic warfare and the reinvention of accuracy,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, 2020, pp. 175-187, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1760587, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

The discourse surrounding Project Maven overwhelmingly begs the question of the criteria by which ‘objects’ are identified as imminent threats. Just what constitutes the profile of an ‘ISIS pickup truck’ (Peniston 2017), and what were the 38 categories used by those who hand-labelled 150,000 images to form the initial training data set? Most pressingly, what does it mean to be living under drones, where the presence of what is seen by the US apparatus as ‘abnormal activity’ (Weisgerberger 2017) might at any point trigger the identification of a threat and attack from weapons operating outside the range of one’s own perception (Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012)? The project demands that we turn our attention to the highly problematic systems of classification by which categories like ‘Islamic State militants’ operating in Iraq, Syria, Somalia and other areas of US strategic interest are constituted. Even more urgently, it calls on us to question the premise that those categories are pre-existing and stable and that their members exist independently of the classificatory schemes that identify them, or of classification’s violent consequences (see Bowker and Star 1999).

At some point down the road, according to Shanahan, the goal is to put the Project Maven technology ‘at the edge,’ on the drones themselves (Weisgerberger 2017). Analyses of the use of remotely-controlled weapon systems should begin to make clear, however, the further problems inherent in the project of untethering these systems from their human controllers, which military technophiles take as the next logical step in the automation of warfare. Inescapably, the actual situations in which weapons are used are fraught with uncertainties. That these give rise to misrecognition on the part of human combatants could be – and has been – cited as the rationale for further automation of target identification. But if we look carefully at the circumstances surrounding documented incidents, it becomes clear that however tragically prone to misreading actual situations of contemporary ‘irregular warfare’ might be, the premise that they could be specified algorithmically is indefensible. There is no technological solution to this problem.

Conclusion

Interrogating the Cold War logics of nuclear deterrence, Mackenzie (1990) has effectively opened up for us the black box of weapons targeting, and elucidated the contingent accomplishment of accuracy as a fact. In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, accuracy involved stabilising mathematical calculations of the trajectory that would be followed by a missile once released from its silo. The reinvention of accuracy in the case of so-called counterterrorism operations has worked to elide the difference between the precision with which a weapon, once fired, will strike its target, and the acts of identification of legitimate threats that targeting presupposes.

Insofar as the ‘becoming weapon’ of perception is tied to the identification of an Other as threat, this process long predates modern weaponry. A question for us to pursue, then, is just what are the particular apparatuses of recognition that comprise contemporary military discourses and technologies? How does the current ‘threat’ become recognisable, as specifically situated persons, embodied and emplaced? As military perceptions become more deeply imbricated with weaponry, it is also clear that the elaboration of weaponry is characterised not by a corresponding sophistication in military visualities, but rather by ever more reliance on still crude classificatory systems of racial/ethnic stereotyping and profiling. The cross hair of the weapon is deeply implicated in the objectification of its target. Yet as long as the ‘accuracy’ of the weapon is measured by the relation of lethal force to its designated object, the most vital question is left outside of the frame. Whether for a guided missile system, or the final actions of a suicide bomber, the fundamental question is how a target comes to be designated as such in the first instance, and within what regimes of historic injury and future accountability.

The operational trope of ‘situational awareness’ is a core doctrine for military command and control. Taking a commitment to situational awareness seriously opens generative lines of critique – critique that needs to be taken seriously as well by those committed to military doctrine and operations (see de Goede 2020; Austin, Bellanova, and Kaufmann 2019). My aim in this paper has been to contribute to the wider body of scholarship devoted to understanding more deeply how technologies of militarism enrol their subjects and create their objects. The circuits that connect the apparatuses that I have discussed are the fantasies of recognition and the practices of dehumanisation that have shaped the politics of militarism since the advent of modern war fighting. These become ever more dangerous in the contemporary moment, as the figure of the ‘imminent threat’ is expanded into a horizon of anywhere and of endless war, and in that way actions taken in the name of defence by the US and its allies become a truly imminent threat to others. The promise of algorithmic warfare is a technological solution to the infamous ‘fog of war,’ taking the speed that automation enables as a proxy for the validity of the analyses that result. Rather than further accelerate the speed of warfighting, we need to challenge proclamations of an inevitable AI arms race and redirect investment to innovations in diplomacy and social justice that might truly de-escalate the current threats – both geopolitical and planetary – to our collective security.

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