Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

The 1AC’s approach to disease security is underpinned by a racialized politics of insecurity that fails to respond to future pandemics and naturalizes racist assumptions that inform Western pandemic responses

Pan, 2021

(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)

Mainstream security theory and practice (methodologies) consist in a highly racialised IR epistemology-cum-ontology. These three imbricated layers together provide a crucial context within which the West’s interpretations of and responses to COVID-19 need to be understood. First, the racialised politics of (in)security has allowed many in the West to intuitively associate the threat of coronavirus ontologically with the ‘zone of insecurity’, particularly the ‘yellow people’. Initially identified in China, COVID-19 was quickly ontologised, perhaps subconsciously by many, as a disease of non-whites, Asians, and particularly Chinese, possibly due to their seemingly unhygienic and even inhumane practices such as the ‘wet market’. In a UC Berkeley’s Health Services Center ‘managing fears and anxiety’ informational post on Instagram in early 2020, xenophobia towards Asian people was listed as a ‘normal reaction’ (Hussain 2020).

Meanwhile, locating the virus threat in the ‘zone of insecurity’ also evokes a (false) sense of security and immunity among those who think they safely reside in the ‘zone of security’. At the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Riyadh in late February 2020, the topic of COVID-19 came up but European countries were not interested. An indifferent Italian representative allegedly said that ‘We have nothing to do with it [COVID-19]. It is a yellow people’s disease, not ours’ (Jiang 2020). Repeatedly calling the coronavirus the ‘China virus’, US President Donald Trump wasn’t concerned either: ‘you have 15 people [in the US], and the 15 within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero’. In other words, such diseases would be unlikely to take hold in the ‘zone of security’. To be sure, not all Western political and opinion leaders buy the racist narrative on COVID-19 and, while some did, it happened mostly during the early stage of the pandemic. However, in the fight against a rapidly spreading pandemic, such initial ontological misperceptions could and have proven very costly.

Second, when the coronavirus inevitably spread to the ‘zone of security’, many (certainly not all) Western measures in controlling the pandemic closely followed the predictable script of some racialised methodologies of security and biopolitics. The Trump administration was quick to seal its southwestern border and deport thousands of migrants in an attempt to prevent the ‘import’ of coronavirus from ‘elsewhere’, while in fact its deportation policy contributed to exporting cases to countries like Mexico, Haiti and Guatemala. Earlier, it also implemented a travel ban on the entry of Chinese nationals. Australia and other Western countries quickly followed suit. Even as case numbers surged in Western countries such as Italy, Spain, and the US, there was a strong reluctance to apply the travel ban within the Western ‘zone of security’. Dr Norman Swan, presenter of the Australian broadcaster ABC’s Health Report, attributed the reluctance to the factor of ‘politics’ (Zhou and Xiao 2020). Yet no ordinary politics, this is racialised biopolitics informed by the aforementioned racialised ontology of (in)security.

A third important dimension of the COVID-19 Westfailure has to do with epistemic racism, which defines the ‘zone of insecurity’ in terms of its perceived inability to know (or even count). Those in such a zone are believed to have little to offer in the way of credible expertise or knowledge. ‘Can we trust Chinese Covid-19 science?’, reads the title of a Guardian article that, while paying lip service to the merit of Chinese research (on COVID-19), made sure to mention every possible reason to be suspicious of ‘Chinese’ science: from its authoritarian regime, censorship, human rights abuse, and ambition for global science dominance to academic fraud, intellectual property theft, and lax approaches to research ethics (Spinney 2020). The same concerns prompted the Australian media to ask a similar question: ‘Can we trust a Chinese vaccine?’

The mistrust of non-Western knowledge and experience, among other things, saw strong Western resistance to wearing face-masks, at least in the initial phase of the pandemic. A common practice in Asia, mask-wearing was seen as mostly associated with diseases and reflective of Asians’ ‘herd mentality’ that is ‘ingrained into their cultural psyche in a way it isn’t here’ (Elliott 2020). Western leaders and medical experts only began to encourage mask-wearing after they eventually felt satisfied that there was now enough accumulative scientific evidence (McCabe 2020). Never mind much earlier evidence in Chinese research, which helped shape China’s national policy response to the COVID-19 (including mandatory use of face-masks in public areas) from the start of February 2020. A later Cambridge-led study published in the journal Nature Medicine arrived at similar findings, but it did not mention the earlier Chinese discovery. The explanation of the lead researcher of the Cambridge team is telling: the quality of the Chinese study ‘was not at the standards that we were comfortable to cite or rely on scientifically’ (Chen 2020).

Indeed, while Western responses seemed to be based on scientific evidence, Chinese responses were almost invariably labelled ‘draconian’, ‘excessive’, ‘flat-out backward’, and ‘dystopian’ (Johnson 2020), or simply referred to as ‘Xi Jinping’s tactics’ (Birtles 2020). By definition, such tactics would be anathema to Western scientific and democratic sensibilities. In their policy recommendations to the government, British scientists initially did not even consider a Wuhan-style lockdown an option, citing that it ‘would never be acceptable in a democracy like the UK’ (Grey and MacAskill 2020).

Conclusion

Most studies of racism in international security have focused, and rightly so, on its violence and injustice imposed on the racialised Others (see other contributions in this Forum). But as this piece has illustrated, the racialised politics of (in)security is a double-edged sword, not only often traumatising the weak and the disadvantaged in the ‘zone of insecurity’, but also (albeit less often, certainly less often acknowledged) inflicting damage in the ‘zone of security’ itself, particularly in terms of the necropolitical economic consequences for those racial and intersectional Others within (Mbembe 2003; Scauso et al. 2020). Thanks to the highly racialised frameworks and strategies, many Western countries have mistaken the racialised Others for the source of the transnational threat of COVID-19, adopted racist half-measures that are ineffective, and failed to learn valuable lessons and experiences from the Others who have traditionally been dismissed as civilisationally and scientifically inferior and backward. Yet, the self-serving racial boundaries between the imagined zones of security and insecurity offer no defence against a virus that neither recognises nor operates along colour lines. Various lessons could and should be learned from the pandemic, but Western security experts and policymakers would do well to critically reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological myths, blind spots, and dangers of their racialised regime of truth. If anything positive was to come out of the disastrous failures, it would entail radically re-imagining security/insecurity in a post-COVID and posthuman world.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.