The 1AC’s call for increased cybersecurity is another manifestation of the hysteric social relation that maintains an unrealizable need for improving cybersecurity through shifting the goals of cybersecurity or proposing unattainable standards
Jacobsen, 2020
(Jeppe Teglskov, researcher at the Royal Danish Defence College’s Institute for Military Technology, “From neurotic citizen to hysteric security expert: a Lacanian reading fo the perpetual demand for US cyber defence,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 1, 2020, pp. 46-58, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1735830, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
At the end of 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) brought together policy experts to develop cybersecurity recommendation for the incoming president. Under the headline ‘Military Doctrine and Deterrence’, the commission report emphasised the importance of ‘the need for a credible military presence in cyberspace to provide a deterrent against potential attackers’ (CSIS 2008, 24). The following quote from the report, however, calls in to question the commission’s own recommendation:
Deterrence in cyberspace is particularly complicated because of the problems with attribution and identification. If a country does not know who is attacking, it is difficult to create appropriate and proportionate responses in ways that reduce the chance of escalation. A signal that a country is contemplating a response that goes to all potential attackers will not deter and could actually create more conflict (ibid.: 26).
In short, if the attacker is not attributable and hence does not fear retaliation, then even the most potent cyber military is superfluous. To make a policy recommendation and in the same breath call into question the soundness of this policy is a hysteric communication par excellence. It avoids the anxiety that emerges when the specific object of desire (offensive military capabilities) is achieved by already introducing a new object of desire (better attribution).
Tellingly, the Administration’s decision to establish the US Cyber Command, the cyber branch of the US military, was immediately criticised as insufficient. CSIS director James Lewis underlined, for example, that ‘the U.S. is widely recognized to have pre-eminent offensive cyber capabilities, but it obtains little or no deterrent effect from this’ (cited in Markoff, Sanger, and Shanker 2010). In other words, the government should do a better job defending against and identifying the culprits in cyberspace.
Then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III was ready with a plan for improving cyber defence capacities. Presenting the Department’s cyber strategy, Lynn underlined that ‘[US cyber] deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation’ (Lynn III 2010, 99–100). The newfound priority of cyber defence did not appear to reassure the expert subject. As a case in point, the National Research Council (NRC) hosted a 2010 workshop with policy experts on cyber deterrence. And shortly after, the independent Defense Science Board (DSB) created a task force on Resilient Military System and the Advanced Cyber Threat to provide recommendations on how to maintain deterrence in the cyber era. Neither the NRC workshop nor the DSB report found offensive cyber capabilities or cyber defence to be the solution to the cyber deterrence problem. Instead, the desired object had drifted along: Now, the Administration needs to clearly articulate the willingness and the capacity to respond to cyberattacks not only with cyber weapons but with all available tools – ultimately nuclear weapons (DSB 2013: 15; Rosenzweig 2010, 247).
Articulating the willingness to respond to cyberattacks with any means was first introduced by the Obama Administration in the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace and subsequently iterated in both the Department of Defense (2015) Cyber Strategy as well as in a White House cyber deterrence white paper of late 2015 (Obama 2011: 14; Department of Defense 2015: 11; Otto 2015). However, as is prototypical in a hysteric social bond, getting close to the object of desire – that is, having more steadfast articulations about the willingness to retaliate – causes anxiety that prompts a slide towards a new object of desire. In this case, manifesting in a redefinition of the meaning of cyber deterrence.
Two subsequent commission reports on cyber deterrence, namely the CSIS cyber recommendations to President Trump and the 2017 DSB follow-up report on cyber deterrence (CSIS 2017a; DSB. 2017), no longer focused only on large-scale cyberattacks against the US critical infrastructures as that which needed to be deterred. In fact, the government’s cyber deterrence’s efforts including the articulation of a willingness to respond with all means necessary seemed to have worked, as no serious, crippling cyberattacks against US critical infrastructures had taken place – despite the experts’ continuous criticisms of US national cyber insecurity. What the US did not prevent, however, was economic cyber espionage and minor, non-destructive disturbances of public and private networks. Thus, in the new commission reports, the anxiety over such malicious cyber activity was now included as that which needed to be deterred. Once again, anxiety pushes desire along, now in the form of a desire for better defining a proportional response to cyberattacks on private entities and economic espionage. This drift to better declaratory policy also offers an explanation as to why the government – when it finally delivered on the previous demand for better attribution – failed to satisfy the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence. In 2014, the US successfully attributed and indicted Chinese government hackers for commercial cyber espionage, but as the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence now involved a desire for a strong national security response to cyber espionage, the US government’s attributions only reinforced the demands for economic sanctions (Nakashima 2015).
In short, as soon as the government delivers, the expert subject’s desire shifts, from offensive military capabilities in cyberspace to better attribution, to an articulation of willingness to respond, and most recently, to the need to define proportional responses to non-military cyber activity. With the drift, the cyber threat continues as a pertinent national security challenge – to which the solution remains always just out of reach.
Yet, the constant drift in the object of desire is only one manifestation of a hysteric social bond. Another is a demand for the unachievable. One of the policy recommendations that seems most persistent is cyber resilience: The 2013 DSB report demanded investments in resilient systems to ensure a ‘survivable strike capability’ (DSB 2013, 41), which was reinvented as the demand for resilient ‘thin line strike capabilities’ in the 2017 DSB report (2017, 17–8). And both the 2008 and 2017 CSIS report (2008: 27; 2017a: 6), and the NRC workshop proceedings (Rosenzweig 2010, 256) call for more cyber resilience initiatives. As an element in a hysteric social bond, the persistent demand for resilience ties to the lack of clarity that accompanies this policy recommendation. The same reports that call upon the Administration to implement resilience-building measures, call into question the feasibility of resilience. The DSB. (2017: 4, 10) underlines that the Internet of Things ‘will only exacerbate an already tenuous posture and make defense even more challenging in the coming years’, and consequently that ‘offensive cyber capabilities continue to grow and are likely to outpace cyber defense and resilience’. The CSIS (2017a, 6) is equally sceptical: ‘While there have been good advances in the network protections of leading defence contractors, this has only encouraged opponents to become more inventive and more persistent’.
The assessment that resilience in cyberspace is unfeasible is understandable. Resilience is defined as ‘the ability to provide acceptable operations despite disruption: natural or man-made, inadvertent or deliberate’ (DSB 2013, 2). But when is something ‘acceptable’? And, how do you determine whether resilience efforts are deterring the adversary? These questions remind unanswered.
The critical risk literature has explained how resilience, along with precaution, premediation and imagination are styles of reasoning that have come to dominate security governance, for example, in the response to terrorism or natural disasters (Aradau and van Munster 2011). As the above has shown, this also applies to cyberspace; however, reading the expert subject’s call for cyber deterrence through the hysteric social bond reveals the shortcomings of reducing the expert to the provider of security techniques such as resilience. Truly embracing risk or uncertainty management would force expert subjects at least to recognise the need to discuss what ‘acceptable’ levels of cyber risks and ‘resilient enough’ look like. The lack of attention given to questions such as these suggests that the expert subject occupies a social position not simply for managing cyber risks and uncertainties but where identification takes place through making demands that keep the space for criticism open. With reference to uncertainty, the expert subject can always insist that current strategies do not sufficiently manage the cyber insecurities, keep the confrontation with its desire at a distance, and ultimately reproduce ‘cyber’ as a national insecurity.