The aff’s securitization of hybrid warfare is anxiety-reproducing – oscillating descriptions between its knowability and unknowability as well as its undefined scope entrenches anxiety and primes audiences to accept strategies to manage anxiety produced by the threat of hybrid warfare
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
*HW = hybrid warfare
Building on Heath-Kelly and Jacobsen, our final argument is that hybrid warfare works exactly like their examples, as HW, too, is a discourse that is simultaneously anxiety-repressing and anxiety-reproducing. In fact, we argue that the linking of HW and East/West geopolitics produces a particularly strongly anxiety-ridden discourse. While hybrid warfare presents threats as invisible and omnipresent due to their covert and networked nature, the East/West imagination further raises the stakes and salience of such threats by painting them as parts of a titanic civilisational struggle. The subjects produced by such discourse can never rest, as what may be going on right behind their noses is not just one particular cyber-attack, a single conspiracy theory that has gained traction on Facebook, or merely one instance of information stolen by a spy. Instead, it is a battle for the future of ‘the West’ and the Czech belonging to it, one where the alternative option is the most tragic one: a descent deep into the ‘abyss’ of ‘the East’ (Cadier, 2019). We will now illustrate these arguments by focusing on the unfathomability of HW, the shifting nature of the threats it produces, and the anxieties inherent in the East/West geopolitics that underpin it.
First, the ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) is pre-emptively incorporated in the HW discourse by its portrayal of the looming dangers as insidious, invisible and even impossible to detect. As a key security document states, ‘[t]he principal risk to which a subject attacked by a hybrid campaign is exposed lies in the fact that they will not be able to identify the hybrid campaign – in time, in its full scale, or at all’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 129). According to the deputy Helena Langˇsadlov ´ ´ a, what we are supposedly facing are highly dangerous, yet ‘creeping threats’, which we ‘cannot see on a day by day basis’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2019). This leads some to claim that ‘at no point in history was it so extremely difficult to decide, if we are at war, or not’ (Taborský, ´ 2019, p. 164). While there may be little drama on the surface, no one can ever rest in this logic. An attack may be already underway, one that can even be approximated to war, literally at any minute. As the Special Forces general, Karel Rehka, ˇ put it at a conference organised in the Czech parliament: ‘In a way, we are already at war, we just do not realise it or are not able to admit it.’ (Lang, 2015) This is a mode of thinking that produces highly anxious subjects, in a constant sense of the ‘expectant dread’ that is anxiety (Hook, 2015, p. 117), one not yet having a clear referent and directed towards all possible yet still unknown dangers that may materialise at any time.
It is in these notions that an unspecified existential threat may be hidden behind mundane events that the otherwise backgrounded ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of HW suddenly kicks back in. If the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination ‘made sense’ and provided at least some fleeting ontological security by pointing to Russia, this is frustrated by the surplus anxiety produced via this ‘postmodern’ imagination of insidious, hidden networks operating in physical and cyberspace alike. In fact, as the discourse postulates, we may not even know that it really is Russia in the first place that is behind a particular incident, as hybrid attackers seek to create ‘an environment where responsibility for these activities cannot (at least formally) be attributed to them, or at least only speculatively and with great difficulty’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). We may ultimately never know if this or that mundane event is actually not a part of something much bigger, as it is the very aim of the attacker to ‘prevent a clear interpretation of events and the discovery of their interconnectedness’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). Therefore, while the prevalent ‘modern’ geopolitical reading of HW enables channelling anxiety by constructing Russia an object of fear, it still remains far from the manageable fear of ‘fight or flight’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 241). This is because these supposedly known aspects of the danger are constantly being accompanied and disrupted by the surplus anxiety of the ‘unknown unknowns’ stemming from the partial inclusion of the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical reading. This effectively pre-empts the HW discourse from ever solving the problems it is supposedly designed to tackle, as it is wholly unclear how to act upon threats that we are not yet aware of or do not know how to make sense of.
Second, this oscillation between the known and the unknown and between fear and anxiety manifests itself in the constantly shifting construction of what is supposed to be the exact nature of the threat coming from Russia. This is best illustrated in the wording of the annual reports of the Czech counterintelligence agency (SIS), which reinforce the notion that Russia is indeed a severe threat, yet the precise character and shape of this threat appears to be changing year after year. As already mentioned, in first annual public report reflecting on the situation after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the SIS warned that their assessment showed the formation of what was spectacularly labelled as the ‘New Reincarnation of the Comintern’ – a loose network of allied actors, similar to the Cold War Soviet-controlled network of ideologically affiliated political parties, agitators and agents. The danger was portrayed as a new version of this tried and tested strategy, which Russia supposedly employs to connect different groups dissatisfied with the Western liberal democracy (Security Information Service, 2015, pp. 11–12).
However, the spectre of the Comintern was a one-off, never to appear again. Instead, SIS later concluded that the threat resided in a much looser combination of often uncoordinated actions of Russian intelligence, authentic Czech individuals not in any way linked to Moscow but ‘only’ spreading their own ‘pro-Russian’ worldviews, and finally, even in the lack of education about modern history in schools (Security Information Service, 2018, pp. 6–8). This trend of diffusing the danger from a Kremlin-coordinated network to seeing the threats in mere ideological resonances further continued. The most recent report notes that there is a ‘transition from state-controlled or directed activities to spontaneous actions’ of like-minded actors. ‘When Russian state officials express what they desire to happen (for instance by spreading manipulative information), proxy actors without any links to the Russian state proceed to action on their own initiative and based on what they think the officials might want’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9).
Through this move, the spectre of ‘Russian hybrid warfare’ can now encompass virtually anything that can be somehow interpreted as matching with the desires or interests of the Kremlin, without any need for proving direct links, as these are no longer considered necessary. The construction of ‘a threat’ now includes even situations when ‘a foreign power does not engage in any direct action and keeps its distance, while using various ways (PR, instigating statements, propaganda etc.) to inspire individual persons to take action’ (Security Information Service, 2020, p. 9). Put differently, Russian threat can be present even where there is no direct Russian hand whatsoever. Literally any individual with views somehow similar to those of the Russian state can be seen as part of it, which makes the idea that security can ever be achieved virtually impossible. Instead, this logic contributes to the reproduction of an anxious society, defined by ‘the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247).
Third, this notion that the possibility that something ‘Russian’ may be insidiously present deep within the Czech society then revives also the old anxieties inherent in the ‘modern’ East/West geopolitical imagination itself. Central Europeans’ self-positioning in East/West geopolitics is highly ambivalent (Kuus, 2007; Todorova, 2009). On the one hand, being or becoming part of ‘the Western civilisation’ is a source of ontological security. On the other hand, this security is never quite complete or permanent. This is because Central Europeans locate themselves at the very limit of the West, as ‘European edge-men’ (Ma¨lksoo, 2010, p. 5), whose membership in the civilisation must constantly be proved as it can always be taken away – especially by the forces of the ‘East’. The ‘old shadow of Yalta’, the feeling that the region’s ‘freedom could yet again be expendable in times of crisis’ is constantly present (Ma¨lksoo, 2010, p. 75). Put differently, East/West geopolitics equips the Czech ‘pro-Western’ security intellectuals with a ‘mental map, where the country is depicted as being on the “edge” of Europe and constantly risking to “fall” into an abyss […] traditionally characterised as the “East”’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84). While the East/West geopolitical imagination can succeed in spatialising the threat in the Russian ‘other’, the position it grants to the self is always potentially insecure. Therefore, it is also East/West geopolitics itself that produces subjects that are constantly on alert, facing the constant ‘possibility of loss of one’s soul’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 8) that defines the experience of anxiety.
Such fragile geopolitical self-positioning further fuels the search for new and new sources of hybrid threats, as failing to uncover and face them may have existential consequences, especially given that ‘Easternness’ may have already infiltrated and compromised the Czech social body. This notion of ‘East within’ links to the above discussed unfathomability and invisibility of HW and manifests itself in multiple ways. For one counterintelligence report, it takes the form of smuggled ideas and narratives, presented ‘in a way leading Czech citizens to believe they are recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not of Russian propaganda’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11). Similarly, a popular book on ‘fake news’ geopoliticises social attitudes en bloc by identifying them along East/West axis, presenting the ‘disappointed’ part of society as ‘seeing a model in Russia, or perhaps China’ (Gregor, Mlejnkova´, & Zvolsi.info, 2018, p. 62). For others, the ‘East within’ takes the form in the physical presence of ‘Putin’s agents’ who supposedly ‘quite likely teach your children at universities, you meet them for a coffee in your favourite caf´e or work in normal jobs.’ (Kundra, 2016a, p. 88).
The anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare is thus also about creating the normatively highly disturbing ‘“red under every bed” mentality’ (Fridman, 2018, p. 3) and applying ‘the ethics of total war […] even to the smallest skirmish’ (Galeotti, 2019, p. 8). Therefore, viewing security threats through the prism of hybrid warfare reproduces a highly anxious society and perpetuates the justification for those ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ (O ´ Tuathail & Agnew, 1992) that would not hesitate to provide the sort of geopolitical fixes that were discussed in the previous sections. Thereby, the discourse ends up reproducing itself, as the two faces of anxiety geopolitics not only disrupt, but also dialectically reinforce one another: geopolitical discourse emerges to repress anxiety and provide ontological security, yet the anxiety inherent in the discourse disrupts ontological security and, to come full circle, creates the need for geopolitical discourses. The result is a society oscillating between its desire to avoid anxiety and the repeated frustration thereof; an affective pulsation that has arguably been elevated to a dominant mode of politics of (in)security in our present time (Eklundh et al., 2017), of which hybrid warfare is a prime example. As similar patterns of anxious over-reaction and securitisation of broad areas of social life have been recognised by authors writing about HW in different empirical contexts (Fridman, 2018; Galeotti, 2019; M¨ alksoo, 2018; Ord ¨ ´en, 2019), we believe that the problem with ‘hybrid warfare’ is of a more general nature and the relevance of our analysis reaches beyond the Czech case.