The 1AC’s descriptions of a Russian hybrid warfare deploys Orientalist tropes to secure a collective Western identity threatened by Russia as a scapegoat for dispersed sources of anxiety
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
*HW = hybrid warfare
First, a certain event needs to be constructed as a supposed point of origin of the perceived unease, a ‘crisis’ that dislocates the symbolic order (Nabers, 2015). This is the first move in the repression of anxiety, one in which an ‘actually existing’ empirical event is discursively presented as the apparent cause of the deeper ontological crisis that is affectively experienced as anxiety. In the HW discourse in Czechia, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine of 2014 is presented as such profoundly shocking and dislocating event. As the otherwise rather down-to-earth and matter-of-fact military intellectual, Karel Rehka, ˇ puts it: ‘the Russian Federation shocked the whole world. The unimaginable was broken into.’ (Rehka, ˇ 2017, p. 199) ‘Shock’ and ‘helplessness’ are words used also by a high-ranking Czech diplomat (personal interview, Prague, August 4, 2020). A leading Czech think-tanker then recalls how ‘surprised’ he was by Russia’s invasion and how ‘disorganised and fragmented’ the security debates were in the months that followed (Janda, 2017). The affective experience is captured well also in a widely cited and circulated popular book, which vividly describes how ‘we are walking on the edge of a cliff’ and ‘[u]ncertainty is the only thing that you can count on these days’ (Alvarov´ a, 2017, p. 20). Therefore, 2014 was constructed as a radical breakthrough into a much more insecure world. Yet, this move of identifying the supposed origin of these dizzying feelings of anxiety in one particular event was at the same time already the first step of seeking ontological security by making sense of it.
A second step is putting the name on the problem. It is only the performative and affect-laden performance of naming that connects disparate phenomena together and creates a discursive ‘object’ that can be then dealt with politically (Laclau, 2005). In our case, this leads to the creative appropriation of the concepts of ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘hybrid threats’, which were virtually non-existent in the Czech public discourse prior to 2014 (Daniel & Eberle, 2018), and using them as a linchpin that connects all sorts of societal problems. For an authoritative Czech security document, ‘hybrid threat’ is a ‘way to wage a confrontation or a conflict’, one that is characterised by an extraordinarily broad spectrum of measures: ‘a wide, complex, adaptable, and integrated combination of conventional and unconventional means, overt and covert activities, characterised primarily by coercion and subversion’ (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2016, p. 127). The range of actors that can execute such methods is similarly broad, including ‘military, paramilitary, and various civilian actors’ (ibid.). Similarly, an overview of a ‘Russian hybrid strategy’ provided by the counterintelligence service includes ‘interpretation of modern history’, different ways of ‘information warfare’, ‘networking/infiltration’ across the fields of politics, economy, crime, espionage, culture and education, and military/guerrilla operations alike (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). In statements like these, hybrid warfare is stretched so as to incorporate almost anything that can be understood as a hostile activity. A such, it becomes an universal object of fear, broad enough to be used as a placeholder for all sorts of anxieties.
In the third move, hybrid warfare is territorialised by pointing to Russia as its ultimate source. The ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of hybrid warfare in terms of flows, clouds and infrastructures, is backgrounded in favour of the ‘modern’ territorial East/West geopolitics of a Russian threat. In certain cases, this means little more than merely pointing out that it is indeed Russia that ‘has executed hybrid operations [ …], including targeted disinformation activities and cyber-attacks’, as the Defence Strategy (Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2017, p. 7) puts it explicitly and other documents hint at implicitly (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, 2015). More interesting are the instances which present Russia not only as one source of threats, but as an orchestrator coordinating all possible means and actors. In such cases, the ‘postmodern’ geopolitical imagination of networks is used and reproduced, yet with a key twist: such networks are seen as hierarchical, with centre in Moscow. In this logic, different domestic actors – ‘alternative news’ websites spreading anti-Western narratives, right-wing populists, even contrarian intellectuals – can ultimately be tied to an overall Russia’s masterplan (for an example see Janda & Kundra, 2016). The counterintelligence agency reports are an example of this ‘puppet-master’ approach. One of them lists ‘covert infiltration of Czech media and the Internet’ and ‘foundation of puppet organizations, covert and open support of populist or extremist subjects’ among the key activities of Russia’s ‘information operations’ (Security Information Service, 2016, p. 9). Another outlines this logic in colourful detail, claiming that ‘Russia is creating a structure in Europe drawing on the concept of the Comintern (the Communist International; the Third International) founded by the Soviet Union’ (Security Information Service, 2015, p. 11), an organised network of all sorts of actors ‘with pro-Russian stances or fighting against the system’ (ibid., 12).
However, different actors can be labelled as agents or instrument of HW and then geopoliticised and linked to Russia not only by direct association, but also because they are merely voicing opinions that can be somehow qualified as ‘pro-Russian’. As a more recent counterintelligence report puts it, actually an ‘overwhelming majority of disinformation websites in Czech are the work of Czech […] citizens, who are not supported by Russian entities.’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 8) Nevertheless, this still makes them a part of a broader geopolitical threat, as ‘these people and their internet projects are misused by Russia to spread propaganda or support other components of the hybrid strategy.’ (ibid., 8) It is this imagination of a Russian-orchestrated networked threat that enables a leading Czech journalist to blankly dismiss the prominent disinformation website, Aeronet. cz, as ‘writing for Putin’ (Kundra, 2016b), without any evidence of links to the Russian state known at that point and with his own subsequent investigations showing that this is most likely not the case. It also makes it possible to deal with anxieties by externalising the problem, such as when a popular book argues that ‘Furious hate […] is not Czech, it is something new, foreign. It came from the outside and ‘somehow’ entered into us.’ (Alvarov´ a, 2017, p. 88).
In the fourth and final move, this ‘hybrid’ struggle with Russia is endowed with meaning by being inserted into the whole symbolic structure of East/West civilisational geopolitics, in which ‘[i]ssues of security and geopolitics are […] reframed in cultural terms. They become simultaneously geographical, cultural and strategic concepts, and they diffuse into ever more spheres of political life.’ (Kuus, 2007, p. x) The societal anxieties that are managed via the narrative of hybrid warfare emanating from Russia, are now also made part of an eternal struggle between the East and the West. This reactivates the ‘mental maps’, in which ‘the West’ functions as a desired point of identification and a promise of security and prosperity, whereas ‘the East’ is seen as ‘an abyss’, a notion ‘which in the Czech political discourse refers less to a geographical space than to ontological categories defining the alienated past of the Czech Republic.’ (Cadier, 2019, p. 84) As one member of parliament, Jan Bartoˇsek, put it, the Czechs are left with an unequivocal choice: ‘either we will be part of NATO as a firm ally of our pro-Western orientation, or we will be just one of Russia’s many colonies. There is no third way.’ (in Chamber of Deputies, 2018a).
In statements like these, Russia is presented as a fundamentally different entity, a quintessentially Oriental actor, belonging to a different ‘universe’ that ‘until nowadays has not met’ with the European one (Alvarova, ´ 2017, p. 70). Echoing classical Orientalist tropes, Russians supposedly rely on ‘[m]ysticism, irrationality, associational instead of logical thinking – thus, a model of thinking that is of different civilisation, the one we know rather from the Orient’ (Alvarova, ´ 2017, p. 193). The potentially catastrophic consequences of allying with Russia are then often presented through references to the past, reinforcing the notion that what is at stake in HW is in fact yet another instance of a historical struggle between civilisations. ‘Many of us probably know our modern history, from 1945 through 1948, Russian advisers, death of [foreign minister] Jan Masaryk, occupation in 1968. The Russian influence, which simply broke us away from the West, ripped us from [our] democratic development, and has incalculable economic consequences stretching to this day.’ (Helena Langˇsadlov ´ a ´ in Chamber of Deputies, 2018b).
This idea that issues like propaganda, misinformation or rise of populism are instances of a dramatic geopolitical confrontation, is finally driven home also by the notion that it is the West as a whole that is under attack, not just any individual country. According to a counterintelligence report, ‘the goal of the Russian hybrid campaign’ is ‘primarily to weaken NATO and the EU internally, e.g. by weakening individual member states’ (Security Information Service, 2018, p. 7). Therefore, should the Czechs fail to defend themselves, they are supposedly endangering something much bigger. According to a member of parliament, Jan Lipavský, what the Russians want is ‘to break European unity’ (Chamber of Deputies, 2018b). Such ideas connect hybrid warfare squarely to the Messianistic undertones of the East/West geopolitical imagination, in which the Central Europeans serve as guardians defending the West at its limit. To paraphrase Milan Kundera’s (1984) foundational essay on Central European civilisational geopolitics, by fighting hybrid warfare, the Czechs are risking ‘dying for Czechia and the West’, which indeed gives a sense of deep purpose and meaning to their cause and produces a strong anxiety-repressing narrative.
To sum up this part, one important aspect of the anxiety geopolitics of hybrid warfare lies in the way how it allows channelling deeper anxieties by using the East/West geopolitical imagination to produce familiar storylines, identities and objects of fear. Despite being constructed as multifaceted, broad and difficult to detect, hybrid warfare is made legible by being projected on a familiar ‘mental map’, where it becomes merely the most recent instance of long-lasting struggle between the West and a fundamentally different, antagonist Russia. However, the relationship between the discourses of hybrid warfare and East/West geopolitics goes both ways: HW is not only territorialised by, but also gives broader meaning to and, in a way, promises to reinforce the East/West civilisational geopolitics. It is in and through HW that Russia is constructed as fundamentally different and the West presented as a coherent entity under attack, as well as something worth defending against the potentially tragic alternatives. Through the discourse of hybrid warfare, doubts about the relevance or resilience of a Westcentric geopolitical order are seemingly brushed away and old geopolitical identities are hardened. This is precisely the logic of ontological security that makes the ideas of a ‘return of geopolitics’ and the ‘new Cold War’ so appealing, as shown by Guzzini (2012, 2016) and Browning (2018).