The 1AC securitizes Russian disinformation threat – constructing uniquely Russian AI attacks.
Unver 22 - Associate Professor at Ozyegin University, Department of International Relations (Ahmet Kurnaz AND** Research Assistant, Political Science and Public Administration, Çanakkale 18 Mart University “Securitization of Disinformation in NATO Lexicon: A Computational Text Analysis” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4040148)
Our analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its official documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in official documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its official documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging. The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like official speeches, texts and reports. This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s official statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem. Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there isn’t a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter into NATO threat language, NATO’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis or pre- and post-2014 documents that prioritize Russia as a threat alike, implying that it is not really disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This suggests the hypothesis that even if technologies change, NATO Russia rivalry will remain securitized the same way. In other words, contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.