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Realism is an inaccurate lens for understanding IR – makes NATO inoperable and guarantees escalation

Sireci and Coletta 09 (Jonathan Sireci and Damon Coletta, Damon V. Coletta is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. Jonathan Sireci is a US cadet., Enduring without an enemy: NATOs realist foundations, Institute of International Relations, 2009.)

Difficulties associated with realist reactions to the persistence of NATO begin at the foundations of realism itself. Realism as a theoretical orientation toward the inter national system supposedly values what is over what should be (Carr, c1938, 2001: 63). When a theory that values cold, hard, objective reality as the cornerstone for explaining what will occur denies something obviously real, like continued NATO activity, the irony is damning. Beginning with neorealism, the scientific brand launched by Kenneth Waltz's (1979) Theory of International Politics offered a cogent restructuring of classic realist thought (Keohane, 1986:14). Waltz addressed Hans Morgenthau's failure to clarify the usage of such central terms as 'power' and 'balance of power' while avoiding the reductionism that weakened previous formulations. With respect to actors and goals in his theory, Waltz disciplined his predecessors' ideas, summing up states as 'unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination' (Ibid.: 13-15). He argued that the fundamental nature of states leads to balancing in their interactions. The position of every state within the structure of states' relative capabilities permits a systemic expression of international order (i.e., bipolarity or multipolarity) (Nye, 1988). For Waltz, the Cold War was a classic example of bipolar power alignment, NATO was fundamentally linked to this bipolar power alignment, and NATO would not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union because new power arrangements at the interstate level would render it obsolete (Keohane and Waltz, 2000-2001). Waltz excused the glaring failure of neorealism by arguing that the dissolution of the Soviet threat ultimately allowed American policy to become capricious (Waltz, 2000). Essentially, he retreated to the notion that while constancy of threat produces constancy of policy, in the absence of threat, policies become unpredictable.

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