Their claims about “real threats” invests in a politics of anxiety – objects of fear are rhetorically constructed in an attempt to concretize a generalized and ever-present insecurity
Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
For this purpose, we reach to the literature on the politics of anxiety drawing mainly on the work of Jacques Lacan, a psychoanalyst whose ideas have been increasingly prolific in IR (for an authoritative overview see Zevnik & Mandelbaum, 2021), and, to a lesser extent, critical geopolitics (Klinke, 2016; Laketa, 2019; Müller, 2013). Our approach shares the Giddensian notion that anxiety is an inarticulable, traumatic and potentially paralysing affect that subjects attempt to avoid and repress. However, instead of seeing it as merely something that ‘lurks’ behind as the dark other of normal life, anxiety is understood as a durable affective condition interwoven in everyday experiences as well as social processes and political institutions. It doesn’t just lurk, it is always already there, as it is present in the key mechanisms that hold society together: in the production of social subjects and the creation of rules through which these are regulated and bound together.
In this reading, anxiety is correlative to the very emergence and existence of the subject as such. It is ‘a type of expectant dread’ or ‘a crushing experience of ‘out of placeness’’ that arises ‘when the subject, unable to ground themselves in either a functional horizon of values or a reliable social or subjective identification, fears that they might be somehow swallowed up, devoured’ (Hook, 2015, pp. 117, 119). It is less about the disorientation and uncertainty caused by one particular crisis (e.g. Russia invading Ukraine, Covid-19 arriving) and more about being reminded of the ultimately irreducible fragility of all things, including human lives and social orders. In this sense, anxiety is an affect linked to experiencing the limit of one’s own existence as a subject, something that signifies the encounter with ‘the real’, to use the Lacanian term for the internal limit of social order and/or the biological limit of human existence. Anxiety can never be fully managed or repressed, as it is a reaction to being confronted with what is for Lacan the ultimate reality of human existence: the fundamental ‘groundlessness of meaning’ (Balaska, 2019, p. 25) and, therefore, the impossibility of ever achieving a coherent and stable identity. In this sense, anxiety is the affect that ‘does not deceive’ (Lacan, 2014, p. 160), as it does not cover over the void at the heart of every social identity, but rather confronts us with it at the level of bodily sensation. To put it differently, subjects are always ultimately ontologically insecure, as no narratives, routines or relationships – personal or geopolitical – can ever fully deal with the omnipresent possibility that things may not make sense and everything can break down any minute. Anxiety emerges as the affect that signifies ‘the need for the stabilisation of the subject’ (Burgess, 2017, p. 29), yet this stabilisation is doomed to fail in the longer term.
Therefore, in contrast to readings that see it as an aberration, anxiety is omnipresent, even though it clearly varies in its intensity across time and space. Sometimes it is experienced more often and more strongly, while there may be other, less anxious times (Solomon, 2012 makes this argument with respect to affects in general). The current social condition is arguably one when anxiety is on the high; leading some authors to argue that we are now living in an ‘anxious society’, ‘a society on constant alert, despite having no identifiable existential threat. Instead, there is the constant presence of the possibility of that threat, and with it, the sense that government cannot fully protect the people and that danger resides in the everyday’ (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020, p. 247, emph. added; Eklundh et al., 2017). Such (highly) anxious society was created by the congruence of a range of factors. Some point to the effects of neoliberalism and austerity that produce the widespread feelings of powerlessness and loss of control (Hirvonen, 2017). Others focus on the social media economy that requires users who are constantly obsessively checking for news updates, notifications and the affective gratification coming from ‘retweets’ and ‘likes’ (Davies, 2019). For yet others, the proliferation of anxiety is connected to the societal changes linked to gender, race and immigration (Ali & Whitham, 2018; Klinke, 2016; Zevnik, 2017b), or the ‘security creep’ perpetuated by discourses and practices of counterterrorism and cybersecurity (Heath-Kelly, 2018; Jacobsen, 2020).
This extended understanding of anxiety as ontologically conditioned and socially circulated ‘nervous states’ (Davies, 2019) without a clear and concrete referent object opens the possibility to think (geo)politics of anxiety in broader and arguably more critical terms than in conventional ontological security literature. On the one hand, the Lacanian approach broadly agrees with the Giddensian ontological security framework with respect to how subjects try to deal with anxiety: by ‘pinning’ it onto an object and transforming it into a more tangible fear of something. In this manner, ‘fear becomes a way of easing anxiety; of attaching a signifier (an object of fear) to what is otherwise an unfounded experience of unease’ (Zevnik, 2017a, p. 237). Such ‘politics of fear’ then transforms the crushing and paralysing experience of anxiety into the management of ‘concrete objects that we have invented’ (Hirvonen, 2017, p. 261), such as the geopolitically coded ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘Russians hackers’. In this step, anxiety is ostensibly eased or repressed by the production of (geopolitical) narratives that ‘make sense’ of the unpleasant experience by giving it a name and placing it on a map.2 ***FOOTNOTE BEGINS*** There is nothing natural about the construction of particular fear objects, be it ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘Russian hybrid warfare’, as discourses of fear are always contingent. Societies are complicit in the production of their fears through the reflexive/strategic as well as non-reflexive/habitual ways through which discourses are produced and reproduced. This also makes it possible to challenge them and search for alternatives. ***FOOTNOTE ENDS***