Scholarly articles tend to inflate the issue of cyber warfare into having a much larger impact than it does in reality, leading to fear amongst citizenry.
Gomez and Whyte 2021 (Miguel Gomez, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; Christopher Whyte, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security with expertise in U.S. Cybersecurity Policymaking), “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/65/4/1137/6276244) //AA
State-sponsored OCOs are an increasingly common feature of the international system in the twenty-first century. In the past decade, incidents caused by these have taken a number of forms and each year has brought a dramatic overall uptick in the number of significant and publicly disclosed incidents. Simultaneously, there has been an immense diversification of those elements of government, industry, and civil society targeted, a trend that is apparent even in data that often misrepresent the impact of cyber events on civil society actors (Maschmeyer, Deibert, and Lindsay 2020). Cyber operations increasingly target prominent political personas and organizations in aid of influence campaigns in a remarkably prominent fashion. Moreover, beyond the routine theft of confidential information, malware designed to tamper with the function of industrial control systems across power generation, factory production, and even dam infrastructure is found with some relative frequency. Herein lies the broad assertion that physical effects from OCOs seem more likely today than ever before. Interestingly, even as cyber conflict evolves and becomes commonplace, professional narratives and media representations remain somewhat static (Dunn Cavelty 2008, 2013; Gomez and Villar 2018). Since at least 2007, when distributed denial-of-service operations targeting Estonia constituted the first major cyber assault on a NATO member state, the potential for catastrophic damage resulting from malicious digital behavior surfaced as a recurring narrative in Western punditry and popular commentary. Despite such depictions, the growing empirical record suggests the limited efficacy of publicly disclosed OCOs. Only a handful of deployments of malicious code have been captured to date that were intended to cause the physical effects that are so often the substance of doomsayer reporting. Of these, most did not execute. As an instrument of foreign policy, Iasiello (2013) and others argue that cyber operations often fall short of achieving their objectives despite advances in capabilities. Similarly, the latest version of the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute (DCID) data, which tracks major interstate cyber conflict incidents between 2000 and 2016, illustrates the limited coercive potential of OCOs by identifying the rarity of concession-generating incidents (Valeriano and Maness 2014). The absence of empirical support for the revolutionary potential of cyber operations encourages criticism of those who oversell the strategic utility of the method (Gartzke 2013; Lindsay 2013; Maness and Valeriano 2016; Borghard and Lonergan 2017; Kostyuk and Zhukov 2017), with the result that the real-world impact of cyber conflict remains somewhat unclear even as the landscape of incidents becomes more densely populated. This growing skepticism surrounding the exercise of cyber power,3 however, continues to go against how the issue is framed in broader scholarship and in the public eye. Scholars still regularly cite the assumptions of “cyber doom” as they present their work, particularly in technical research (Dunn Cavelty 2009; Lawson et al. 2016). Furthermore, Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting (2017) observe that media reporting continues to depict OCOs as existential threats to cyber-dependent societies. Continued references to this narrative, even among otherwise skeptical researchers, are puzzling. While the six-year Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting (2017) study encompasses some of the most prominent cybersecurity incidents,4 it also permits the observation of its limited effects. Cyber operations that reflect the prevalent narrative are typically inaccessible to the majority of state actors (Pytlak and Mitchell 2016). Moreover, there is reason to think that prominent operations that could affect public perceptions of the shape of global cyber conflict should be few and far between. For one thing, the ability to inflict damage to critical infrastructure requires significant financial, scientific, and organizational resources (Slayton 2017). For another, if concessions are to be obtained, sustained pressure is typically required, which is challenging with OCOs relative to other mechanisms of state power (Borghard and Lonergan 2017). Lastly, strategic considerations also need to be considered. As most interactions in cyberspace are regionally bound and may involve rivalries, restraint is necessary to manage escalatory risk (Valeriano and Maness 2015; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2017). Unlike conventional capabilities, cyber operations and their corresponding tools do not communicate intent well and increase the risk of misperception (Buchanan 2017). It seems clear that while much conceptual and empirical clarifications about cyber conflict exist in scholarly and professional settings, there remains a distorted view of the impact of information about cyber conflict on the average citizen. This is problematic for a range of reasons, perhaps most notably because of how the diversification of cyber conflict has increasingly brought questions about the nature, integrity, and function of public information environments to the fore of strategic discussions about digital insecurity.