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Capitalism relies on producing catastrophes to expand access to new markets and delegitimize criticism – refuse the claim of no alternative in favor of analyzing capitalism’s construction of crises that opens space for revolutionary potential

Masco 15 - Joseph Masco is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago and author of The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror, also published by Duke University Press, and The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post--Cold War New Mexico, [“The Time of Catastrophe: Catastrophe’s Apocalypse,” 2015, Routledge, eBook ISBN9781315552187]RA

When is the Catastrophic? Think about the strangeness of today’s situation. Thirty, forty years ago, we were still debating about what the future will be: communist, fascist, capitalist, whatever. Today, nobody even debates these issues. We all silently accept global capitalism is here to stay. On the other hand, we are obsessed with cosmic catastrophes: the whole life on earth disintegrating, because of some virus, because of an asteroid hitting the earth, and so on. So the paradox is, that it’s much easier to imagine the end of all life on earth than a much more modest radical change in capitalism. “In relation to the history of organic life on earth,” writes a modern biologist, “the paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens constitutes something like two seconds at the close of a twenty-four hour day. On this scale, the history of civilized mankind would fill one-fifth of the last second of the last hour.” The present, which, as the model of Messianic time comprises the entire history of mankind in a enormous abridgement, coincides exactly with the stature which the history of mankind has in the universe. In the early twenty-first century, narratives of end times proliferate—terrorism, peak oil, emerging disease, boom and bust capitalism, and a destabilized biosphere compete with each other for public attention. The difficulty of prioritizing which catastrophe should take precedence over all the others has created a curious new kind of psychosocial fatigue, where claims on imminent destruction are met with a retreat inward or simply a shrug. How is it that Americans, residents of the most powerful country in human history (unchallenged across military, economic, and political domains) have come to feel so precarious and vulnerable? It is important to note that our politics of catastrophe involve cultural formations as well as material assessments; they are historical projections that articulate fear but can also work to block both thought and action. Žižek (building on similar comments by Jameson about capitalism now seeming more permanent than the world) helps us see one dimension of this problem by underscoring the current lack of alternative ideologies to constitute the future today.37 The demise of the large social engineering projects of the twentieth century, and the rise of an unrestrained neoliberalism in their wake, combine to create a vision of a market driven future that can only produce profit by generating boom and bust cycles and extraction regimes that leave ruin in their wake.38 Disaster has actually become a kind of industry in recent years, revealing an unplanned obsolescence for urban infrastructure breaking down under shifting environmental condition and lack of maintenance. This has enabled radical new kinds of corporate experimentation and profit-making, making disaster highly lucrative.39 The formal end of the welfare state project (largely coterminous with the end of the Cold War, if not the nuclear danger) has also diminished the public space devoted to positive visions of a collective future in American life. It is difficult to find official commitments to a steady improvement in the qualities of collective life of the kind once used to balance images of nuclear catastrophe. Today, we are more than a generation removed from the kind of social contract that engineered most American institutions, and are instead increasingly reliant on market logics to design the collective future.40 Thus, we have inherited from the twentieth-century’s contest of utopian visions a world still organized by nuclear weapons but subject to the radical destabilizing effects of a boom and bust global capitalism that operates on ever-shorter windows of profitability and with fewer restraints and responsibilities. The reluctance of our systems of governance to imagine different futures, let alone to organize society on behalf of them, leaves crisis the predominant mode for political expression, as imminent danger becomes the primary motivating force outside of capital. Consequently, competing domains and scales of endangerment now seem to buffet U.S. citizens without respite, as the bursting of bubble economies resides alongside the minute-to-minute danger of a nuclear blast within the century-long sequence of anthropogenic environmental change. In a striking passage from his “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin evokes geological time as a way to shift the story of human beings on planet earth.41 All human history becomes a brief moment of planetary time from this perspective, which raises the important question how temporality itself informs the cataclysmic and whether human beings have the right senses to understand collective danger at all. Pre-figuring the language of the anthropocene, Benjamin uses geological time to disrupt the time of capital and to reposition humanity as merely one kind of life on planet Earth, a species which may or may not be able to avoid the cataclysmic end most creatures meet. But if danger incubates in the present, revealing itself in the catastrophic act, how can we see through a normative everyday to assess accruing danger operating on all possible temporal scales—particularly the forms that people generate and thus collectively control? Benjamin suggests that a radical emancipatory insight is also incubating in the present, a Messianic potential that could shift perception itself allowing a different kind of time to emerge, one that is not coded as “progress” (tied to homogenous empty time) and that is outside of capitalism. For Benjamin, just as the cataclysmic is coded into everyday life, so is the possibility for a radical shift in perception and with it an emancipatory politics. That this “potential” has not been activated is, for him, the ongoing state of emergency that he critiques so forcefully. In this way, he shifts the “emergency” from the narratives of violence that can function as heroic vehicles for self-sacrifice and warfare in the moment, to a more structural assessment of how social institutions normalize and render invisible the violence of capitalism itself. What Benjamin asks us to consider is how social institutions function as an expression and achievement of human engineering, and thus how the human-made can be remade under different concepts of value and with different futures in mind. Catastrophe’s apocalypse would, in this case, be to see the agentive behind the everyday crisis, to see the possibility of a social order not yet conceived as forestalled in the name of history, class, or the status quo. Catastrophe’s apocalypse would be to enter into a radically different temporality, a perspectival space for Benjamin in which structural violence is revealed as manufactured, enabling the current moment to be opened as a space of revolutionary critical potential. From this perspective, perhaps the proliferation of catastrophic images and narratives today has less to say about new objective degrees of endangerment than a shift in the psychosocial mechanisms of normalization and absorption. And here we might focus on a temporal paradox of our security culture today concerning the relation of nuclear danger to climate crisis. The nuclear danger of Cold War—the fears of a nuclear war that would consume global civilization in an instant—seems distant to many American in the twenty-first century but the technological systems built to enable it are still present and active. The global nuclear infrastructure remains on high alert and nuclear war could still be launched at a moment’s notice and between ever more nuclear powers. The Presidents of the U.S. and of Russia still carry launch codes with them every second of the day, and weapons scientists and defense personnel maintain a state of the art global nuclear system of war fighting. Americans tend to see global nuclear crisis now as an issue of the past, a matter for the last century (replaced by a wide range of terrorist threats). But today there are many more nuclear weapons on the planet than in 1958 when The Power of Decision was made, and the U.S. has committed to maintaining a state of the art arsenal for the indefinite future. Indeed, the nuclear fetish, despite the end of underground nuclear testing in 1992, remains firmly in place: In 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy asked Congress for funds to build a new nuclear complex for the twenty-first century, involving new weapons designs and production facilities—amounting to a $1 trillion expenditure over the next three decades.42 Thus, while perceptions of nuclear danger have changed markedly since 1958, the technological possibility of a total ending has only increased: we live today on the edge of nuclear war and just don’t seem to notice it anymore.43 So what was once a national fixation on nuclear crisis no longer mobilizes in the same way, attaining an embedded-ness in everyday life that can be ignored by most citizens in favor of other concerns. Similarly, the climate crisis of the twenty-first century was already present in 1958, when The Power of Decision articulated the terms of national crisis and Unchained Goddess warned viewers of a destabilized future environment. In the first decade of the Cold War, earth scientists publicized disturbing trends in their data sets, documenting shifts in air, water, and land quality via industrial pollutants. The debates about radioactive fallout from nuclear testing led to the Partial Test Ban treaty in 1963, which moved U.S. nuclear testing underground, eliminating the production of new radioactive fallout from the U.S. test program. However, the larger lesson of how industrial activity was harming the biosphere was left unaddressed as a security problem for decades. Had climate change risen to the level of a nation crisis in the 1950s the world would have been spared the coming destabilization of ecosystems, species die-offs, flooding, illness, and drought projected in the IPCC reports. Indeed, climate scientists now identify 1950 as the beginning of the “great acceleration”—a period of startling changes in human consumption patterns linked to the advance of the middle class and escalating carbon emissions.44 In other words, the inauguration of the global nuclear danger was also the inflection point for climate change, simultaneously installing two catastrophic potentials into everyday life that operate on vastly different time scales. Americans focused on the crisis of nuclear war in the twentieth century while missing the other incremental crisis of their own making, the expansion of a consumer economy that has become a highly destructive force on planet earth. Thus, nuclear and climate dangers are human-made crises decades in the making, and are deeply embedded within a petroleum-based capitalist-militarist-industrial system. After World War II, the security state embraced nuclear danger as its coordinating principle while rejecting the environment as a major security concern. Partly this is explained by the radically different temporalities evoked by each kind of danger: nuclear crisis playing out in minutes and hours while climate crisis plays out over decades and centuries. However, each crisis also evokes a different kind of sovereignty and requires very different kinds of governance. A global denuclearization project could substantially reduce the nuclear danger in a few years, but global warming is a planetary phenomenon that requires vast international cooperation—indeed, it now demands a post-national security logic of planetary defense. Perhaps this is also why so many images of climate change in the U.S. rely on tropes developed to communicate the danger of nuclear weapons, a way of acknowledging a collective danger without forcing a change in existing conceptual structures or modes of response. In U.S. public discourse, nuclear and climate dangers are both grounded in images of a world that is no longer capable of supporting human society, a time when as nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, once put it, the “survivors would envy the dead.”45 This kind of catastrophic narrative, in its depiction of a perfect and total loss, however, requires an apocalyptic rendering precisely because it is an historical and highly politicized artifact. What is required now is a critical engagement that assesses not only the possibility of total endings but also the instrumentalities, ideologies, and practices that inform them. Perhaps today this could take the form of a reassessment of industrial reasoning itself and an effort to “cancel the apocalypse” not by a heroic suicide bombing (as in Pacific Rim or The Power of Decision) but rather by attending to local infrastructure itself as a social project that needs constant critical reassessment and reinvention to acknowledge radically changing environmental conditions. This would mean embracing both middle and deep futures as a collective security project, and thinking through multigenerational toxic legacies as well as imminent dangers (see Orff and Misrash 2012).46 Above all, it would mean focusing expert and public energies not on rehearsing the perfect catastrophes of total endings but rather on the qualities, consequences, and insights of living in messy aftermaths.

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