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No link – studies prove “cyber doom” narratives don’t produce generalized anxiety and are informed by real incidents of cyber conflict

Gomez and Whyte 2021 (Miguel Gomez, Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich; Christopher Whyte, Assistant Professor of Homeland Security with expertise in U.S. Cybersecurity Policymaking), “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/65/4/1137/6276244) //AA

According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). Expectations of real-world damage inflicted through cyberspace reinforce the “cyber doom” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive failure of social and economic processes across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects. Presently, conflict in cyberspace is characterized by persistent-yet-limited effects and a condition of apparent restraint exercised by cyber-capable actors (Maness and Valeriano 2016; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a). Moreover, the unabated integration of vulnerable information systems across all aspects of modern societies raises the question of whether or not a sense of dread associated with the exploitation of cyberspace is as severe as commonly portrayed (Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting 2017). Most damningly, the idea that “cyber doom” is most visible in Western national experiences as a fear appeal employed by politicians to galvanize support for policy in no way explains these curious logical shortcomings. At the heart of the “cyber doom” narrative is the assumption that information about cyberattacks released to the public—particularly information about sophisticated cyber operations of foreign countries and organized crime1— produces anxiety about the digital health and security of a person. Ironically, this assumed relationship between cyber operations, their portrayal in public-facing media, and individual impact is often discussed in unclear terms by scholars than is the determining role of techno-strategic conditions. Despite the recent turn by some to consider the societal impact of OCOs (Lin and Kerr 2017; Lindsay 2020; Whyte 2020), most research on cyber conflict continues to emphasize logic-of-the-domain explanations for the behavior of cyber-capable actors.2 This makes a certain sense because the domain is human-made and malleable. However, it is also puzzling given the scope of cyberspace and the degree to which digital action impacts both private industry and civil society across numerous levels. Though the mechanisms of interaction may be less precise than is the case with other forms of state power, the literature on public opinion, morale, and psychology in foreign policymaking tells us that popular perceptions of threat are shaped by a host of factors that then impact the formulation and implementation of state security policy. In this article, we take aim at the “cyber doom” narrative logic as an initial step toward clarifying the relationship between cyber conflict, its portrayal, and public thinking about digital insecurity. Consequently, we align with critics of the narrative itself but argue that such criticisms make overly simplistic assumptions about public opinion and national security that do little to enrich and undergird evolving cyber conflict research. The logic of the core argument about digital disaster aside, the broader “cyber doom” argument— i.e., that the rhetorical and cognitive prospect of doom has some effect on a population—is undertheorized and understudied. This point is particularly important because scholarship aimed at explaining the sources of state public policy on cyberspace makes the curious misstep of holding domestic population preferences constant while focusing on third image determinants of strategy development. Authors argue that publics cyclically react with some fear to emergent threats and that, therefore, public policy is best explained by the incidence of cyber conflict or steps taken by state peers. Given that such assumptions are clearly far from safe on the merits, this article aims to ascertain whether or not negativity among the general public associated with malicious behavior in cyberspace is as salient as broadly claimed. We add evidence to the argument that the “cyber doom” narrative is unrealistic (Lawson 2013) by showing that the assumptions found therein are misleading. Our study finds that sensitivity to cybersecurity threats is situationally shaped by exposure to negative reporting but that the onset of associated dread is not a given. Instead, it is influenced by expectations of the role of technology in modern society. Respondents dependent on such technologies are not as prone to negative effect as are those who remain not so deeply embedded in the fabric of digital society. Both groups become more sensitive to cybersecurity threats to their person as the information they consume becomes more negative, and this personal concern facilitates a heightened sensitivity to threats to the polity. However, the dread predicted by the “cyber doom” narrative is only weakly predictive of this dynamic and has no effect on the threat sensitivity of those who do not respond emotionally. Finally, in both cases, the link between concern for society is not a clear result of negative information so much as it is the result of initial sensitivity to threats at the personal level. Consequently, we make two contributions. First, we show that the impact of novel environmental circumstances on individual opinion formation is shaped by issue embeddedness, suggesting that long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the affective response it is associated with. Second, we present evidence suggesting nevertheless that the unique characteristics of such a development matter in opinion formation, as sensitivity to digital threats to the polity is clearly premised on personal threat sensitivity. These findings suggest that not only “cyber doom” is strategically and functionally unrealistic, but the effects of the idea’s securitization are also minimal and prone to diminishment over time. In doing so, they speak to the broad research program on public opinion and audience dynamics in foreign policymaking. More specifically, in line with recent work (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), our study suggests that citizens are far more capable of responding to threat stimuli absent elite cues. Significantly, our work joins research that locates responsiveness to policy issues in the interaction of cognitive priors and social context with incoming information about new events. Judgment is rarely as linear as the “cyber doom” narrative suggests in its linking of negative reporting, fearful response, and sensitivity to threat inflation. Instead, individuals are conditioned by social circumstances such that even novel threats are incorporated into the horizon of issues the public encounters. The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first introduces the theoretical framework supporting the underlying claims investigated and adopts existing frameworks to account for the effects of continued exposure to cyber threats. The second discusses the experimental design employed. Though common across political science research, the methodology is only recently employed in cybersecurity and cyber conflict scholarship in response to (1) difficulties related to obtaining observational data and (2) the growing interest in individual-level behavior as impactful in digital affairs (Gross, Canetti, and Vashdi 2017; Gomez 2019b; Jensen and Valeriano 2019). This is followed by the presentation and analysis of results. Finally, an in-depth discussion is offered that further develops the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. The findings are not limited to the validity of the core “cyber doom” narrative and the general disposition of non-elites toward cybersecurity issues. Instead, we contribute to the body of scholarship on public opinion in foreign policymaking and speak to ongoing research linking decision-making and the modern digital information environment.

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