Heg causes nuclear miscalc with Russia.
Zuckerman ‘16 (June 7, 2016, at 4:21 p.m., Mortimer Zuckerman is the chairman and editor-in-chief of U.S. News & World Report and the publisher of the New York Daily News, Cites William Perry – former sec of Defense under Clinton, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-07/four-paths-to-nuclear-disaster)//AP
The third current nuclear threat, the danger of nuclear war through miscalculation, most seriously with the Russians, is, Perry warns, complex but quite credible. The story begins at the end of the Cold War when prospects seemed promising for a crucial cooperative atmosphere with the Russians, perhaps eventually a pan-European security system. Indeed, because of the considerable diplomatic effort led by Perry, the Russians had joined their military forces with NATO's operating in Bosnia, a remarkable and hopeful development. But the present situation is marked by Russia's continuing aggressive statements about their ongoing dependence on nuclear weapons, their robust program to modernize those forces (which seems to mirror U.S. modernization programs) and their aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere in their neighborhood. It has been an especially bitter development for Perry, for it started after the Cold War ended. So what happened? After the Cold War ended, and under Perry's leadership, the Partnership for Peace was formed as an interim organization which Eastern European nations, including Russia, could join as a step to eventual NATO membership, the key idea being that the transition would be gradual. Understandably, there was little patience among the outside nations in waiting to join. Perry emphasized that traditional Russian sensibilities and concerns about its regional security mandated a carefully staged, gradual expansion of the security organization. He was opposed by Richard Holbrooke, then an assistant secretary in the State Department, who argued to promptly move to the Eastern European "partnership" members into NATO. After all, what could the Russians do? Perry asked Clinton to hold a decisive National Security Council meeting where he could make the case for delay. There Vice President Al Gore argued for immediate inclusion and Perry lost the day. Clinton agreed to membership at once for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, delaying for a while the membership of the Baltic States. Perry nearly resigned, but decided not to do so in the hopes he could help mitigate the increasing lack of trust by the Russians who claimed NATO had no concern for their priorities. But it was not possible; NATO expansion turned out to be the first slip down a slick slope leading to the hostile relations we have today. Russia today genuinely feels threatened and concerned regarding what it believes is U.S. pursuit of military superiority and political and economic hegemony. It views our actions as inconsistent with traditional notions of strategic stability. Thus Russia presently is an unlikely partner in the process of nuclear disarmament. Perry makes the case that it is in U.S. and Russian interest to change our present momentum toward a new Cold War and he emphasizes that this process requires listening carefully to the concerns of others. Failing that, the germinating threat is evident today: Look, for example, to Russia's action in the Ukraine and the Baltics, where President Vladimir Putin has pursued an aggressive policy based on the stated belief that his country bears a responsibility to protect ethnic Russians in those countries. This policy has already led to warfare in the Ukraine; if it were applied to any of the Baltic nations, all of which have a substantial number of ethnic Russians, it could lead to a military conflict between Russian and NATO troops. Clearly the greatest danger is an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons, either by foolish design or miscalculation. The expressions by the Russian government of its dependence on nuclear weapons make this danger all the more pressing. Neither the Russian nor NATO leadership would want this outcome of course; but the escalation could occur beyond their control, especially with the Russian emphasis on "tactical" nuclear weapons whose management might be in the hands of battlefield military commanders, as it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis.