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The West needs Turkey, despite its constraints.

Hess 6/22 (Maximilian, Central Asia fellow @ the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Why the West Should Make Peace With Erdogan Now”, Foreign Policy, June 22, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/)

However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February.

At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival.

The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime.

Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard.

But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy.

Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations.

Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved: Syria, Libya, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence.

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