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NATO structural inefficiencies deck effective co-op efforts now – guarantees regional challenges and US leadership collapse.

Deni 19 – John Deni is a Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intragovernmental, and Multinational Security Studies at the USAWC SSI, [“Staying Alive by Overeating? The Enduring NATO Alliance at 70,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2019]RA

Over the last 30 years, NATO’s evolving mission growth has exhibited two of the most commonly cited typologies of organizational change—adaptive learning and incremental growth.35 The former is rational, empirically driven, and usually efficient—organizations change by carefully studying and modifying ends, ways, and means. The latter may be rational but it is typically not efficient—new tasks are simply added on to old ones, without any critical appraisal of purpose or goals. With specific regard to the post-Cold War period, or roughly 1990 until 2014, both of these typologies were evident. In some cases during the 1990–2014 time period, the alliance engaged in a well-informed, almost methodical shift away from collective defense and toward crisis management and cooperative security. For example, NATO developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to build norms, establish guidelines, and manage the admission of new member states from Eastern Europe.36 In a similar way, the alliance developed a robust force generation system to manage the challenge of providing continuous force rotations for operations in Afghanistan during an era of shrinking resources.37 In other instances during the 1990–2014 time period, it seems clear that NATO’s post-Cold War shift toward crisis management and cooperative security was characterized by incremental growth, with member states pushing tasks onto the alliance’s plate without a knowledge-mediated approach. For example, the addition of energy security to the alliance’s agenda made little sense at a time when there was (and still is) significant divergence among the member states over what role NATO should play in this issue area, or when there was little understanding of what capabilities or capacity NATO could actually bring to the table.38 In contrast to the post-Cold War 1990–2014 time period, since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 NATO appears to have whole-heartedly resorted to incremental growth. It has done so by recommitting itself to collective defense while also maintaining or even augmenting its work in crisis management and cooperative security. Notably, there has been no significant strategic-level reassessment of NATO’s mission set and no new Strategic Concept published since the last was released in 2010. The alliance’s embrace of an all-of-the-above approach is largely a function of the unique principal–agent dynamic at work within NATO and among its member states, and the complex array of member state interests. As noted briefly earlier in this article, in contrast to an international organization like the United Nations, NATO’s potential for action independent of the interests of its largest member states is extraordinarily limited. Certainly, there are instances when NATO’s international secretariat or its Secretary General show signs of autonomy. However, the alliance organization’s ability to exploit its limited autonomy and truly counteract the desires of its member states is limited by several factors. First, the Secretary General’s position is not a permanent one but rather a rotating one—most NATO Secretary Generals serve a single 4-year term—and the nominees are subject to the unanimous approval of all member states. This prevents the development of an entrenched leader capable of making decisions against the wishes of most member states. In contrast, UN Secretary Generals are nominated by a minimum of 9 members of the UN Security Council, including no vetoes by the five permanent members, and then subject to a majority vote of the General Assembly. UN Secretary Generals normally hold two consecutive 5-year terms. Second, while it is true that the NATO International Staff consists of many permanent civil servants, it also is comprised of staff members temporarily assigned there by individual allied governments. This limits the autonomy that the International Staff might otherwise develop since temporarily assigned employees usually fail to develop strong biases toward the institution they work for, or biases that would displace their loyalties to their permanent employer back home.39 Moreover, the International Military Staff (IMS) is comprised almost entirely of military officials on temporary assignments. The same holds true with regard to the Allied Command Operations based in Mons, Belgium and the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia. At the same time, the array of sometimes disparate interests among the various alliance member states drives much of NATO’s all-of-the-above approach. NATO exists for several reasons, such as the fact that the alliance is a community of (mostly) liberal democracies that share similar values. What is arguably more critical though is the fact that the alliance continues to exist because it provides more benefits than costs to its members—in short, it meets their security needs, at least in part, in an efficient and effective way relative to other options.40 Among other ways of meeting these needs, the alliance satisfies the demands of its member states by engaging in issue areas of interest to those member states. For instance, Spain wants security in the Mediterranean Sea and stability in northwest Africa. Italy desires the same as well as capacity-building in Africa. Meanwhile, Germany wants a framework for the further development of its political and economic power that reassures its neighbors as well as itself. France wants increased intelligence sharing to mitigate the challenge of returning foreign fighters. Poland wants reassurance against domination from the East (Russia) and possibly from the West (Germany). Farther east, the Baltic States want protection against an existential enemy. The United States wants political legitimacy and military burden sharing for operations near and far. The point is, NATO’s member states often have different security interests, threat perceptions, and strategic objectives, and yet they all look to NATO as a primary means of fulfilling their interests and meeting their objectives. Accordingly, the alliance responds by pursuing a broadening agenda. Arguably, this tendency on the part of the alliance to pursue a broadening agenda to satisfy the sometimes disparate interests of its member states has only gotten worse with enlargement. Since 1997, the alliance has steadily grown, and it seems that trend will continue albeit at a slower rate. In July 2018, the alliance decided to begin accession talks with Macedonia, and it is possible Kosovo may follow. Less likely but still possible is membership for Sweden or Finland, as addressed by Anna Wieslander elsewhere in this special issue. As membership grows, definitions of ‘why NATO matters’ may grow as well, and with it NATO’s agenda. 39 The primary challenge confronting the alliance today is that it lacks the capability and the capacity to fulfill all of the various missions and activities that member states wish to saddle it with. European defense budgets, on average, steadily declined through most of the post-Cold War period, and trends have only reversed since 2014. Despite the turnaround, that acquisition accounts are struggling to keep pace with demand, many military units remain whole on paper only, and readiness continues to be underfunded. Additionally, even though spending increases have been broad based, they have also been uneven. The most significant increases have come from those countries with relatively small military forces, while the ‘big four’ European NATO members—France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, which together account for roughly two-thirds of European NATO military spending—have been increasing at a slower pace. Until these countries pick up their defense spending pace, and until all of the European allies are able to acquire the equipment, manpower, and training necessary to fulfill their agreed upon defense plans, the alliance will continue to struggle in its effort to achieve ‘all of the above.’

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