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Only US leadership in cybersecurity can counter a rising China – key to hardline approach.

Dominguez 21 - Gabriella M. Dominguez (BA, Texas Tech University; MA, Texas Tech University; MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College) is an intelligence specialist with analytic expertise in adversarial doctrine, plans, and tactics regarding the employment of space, counterspace, and denial and deception systems against EUCOM, [“‘Smart Power’ Is Hard Power: A Liberal Position on the US Approach to China," 12-21-2021, Air University (AU), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2880386/smart-power-is-hard-power-a-liberal-position-on-the-us-approach-to-china/]RA

Put simply, the United States is in danger of losing the information and soft power war against the PRC and with it, its superpower status. China has successfully conducted numerous cyberespionage operations, stealing information to build advanced technology and military equipment to counter US information and military advantage. Moreover, the US is failing to rapidly transition emerging technologies into the armed forces and has fallen short in discovering novel ways in which these technologies can be used for enhanced military advantage over an adversary. In 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stressed the inability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to appropriately and rapidly acquire and scale innovative technology for military employment.21 Beijing has initiated a number of efforts to continue to move China closer toward attaining a global leadership position in the IC. China’s “intelligent” approach to warfare—the militarization of enabling technologies such as cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data analytics, and unmanned systems—demonstrate its efforts to prepare for the demands of future combat operations requiring “rapid processing and the fusing of information to support quick and efficient command decision-making.”22 In 2016, China launched the first space-based quantum satellite, Micius, demonstrating considerable progress in in its goal to develop unhackable global communications through entanglement-based quantum key distribution.23 Additionally, its “Three Warfare” strategy—nonkinetic measures to manipulate the behavior of states in favor of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) preferred outcomes—serves to maintain CCP legitimacy, extend Beijing’s reach, and insert China’s brand of socialism across the IC.24 China’s use of information at the political level buoy these advances in information’s operational employment. Most recently, the PRC has taken advantage of the US State Department’s delayed response to the coronavirus pandemic, its emphasis in placing the blame on China and the Chinese people for the creation and spread of COVID-19, and its failure to rapidly allocate COVID-19 resources, including providing vaccines beyond US borders. Notably, Beijing was able to quickly portray itself as a “well-organized state capable of controlling the full situation,” rapidly distribute conspiracy theories that accused the US of spreading COVID-19, pose as the defender against an American bully, and provide vaccines to countries in need before the US—all soft power tools shaping global perceptions in favor of Chinese leadership and direction concerning the pandemic.25 Every action China takes to pursue its interests weakens the legitimacy and attractiveness of US hegemonic leadership, which results in a loss in relative power. A 2020 Pew Research Center survey of 14 advanced economies, three located in the Indo-Pacific region, most people believed China handled the coronavirus better than the US and overall had unfavorable views of both the US and China.26 While limited in scope, this poll provides a glimpse of reduced attractiveness to US liberal hegemony largely influenced by its soft power deficiencies. For weak Indo-Pacific states that regularly employ hedging strategies to prevent either the US or China from dominating the region, the decreased attractiveness of a US partner may spell disaster.27 The US can reverse this potential disaster through a strategy that combines power with ideas—strength with liberal values. The United States must maximize its power relative to that of China to preserve American dominance in the international community, while reinvesting in the propagation of its liberal values28 These smart power objectives emphasize the militarization of emerging technologies to deny CCP advantages in the information domain and require the US to take the lead in strengthening the legitimacy and attraction to US liberal hegemony. To gain a clear military advantage over China, the United States needs to continue to heavily invest in the research and development of emerging information-age technologies—AI, autonomy, robotics, quantum, big data, and machine learning—and its rapid integration into all aspects of US military infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of the information collected and how it is used. Specifically, the United States needs to allocate a larger portion of defense spending to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, increase defense partnerships with Silicon Valley industries and research universities, and improve acquisition practices to facilitate and accelerate military applications of intelligent technologies. The US must invest in and further develop technologies that will enable persistent awareness of adversary actions, speed up effective decision-making, and increase lethality at a low cost and low risk to the US. Specifically, investing in quantum, AI, autonomy, and cyber technologies for offensive and defensive purposes requires further integration and cooperation between the Department of Defense and the scientific community. Increased integration and cooperation between scientific and technical entities and the DOD will assist and maintain US technical and military advantages. Information is power. These high-tech systems are a cost-effective avenue to overcome the limits of human intelligence and allow the United States to rapidly understand the environment and make decisions faster than the adversary. Moreover, a high-tech–enabled force supports rapid collection and analysis of large amounts of data, enables swift decision-making, and enhances the lethality of US military forces.29 Whereas now the US can neither effectively stop nor respond to China stealing US intellectual property via cyber channels, technology such as AI-enabled cybersecurity can be used to rapidly detect China encroachment into US systems and automatically deny its ability to steal US scientific and military data. In an environment characterized by information power, operational agility against an adversary must be met with agility at the political level. The US Department of State (DOS)—responsible for advancing American interests through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance efforts—has fallen short in the narrative battle against its adversaries leading to an overall decline in US appeal and influence worldwide. To increase the attractiveness of US liberal hegemony, the United States needs to influence states to champion American interests and combat adversaries’ anti-US information campaign. To achieve this, the United States must craft a strategic narrative in which ‘a strong America means freedom, prosperity, and security for all,’ consistently reinforcing the story that only through US liberal hegemony can the international community achieve a peaceful end state. Knowing this, the United States must increase its emphasis on alternative instruments to comprehensively maximize power and maintain its superpower status, or risk being outpaced by its competitors.

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