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unipolarity generates great power peace

Daniel W. Drezner 14, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 2014, “Bucks for the Bang? Assessing the Economic Returns to Military Primacy,” in A Dangerous World?: Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, ed. Preble and Mueller, p. 201-205

William Wohlforth has made the strongest theoretical argument for that position in the post-Cold War era. He argues, contrary to balance-of-power theorists, that unipolarity is the most stable and peaceful of all possible international systems: "Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance of power politics among the major states."47 Wohlforth has expanded on that argument in later work, applying social identity theory to explain the durability and peaceful nature of unipolarity.48 Regardless of the causal mechanism, once a military hegemon emerges, all of those international relations theories posit that the world should be much more secure, peaceful, and prosperous. With a preeminent military superpower, other states have less incentive to engage in arms races, brinksmanship, or security rivalries. Consequently, more resources are allocated for economic growth, which creates a virtuous circle of greater growth and greater peace.

The empirical evidence for that causal mechanism is stronger than for the imperial rents argument—although there are significant qualifiers. On one hand, the literature rejects the notion that hegemony is a necessary condition for an open global economy.'1" Indeed, the existence of a liberal hegemon alone is not even necessarily a sufficient condition; supporter states also play a crucial role in the spread of economic openness.50 Although the precise causal mechanisms remain disputed, it is, nevertheless, true that hegemonic eras are strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization.51

Furthermore, there is direct evidence that the exercise of military power to protect sea-lanes boosts global trade flows—though the magnitude of the effect is disputed. The presence of naval forces during times of militarized disputes has reduced market expectations of supply disruptions.52 It could be argued that concerns about energy disruptions have been overstated, however; world oil markets have rapidly adjusted to price spikes, even when U.S. military intervention was absent.33 The benefits of hegemonic military power can also be seen when analyzing the naval reaction to the post-2008 surge in Somali piracy. Attacks spiked after the financial crisis and peaked in 2011. Attacks remain at an elevated level after peaking in 2011, but their success rate has fallen markedly. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of successful global piracy attacks declined by 67 percent. The presence of multinational naval patrols—including the U.S. Navy—in the most vulnerable sea-lanes has helped matters. Improved private security on board commercial tankers appears to have helped even more, however.54

The historical evidence further suggests that global and regional systems with a sole superpower have lower levels of arms races and violent conflict. In one empirical review of the literature, Daniel Geller concluded, "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity. Examinations of pre-Westphalian regional systems also support that finding.56 For example, the East Asia region had a clear hegemon in China from the start of the Ming dynasty to the peak of the Manchu dynasty. The result was a period of remarkable political stability. Countries in the region refrained from attacking China and each other; Beijing refrained from converting its hegemony into an expanding empire." Except for moments of Chinese stagnation, war was extremely rare during that period; indeed, it was so rare that Chinese international relations scholars now extol that tianxia era as a model for the future of global order.58

The post-Cold War era offers further evidence for reduced security rivalries and greater stability in a hegemonic world order. The Human Security Report Project has tracked violent conflict in the post-1945 era, and its data are incontrovertible—there has been a marked and secular decline in interstate violence since the end of the Cold War.31' There has been a further decline in other forms of violence, such as civil war and extrajudicial killings. Consistent with the logic of unipolarity, global military expenditures declined dramatically following the end of the Cold War. Global expenditures on defense as a percentage of global output averaged 5.1 percent between 1972 and 1990. Over the past decade—despite the global "war on terror"—defense expenditures as a percentage of global output have averaged only 2.5 percent.60 The peace dividend from the shift to unipolarity has been significant.

Military primacy alone is not the sole cause of that decline. A growing body of work suggests that the post-Cold War decline is merely the continuation of a long-term secular trend toward less violence.61 Still, even scholars advancing that long-term argument acknowledge the role that U.S. military hegemony plays. Joshua Goldstein, for example, attributes part of the decline in violent conflict to "the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. . . . [A] unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world."62

There are two significant caveats, however. The first reservation is that eventually the cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the sole superpower. Other countries will free-ride off the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that those phenomena are occurring right now, allowing China to outgrow the United States.6"1

The absence of burden sharing is particularly acute on the military side of the public goods equation. Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press argue that the costs of a forward military presence outweigh the gains to the United States from global stability.64 Nuno Monteiro observes that the United States has been at war in 13 of the 22 post-Cold War years—a marked contrast to pre-1989 levels.65 Those military operations might have prevented wider wars from breaking out, but the United States pays the price in blood and treasure. The costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have exacted a significant toll on America's fiscal health—more than $3 trillion to date, with an estimated $4-$6 trillion total for those conflicts.66

The second caveat is whether military power alone is the primary driver for the public goods benefits of unipolarity. Most scholars who attempt to determine the presence of unipolarity do not rely solely on military measures to make that assertion. The literature on measuring state power relies on multiple metrics. Joseph Nye has repeatedly referred to power in world politics as a "three-dimensional chessboard" that comprises military, economic, and "soft power" dimensions. Scholars who debate the persistence of American unipolarity include, at a minimum, both economic and military measures of power.67

Hegemony relies on multiple channels of power. That fact matters because the primary causal mechanism through which unipolarity leads to peace and prosperity is the elimination of uncertainty.68 When hegemony is uncontested and is acknowledged by all major actors, secondary states have less of a need to attempt to balance or to engage in status-seeking behavior. Indeed, even scholars who argue for the persistence of unipolarity acknowledge the importance of preeminence across a variety of power metrics. Wohlforth notes:

The theory suggests that it is not just the aggregate distribution of capabilities that matters for status competition but also the evenness with which key dimensions—such as naval, military, economic, and technological—are distributed. Uneven capability portfolios—when states excel in different relevant material dimensions—make status inconsistency more likely. When an actor possesses some attributes of high status but not others, uncertainty and status inconsistency are likely. The more a lower-ranked actor matches the higher-ranked group in some but not all key material dimensions of status, the more likely it is to conceive an interest in contesting its rank and the more likely the higher-ranked state is to resist."9

If Wohlforth's logic is accurate, then military power alone does not explain the reduction of conflict or security rivalries in the post-Cold War era. It is the combination of military and economic supremacy that leads to peace and prosperity. For unipolarity to yield positive economic benefits through systemic stability, it must be full-spectrum unipolarity.

That observation is problematic for the present and future. As previously noted, a broad-based consensus holds that the military primacy of the United States will remain uncontested for the next decade at least; indeed, even extrapolating current trends, it is far from clear whether Chinese military spending will catch up with the United States in the next generation.70 U.S. economic primacy is another question entirely, however. Multiple private-sector and public-sector estimates assert that China will overtake the United States within the next decade. The International Monetary Fund projects that China's GDP will overtake that of the United States, as measured using purchasing power parity, by the year 2016. At least one estimate posits that China has already overtaken the U.S. economy in purchasing power parity.71 China has been increasingly willing to use its economic power to influence its near abroad, such as withholding rare-earth exports to Japan after a Chinese fishing boat captain was seized in disputed territorial waters.72 It has also attempted to use its economic power to influence U.S. economic policy.73

China's economic rise has reintroduced uncertainty into assessments about the global distribution of power. That perceptual gap is revealed in the different national responses to the April 2012 Pew Global Attitudes survey.74 On the one hand, when asked to name "the world's leading economic power," only Turkey and Mexico had a majority of respondents name the United States. On the other hand, in five of the original G-7 economies, strong majorities or pluralities named China as the world's leading economic power. In other words, an increasing proportion of the developed and developing world thinks that economic primacy has shifted to China. One could argue that elites are immune from mass misperceptions; U.S. policymakers interpret China's rise differently.7. But that does not appear to be the case here. Both public rhetoric and private diplomatic discourse suggest that U.S. policymakers share that view of China's new economic status with the global public.76

That perception is wrong. By any objective assessment, the United States remains the world's largest and most powerful economy; it is also more appropriate to measure economic power by market exchange rates rather than by purchasing power parity.77 Furthermore, there are excellent reasons to doubt the straight-line extrapolation of China's economic ascent.78 Still, according to Wohlforth's logic, the shift in perceptions alone should lead to increases in status-seeking behavior by China. And, indeed, that argument parsimoniously explains the Sino-American relationship since the start of 2009.7P In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, China challenged the security status quo. In early 2009, Chinese ships engaged in multiple skirmishes with U.S. surveillance vessels in an effort to hinder American naval intelligence-gathering efforts.80 Beijing responded angrily and forcefully to the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to activist Liu Xiaobo. China reacted to routine U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with extremely hostile rhetoric and threats to sanction U.S. firms. China refused to condemn North Korea for sinking the South Korean ship Cheonmi, frustrating Japan and South Korea. In response to pushback from the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on the South China Sea at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded by lecturing other participants that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."81

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