Wars only escalate in a multipolar world.
Nilsson 21 – Marcon Nilsson is an Associate Professor of political science at the School of Education and Communication at Jonkoping University, [“The Magnitude of Warfare Revisited—System Polarity and War Duration”, 2021 https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1885&context=jss, acc 7/18/21]
21 Accordingly, this article presents the first theoretical discussion of the connection between polarity and war duration. Contrary to Haas and Levy, it argues that multipolarity is more likely to be associated with increasing war duration. The argument is based on a two-stage process derived from the realist and rational-choice perspectives. The first stage determines what types of wars are likely to emerge given different forms of systemic polarity, while the second stage determines how fast a bargaining space potentially emerges to resolve these conflicts. In the first stage, systemic polarity has an impact on what types of wars are likely to erupt. As Monteiro pointed out, unipolarity often produces conflict “between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers.” 22 Such a selection bias is likely to create an imbalance in the belligerents’ military capabilities, which makes it easy for the unipole to defeat the minor power. Examples of such asymmetric confrontations that give rise to short wars include the Kuwait War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003. This selection bias is unlikely to be as great in bipolarity because of the strict alliance structures or spheres of interest that the two poles’ conflicting interests can create. For example, an attack on Iraq and the Kuwait War became possible only after the weakening of the Soviet Union led to a foreign policy change in Moscow and ultimately to the end of the Cold War. However, with more poles, external balancing by means of alliances becomes more flexible as the number of available alliance partners increases. As Snyder argued, “in a multipolar system, who allies with whom is structurally indeterminate…each state is logically eligible to be either friend or enemy of any other state.” 23 Indeed, if unipolarity increasingly brings asymmetric conflicts, the role of a balancer becomes more prominent in multipolarity, which creates symmetric wars. Especially after the Napoleonic wars, and even earlier, Great Britain played the role of a balancer within the European multipolar system and could throw its support behind one side at one time, and behind another side at another time. 24 Such balancing in multipolarity increases war duration by creating symmetric conflicts in which the warring parties are more equal in power and find it difficult to quickly defeat each other. While asymmetric conflicts can end without long negotiations, as the stronger side can quickly override the weaker side, symmetric conflicts more often involve the process of creating a bargaining space, that is, finding a mutually acceptable negotiated solution. Polarity can affect the duration of this process, as the amount of information that the systemic structure provides about the expected outcome of a war varies. Mearsheimer argued that the international state system “is peaceful when it is obvious that the costs and risk of going to war are high, and the benefits of going to war are low” and that the distribution of power between states “is at the heart of this incentive structure.” 25 Fearon further developed this rational-choice perspective, claiming that as fighting is costly and risky, “rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.” 26 His answer to this puzzle of why rational states start wars relies on the widespread uncertainty in anarchy: Rational state leaders start wars when they miscalculate due to both a lack of information and disagreement about relative power.