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Cullison and Morrison 22- Senior Associate (Non-resident) of the Global Health Policy Center at the CSIS AND** Senior Vice President and Director at the Global Health Policy Center at the CSIS (Thomas and J. Stephen, “Bring DOD Fully into the Mix of Pandemic Preparedness and Response,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6-30-22, Accessed Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/bring-dod-fully-mix-pandemic-preparedness-and-response, Accessed Online on 7-5-22)

Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, the Department of Defense (DOD) has made major contributions, both domestically and internationally, to civilian-led preparedness and response, particularly in logistics and planning, and numerous biomedical arenas including research, direct clinical care, and all aspects of public health including a worldwide network of infectious disease research laboratories. Certainly, DOD will be called upon to augment civil authorities for future similar crises both at home and abroad as it has been so often in the past with Ebola, SARS, MERS, and numerous other outbreaks. Often, however, these contributions arise amid sudden emergency demands, in an ad hoc fashion, without adequate forward mission planning and budgeting, and without clear backing in U.S. national security doctrine. And often DOD actions have deliberately low visibility—they are soon out of sight, out of mind—and are neither appropriately acknowledged nor well understood. At the recent , organized by the White House in collaboration with heads of state representing the G7, G20, African Union, and Caribbean Community (CARICOM), there was no mention of DOD’s special assets and recent performance, no DOD presence among participants, and no consideration of DOD’s current and future contributions to the global response. At some level, that omission is no surprise: the summit is first and foremost about the civilian response. At another, it is a sign of an enduring problem. Multiple factors account for why the DOD role is so often obscured: DOD is typically called upon, at short notice, to play a temporary role addressing critical, often embarrassing gaps, indeed failures, in the civilian sphere. DOD is itself hesitant and ambivalent: many within DOD do not regard its support of pandemic response as part of its core mission, even though its special expertise in intentional or accidental biological events is well recognized. Medical and public health capabilities overwhelmed by a pandemic are fundamentally no different from other disasters for which militaries routinely prepare and respond, both domestically and internationally, when civilian capabilities are insufficient. Yet significant preparation and planning are regularly exercised for many likely scenarios, such as wildfires, tropical storms, and earthquakes, while the same is not true for biological events. Certain live sensitivities are always at play. DOD commitments cannot be open-ended, otherwise they will compromise DOD’s core readiness and operational missions. The commitments cannot be seen, either at home or abroad, as militarizing and dominating the pandemic response. To answer these concerns, it is critically important to clarify early what the likely required capabilities are and how they will be resourced. When that step has not been taken ahead of a sudden emergency, hesitation can follow. These many important considerations notwithstanding, DOD remaining in relative obscurity also carries a price. Often DOD’s capacities are allowed to wither after the emergency has faded, particularly if DOD is not at the interagency table—before, during, and after the crisis—to contribute in a sustained way to strategic planning for future pandemics, with adequate forward budgeting. If DOD’s special assets are not operationally integrated with other agencies, well in advance, into overall U.S. health security strategies, both at home and abroad, hesitation, ambivalence, and ad hoc decisionmaking will follow. This all contributes to high inefficiency and confusion, impeding an effective DOD role.

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