NATO credibility is key to deter Russia
Veebel and Ploom 18 (Vijar Veebel, Baltic Defense College. Illimar Ploom, Estonian National Defense College. The Deterrence Credibility of NATO and the Readiness of the Baltic States to Employ the Deterrence Instruments, Sciendo, December 2018, Pg. 199-200 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330315297_The_Deterrence_Credibility_of_NATO_and_the_Readiness_of_the_Baltic_States_to_Employ_the_Deterrence_Instruments) – ED
Last but not least, the Alliance could also make some significant efforts to increase the credibility of its strategy of deterrence. For example, it is obvious that Russia is not underestimating the role of explicit strategic communication in determining the outcome of the conflict. The tactic of the Kremlin is to mobilize people using emotional arguments (more or less “we are under attack and everybody wants to destroy us”). The same approach would most likely not work in the case of the Alliance, because NATO is highly unlikely to be able and willing to emotionally mobilise and oppose itself to Russia. This is due to the differences among the NATO member states in the way they see Rus- sia’s ambitions and actions in the current security environment. An alternative option for NATO to increase the credibility of its political statements – which would also mean an increase to the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence stra- tegy – would be to rely on rational arguments whereby it explains, in a simple manner, why it would be easier and cheaper for NATO to defend the Baltic countries in comparison to what it would take to liberate them.