The US-Turkey partnership has reached its climax and tensions are high
Beyoghlow 20, Kamal Beyoghlow, Adjunct Associate Professor of Government at American University, “Turkey and the United States on the Brink: Implications for NATO and US-Turkish Strategic and Military Partnership”, USAWC Press, January 18th 2020, pg 1-5, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/63534 // GD
The US-Turkish strategic partnership established at the end of World War II reached its climax in the late eighties, and is at a dangerous crossroad. Such an outcome has had a devastating effect on Turkey’s relationship with other Western partners, especially NATO, which has been the backbone of America’s defense alliance since the start of the Cold War. This situation, if it continues, is likely to force the unraveling of NATO as a cohesive organization at a time when it is facing a myriad of collective global security challenges, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan—far beyond its traditional defensive posture on the European continent. All is not lost, however, and with more diligent diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue and compromises, US-Turkish relations can be salvaged.
States with long and deep commitments to one another seldom experience the kind of political and military distrust and uncertainties characterizing the current state of affairs between Turkey and its traditional Western allies, including the United States. Much of the ongoing tensions can be traced to the American-led interventions in Iraq and Syria, as well as to other fundamental strategic disagreements over how best to shape the future of the Greater Middle East and North Africa. Although some agencies within the US government have had differences with Turkey over the latter’s increasingly authoritarian bent, not all elements within the US government are in agreement with the reasons or path forward. No one factor can be attributed to the new authoritarian trend in Turkey. After all, the majority of the Turkish public, through elections and referendums, has given President Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) the mandate they need to rule and change the political rules of the game in Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s deeply fragmented political system and its weak political parties have played a role in the changes in the nature and the character of Turkey’s political system from a military authoritarian one to a civilian authoritarian one.
From Turkey’s perspective, the United States and NATO have turned upside down the game plans of others in the region, chief among them Turkey’s ruling AKP and its leader, President Erdogan. Using some imagination, one can foresee the adverse impacts American operational and tactical moves have had on Turkey since the invasion of Iraq in 2003; and more recently, since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. America’s sponsorship, training, and military support of the Kurd-dominated Arab democratic force in Syria—a compilation of predominantly Kurdish fighters and supporters affiliated with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD); its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG); and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), fighters which Turkey considers its most dangerous political and military nemeses—have strained US-Turkish relations and impacted Turkish public opinion of the United States in a negative way. Turkey views Western military and logistical support for Kurds in Syria and Iraq as inimical to its broader regional interest of containing Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and beyond and preventing the emergence of Syrian Kurdish enclaves close to its southeast borders, where the bulk of Turkish Kurds reside. Turkey’s long-term position on any autonomous or federated Kurdish enclaves in surrounding regional states could invite calls by Turkish Kurds for similar calls and encourage the PKK—a US designated terror organization—to continue carrying out cross-border attacks on Turkish institutions and territory.
Although there has been no indication so far that rules of engagement involving US military trainees and special forces units have changed as far as Turkey’s security along its southeastern frontier is concerned, the potential for serious clashes between the Turkish military and the Syrian Kurds has been growing following the fall of Raqqa, the seat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS’s) caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Since the summer of 2012, the Turkish media has frequently reported incidents of Turkish fighter jets and ground forces taking off from their bases to chase off Syrian Kurdish units operating too close 4 to Turkey’s border.1 Ankara-backed Syrian groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime have emerged as the main beneficiary of these rules of engagement, which have effectively served as a Turkish cover for the country’s military and logistical operations in border regions, especially since the fall of the Syrian town of Afrin and the expulsion of Kurdish fighters from there by Turkish troops and their Muslim Syrian Sunni fighter allies, including the Free Syrian Army, on March 18, 2018.
Anti-Americanism in Turkey appears to be increasing as the war in Syria continues unabated. These attitudes, if they persist, are likely to adversely affect the resiliency of the traditional partnership among the United States, Turkey, and NATO—especially the military-to-military relationship—including basing rights and other defense commitments enshrined in NATO’s declaration of principles. Turkey is already moving toward an uneasy strategic alliance with Russia and Iran to address the future of Syria and to diversify its logistical and military weapon purchases and ultimate dependency beyond NATO. The proposed Turkish purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia to compensate for Turkey’s gap in air defense capability and the consummation of a long-standing nuclear power deal following years of delicate negotiations between Russia and Turkey will most certainly have profound security implications for the United States, NATO, and the Middle Eastern and North African states. The S-400 acquisition by Turkey poses two problems for NATO: (1) a lack of interoperability with existing NATO platforms and (2) fear that increased military cooperation between Russia and Turkey could expose NATO platforms to Russian espionage activities, ultimately undermine Turkey’s resolve and commitment to NATO, and weaken the organization. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long sought to weaken NATO, which he considers an existential threat to his state.