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Turkey participates in security cooperation with China and Russia, competing against NATO

Gaspers and Huotari 17 (Jan Gaspers and Mikko Huotari, Gaspers has a PhD in international studies, conducts research and have published various pieces on different aspects of EU-NATO cooperation, the OSCE Corfu Process, the European External Action Service and the the evolution of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, worked inter alia with the OSCE Section of the Delegation of the European Union to the International Organisations in Vienna, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the OSCE and the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Mikko Huotari is the Executive Director of MERICS. His research focuses on China’s foreign policy, China-Europe relations and global (economic) governance and competition. He has published on China’s rise as a financial power, trade and investment relations with Europe as well as on geopolitical shifts related to China's emergence as a global security actor, “Turkey Looks to China for Security Cooperation Alternatives”, The German Marshalls Fund, 2017, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%2520Looks%2520to%2520China%2520for%2520Security%2520Cooperation%2520Alternatives%2520edited.pdf) //nehahahah

Lately, Ankara has looked more actively to the East for alternatives to Euroatlantic integration, focusing in on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Observers often point to the recent Turkish–Russian strategic rapprochement as an important indicator of the viability of Ankara’s SCO ambitions. While Russia has doubtlessly been a key player within the SCO since its creation in 2001, it will be China that sets the tone for Turkey’s future relations with the SCO and the transatlantic community. Turkish suggestions that closer ties with the SCO might be traded in for NATO membership threaten to further erode transatlantic security cooperation. The United States and Europe should therefore clearly signal to Beijing that Turkey’s relationship with the SCO could increase tensions between China and transatlantic partners. At the same time, devising a convincing approach to managing Turkey’s strategic realignment will be critical to ongoing U.S. and European efforts to shape China’s increasingly visible global security ambitions in a way that is conducive to transatlantic strategic interests. Ankara Turns to the SCO The SCO serves China, Russia, and Central and South Asian member states as a forum for security cooperation, especially related to border management and counterterrorism, with training and exchanges on the latter being coordinated within the framework of an SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. SCO members also regularly conduct joint military exercises, and they cooperate on cybersecurity matters. Though Turkey has been an SCO dialogue partner since 2012, which constitutes the most basic form of association with the SCO, Ankara has used various high-profile opportunities to express interest in obtaining SCO observer status or joining the organization as a full member since 2013. President Erdoğan made his latest public reference to the idea of full SCO membership in November 2016.3 Western security analysts tend to refute the geostrategic significance of the SCO and rightly downplay its potential as a direct military competitor to NATO. Nevertheless, Turkey’s cozying up to the SCO and implicit suggestions of a trade-in for NATO membership and European integration should ring some alarm bells in Europe and the United States. Ankara might feel less inclined to please Brussels institutions as the EU membership option crumbles away and disappointment with NATO Allies grows. There can be little doubt, though, that Turkey continues to hold significant strategic value for the West when it comes to tackling regional security challenges. For EU member states, it is paramount that the refugee deal struck with Turkey in March 2016 holds firm. Turkey hosts a range of important NATO military facilities that are of vital strategic importance to the Alliance’s ability to project force in the Middle East. Turkey also remains one of the few remaining conduits the West has for communicating with Russia about strategy in Syria — even though the extent to which Turkish and wider transatlantic strategic interests on this issue align is increasingly questionable.

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