The plan is not key - Turkey’s only security cooperation with the U.S. is happening outside of NATO platforms
Oğuzlu 12 (Tarık Oğuzlu, He is currently a Prof. Dr. in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya International University. He holds a Ph.D. degree in IR, a Master of Science degree in IR, and another Master of Arts degree in IR taken taken from Bilkent University. He teaches courses on International Relations Theories, International Politics, European Union Foreign, Security and Defense Policies, Turkey’s relations with the European Union, Foreign Policy Analysis and Turkish Foreign Policy. He works on the following subjects: international relations theories, Europeanization of foreign policy, European Union foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, Turkish foreign policy, Turkey’s relations with EU and NATO/US, Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus dispute, Turkey and the Middle East. He has academic articles published in such journals as Political Science Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Middle East Policy, International Journal, Security Dialogue, Middle Eastern Studies, Turkish Studies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, European Security, International Spectator, Contemporary Security Policy, Mediterranean Politics, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Balkans and Near Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Uluslararası İlişkiler, etc. He is also the head of Center for Social, Economic and Politics Research, “Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests,” Turkish Studies, The Washington Quarterly, 7-25-12, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2012.706578)//nehahahahha
Also, the reluctance of some Western European Alliance members to recognize the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization and to push for the PKK to end its activities in Turkish territory has worried Ankara. As long as a majority of Turks believes that the PKK owes its existence in part to support coming from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO is bound to decrease in the years to come.5 In contrast, the United States, the leading member of the Alliance, has gradually adopted a non-European strategic outlook by considering developments outside the continent as more vital to its national security interests. Yet, Washington has begun to value Turkey’s security cooperation in more bilateral rather than multilateral platforms. In other words, even though Washington’s need to secure Turkey’s strategic cooperation has dramatically increased, the Americans have generally tried to achieve this bilaterally, outside of NATO platforms. Another important factor contributing to the rise of Turkish skepticism toward NATO has been the changing nature of global politics. As the world has become more multipolar, or even nonpolar, and as interstate relations have increasingly taken shape in more multilateral and interdependent settings, NATO-like collective defense organizations have become outdated. In addition, changing power configurations within the international system seem to have increased Turkey’s capability to pursue a multi-dimensional and multi-directional foreign policy. Finally, Turkey’s relations with Russia on one hand, and Middle Eastern countries on the other, will likely also shape Turkey’s future view of NATO.6 Turkey is not an exception to the idea that, as the world has increasingly become post-Western, many states have revised their foreignand security-policy strategies to adapt to the new security environment.