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Global solidarity that converges around AI and the Internet of Things is a symbiotic end of humanism that reifies neoliberal individualism and causes mass industrialized eugenics.

Armand 20 – Charles University, Prague, Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, Director [Louis, “The posthuman: AI, dronology, and “becoming alien”,” AI & SOCIETY (2020) 35:257–262 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0872-2, DKP]

Insofar as humanity dreams of life after death, the “drone” is the as-yet primitive technological image of that afterlife. Like the Panopticon, the drone is a metaphor (Bentham 1995). It is the prototype of an ideal proxy by which the “human condition” transcends its worldly embodiment into a cosmic internet-of-things: a distributed architecture of autopoietic, kinetic agency. Thought that moves itself. Yet, it is precisely for this reason that what calls itself posthuman masks the return of an ever-more-apocalyptic Humanism, wherein the prestige of what is conserved as species unique is equated with the prestige of species transcendence: the (supposed) “uniquely human” capacity to manufacture universalities—artificial intelligence, cybernetic machines, synthetic DNA, etc. The capacity, in other words, to project, by way of abstraction, an all-too Humanistic teleology upon the domain of evolution itself—and thus secure a future against human obsolescence.

This, at least, is the type of paradoxical science fiction narrative that has prepared the way, in the West, for the evocation of “species solidarity” in the face of catastrophic imminence: from Global Warming to Technological Singularity to Human Extinction Event. A pseudo-solidarity bound, on one hand, to the advance of neo-liberal individualism and, on the other, to a ceaseless erosion of the collective “social contract”. It does not matter that the logics of such catastrophes broadly contradict one another: what is essential is that the ultimate promise of business-as-usual both mitigates and masks a whole intervening process of un-becoming.

These symbiotic “ends” of Humanism are previewed in the historical convergence of two events:

1. the recognition (with the birth of cybernetics) that technology could no longer be viewed as a human prosthesis, but that the human was in fact a prosthesis of a general technicity;

2. the contemporary revelation of mass industrialised eugenics

In this simple convergence, the principle that “technological progress” was divisible from ideology—the separation of science from metaphysics, which was the very foundation of Humanist thought—was overthrown. Unable any longer to disguise itself as universal rationality, Humanism was exposed as what it had truly become: western political–economic mysticism. This did not cause Humanism to fail, but rather, under the liberal guise of techno-capitalism, to re-engineer itself into an escape plan for the end of history. It was able to do this because the idea of History itself, as maintained in the industrial imaginary, had never been anything more than a prosthesis of Humanism to begin with. In this way, posthumanism and posthistoricism likewise come to represent something like a closed feedback loop, whose epochal movement has been lugubriously and hubristically fashioned as the “Anthropocene”.

2 Posthuman, all‑too human In the 2002 postscript to his often-cited thesis on the “End of History”—Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution—Francis Fukuyama advanced a line of argument around genetic engineering and recombinant DNA, under the rubric of an urgent need to address the “political control of biotechnology” (Fukuyama 1992, 2002). Failure to do so, he argued, would result in a “desperate rearguard action” for the future of humanity. A future, after all, guaranteed solely by the prospect that “there could be no end of history unless there was an end of science” (Fukuyama 2002: xii). Its contemporary iteration today is the mitigation industry of AI “existential risk”. What this argument conceals behind its tone of Humanistic panic, however, is that—according to its own logic—for science to secure the domain of the future, history must already have ended. If we equate, as Fukuyama does, history with ideological struggle, then the future as technocracy can only be consequent upon the end of politics as such. The real concern of Fukuyama’s “posthumanism” then, is not “political control of biotechnology”, but rather the contrary: biotechnology as political control—where “political control” means social cybernetics.

However, we must extend this line of thought further if we are to perceive its fully apocalyptic character, for concealed within the anxiety of an “uncontrolled” biotechnological assault upon the human, is the implicit understanding of the human itself as biological weapon. For Fukuyama, the true meaning of “posthuman” is thus the accomplishment of humanity’s historical mission. As the “End of History” designates an end of ideological struggle, so too the dénouement of the Anthropocene and the “ends of man” represent the accomplished purpose of species warfare: dominion, not simply over the world, but over all possible worlds. The question for whom is thereby diverted onto the abstraction of the question of control as such, as idealised (human) agency. It represents what Baudrillard called the “spiralling cadaver” (2006: 260) of Humanism: even in the (always hypothetical) aftermath of humanity, the future will be human.

Responding to this strand of Fukuyamesque “scientism” in certain strands of Accelerationist discourse, Germán Sierra has pointed to a recurrent tendency to “reload humanist discourses”, so as to “maintain the fiction of a ghost-of-the-human-re-presenting-itself as immutable and undisputed”:

All the current posthuman narratives, even those pointing to the evolution of a “radical otherness” as intended or unintended consequence of human action, are just modern versions of the extinction fables lying in the foundations of human rationality. Any “radical otherness” that may have a consequence for the human morphospace is just happening on “surface media” … is still “our radical otherness”. No future is still a future—very often a very specific one that is set in order to retro-determine present behaviour. (Sierra 2016)

In this retro-determined image of the future, “Extinction is unavoidable but impossible. Like time travel, if it ever happens, it always does” (Sierra 2016). In this way, “Being human” means the “acceptance of individual death in exchange for not conceiving the extinction of the species”. To which must be added, that any “acceptance” of individual death is premised not merely on the idea of species continuance, but upon the abstract vicariousness of a collective afterlife: a mode of hauntology, or telepathy, an exception from the domain of finite existence by way of an access to a future totality of human data aggregation. Such totalised futurity represents the dialectical counterpart of a radical individualism, in whom the idea of (human) agency corresponds to the very horizon of the impossible, beyond which there is nothing.

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