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Effective deterrence strategies require a silent war against racialized threats -- their every 2AC claim that “threats are real” is a performative gesture of sly civility that renders America the policeman of international politics

Mathur 16. Rita Mathur is a Professor in Political Science and Geography at UTSA and has a PhD in polisci from York. "Sly civility and the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order: a post-colonial critique." 2016. Nuclear Politics: Beyond Positivism.

Sly civility can be understood as a concept encompassing practices of racial etiquette and strategic orientalism as discussed below. The practices of racial etiquette came into play with such speed in the establishment of the nuclear order that ‘the previous longevity of anti-egalitarian and racist sentiment can and was easily lost sight’ (Furedi 1998, 15). The practices of racial etiquette are conscious of the formal principles of equality among sovereign states, induce an epistemological silence against any overt statements on racial inequality but stubbornly refuse to give up on the idea of political mastery. Frank Furedi argues that practices of racial etiquette represent a ‘second form of colonization’ that does not have any serious commitment to anti-racism but seeks to indulge in a ‘silent war’ to ‘produce over time, social formations and even world orders that were macrostructural systems of inclusion and exclusion’ (5). These practices of racial etiquette are further reinforced by contemporary practices of strategic orientalism. Edward Said articulated the concept of ‘Orientalism’ to demonstrate how the West constitutes its own identity on the premise of its differences with others often seen as a source of threat (Said 2001). In these iterative practices of representation the cultural differences are effectively deployed to differentiate the West and discipline the others in the international order. Keith Krause and Andrew Latham suggest that the continued exercise of this disciplinary power necessitates maintenance of military superiority in the post-Cold War period. The West then deploys ‘strategic orientalism’ as a ‘new conceptual template’ that enables the West to impute ‘politicostrategic objectives and purposes’ to Third World countries in a manner that is ‘informed more by Western fears and prejudices than by the realities of politics in these states’ (Krause and Latham 1998, 38). It transforms ‘essentially contestable interpretations of danger’ into ‘“objective” and incontestable facts regarding the sources of threat and insecurity in the international system’ (38). An effort to map these intersecting practices of racial etiquette, orientalism and strategic orientalism on a continuum reveals practices of sly civility. A grasp of these practices of sly civility facilitates an understanding of the nuclear order with its practices of inclusion and exclusion and the West’s efforts to control the narrative of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this narrative there is an assumption that the Western practices of arms control and disarmament are ‘rational’, ‘benign’ and provide for the global ‘public good’ (Krause and Latham 1998, 23). The control of the narrative and its representation of these standards is a prerequisite in the exercise of power over others. Any resistance to this narrative is through practices of racial etiquette and strategic orientalism to be marginalized as peripheral and a source of instability and chaos. These practices of strategic orientalism or sly civility are not sensitive to the ‘ethnocentricity’ of their underlying assumptions and exhibit a ‘distinct matrix of beliefs and dispositions’ towards others in the field of arms control and disarmament (23). It is, therefore, imperative that practices of sly civility be ‘caught in the irredeemable act of writing’ (Bhabha 1994, 133). Homi K. Bhabha suggests that the ‘practice of writing’ is a ‘strategy of colonialist regulation’ (134). This writing ‘puts on trial the very discourse of civility within which representative government claims its liberty and empire its ethics’ (136). The writing makes visible the ‘nationalist, authoritarian tone’ that polices the ‘culturally and racially differentiated colonial space’ of arms control and disarmament (134). This authoritarian tone is embedded in a narrative that is narcisstic in its insistence that the other recognize its authority. In its insistence for this recognition it is willing to calculate and deploy tactical measures such as ‘skeptical conceits’ that dismiss any efforts of the others that seek to challenge its authority (141). Any resistance unleashes acute anxiety and a ‘paranoia of power’ that generates ‘political and psychic’ contestations on authority to regulate the borders of arms control and disarmament (141–2). Despite this anxiety, it is important to scrutinize arms control and disarmament texts as ‘despatches of hyprocrisy’ that seek to ‘moralize’ but exhibit a specific ‘discursive doubleness’ that exists between the lines as an ‘effect of the ambivalent, deferred address of colonialist governance’ (Bhabha 1994, 136). It is in this space ‘between the civil address and its colonial signification’ with ‘each axis displaying a problem of recognition and repetition’ that there ‘shuttles the signifier of authority in search of a strategy of surveillance, subjection, and inscription’ (136). The signifier of authority traverses through time and through its repetition deepens the crisis of authority experienced in practices of arms control and disarmament. This crisis of authority encourages ‘projections’ compelling the ‘native to address the master’ and reproducing the native as ‘partially aligned or reformed’ in discourse ‘endangering the boundaries of truth itself’ (142). Any effort to address this crisis necessitates an exposure of practices of sly civility to encourage a confrontation with the ‘colonialist governmentality’ in the field of arms control and disarmament. This confrontation will make it increasingly difficult for the West to ‘normalize its own history’ and ‘inscribe the history of the other in a fixed hierarchy of civil progress’ (136). These confrontations have been initiated and are now generating a momentum towards disavowal of the strategies of sly civility demanding redressal against the experiences of ‘institutionalized humiliation’ (Parek 2009, 31). The practices of sly civility often fail to grasp that humiliation is not simply an affect but ‘a claim or claims of certain kinds’ and it is important to ‘explore the structure of these claims, their logical or conceptual conditions, and their role in the reproduction of relations of power’ (Palshikar 2009, 81). Bhikhu Parekh locates organized or institutionalized humiliation in an ‘unequal society in which some enjoy considerable power over others and exercise it with relative impunity’ and these powers are vested in ‘social institutions and practices’ that ‘embody disrespect for, and systematically violate the self-respect of groups of individuals’ (Parek 2009, 31). The pathos of this experience of humiliation among the subalterns became acutely visible at a time when the use of nuclear weapons in Japan reinforced the message that: locations in the hierarchy of states are marked off in part by specific weapons, so the possession of certain weapons is considered the sine qua non for claiming places higher up the international order. Perhaps of central importance in this regard are nuclear arms. (Mutimer 2000, 137) This particular experience of humiliation has been compounded with repetitive threats to use nuclear weapons, specifically by the USA, in wars of intervention in the Third World (Petras and Morley 1988, 151). It is against these experiences of vulnerability, suffering and humiliation that discourses on sly civility have to contend with to address the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order. A clear conceptualization of practices of sly civility above encourages us to now survey the system of recordation of the paradox of equality/inequality in the texts on arms control and disarmament. For the purpose of this paper we will limit this exercise to three representative samples of writing that traverse through time vacillating between ‘what is always “in place”, already known and something that must be anxiously repeated’ (Bhabha 1994, 95). These texts display a liberal willingness to entertain the problem of equality/inequality in arms control and disarmament in some measure. The willingness to question the assumptions informing ‘a desirable and feasible’ nuclear order is constrained by the desire to rationalize and make it appear natural that the inequalities should persist in the existing nuclear order (Bull 1987, 191). The treatment meted out to the equality/inequality paradox deserves careful consideration as they make visible the practices of sly civility that are responsible for the hierarchical international nuclear order. In the initial period of the Cold War, Hedley Bull, a representative figure of arms control and disarmament acknowledges the hegemonic control that exists in the nuclear order (1987, 191). He concedes that ‘the vision of the world order that is projected by our arms control arrangements is one against which the majority of states are in revolt’ and that ‘one finds different degrees of opposition to these arrangements, deep mutual divisions’ (191). However he insists on the need for maintaining this nuclear order because those that ‘wish’ to break down this hegemony ‘have nothing in mind with which to replace it’ (191, emphasis added). Bull specifically cites countries such as China, India, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria and argues that ‘the objection of the third world countries is not to the quality of order in the present international arrangements; it is rather to the way in which these arrangements discriminate against them’ (191, emphasis added). Thus, Bull not only specifically identifies the countries that are opposed to the inequality in the nuclear order but is also insistent in making a division between those that have a mind and others that are mindless in their quest for change in the nuclear order. He further argues that states located on the third rung of the hierarchical nuclear order harbour grievances not to the quality of order but the arrangements within this order that are discriminatory against them. This split discourse on quality of nuclear order and responsibility for the arrangements within the nuclear order is further buttressed by the suggestion that ‘those who have special interests recognize the special responsibilities that go with them, and conduct themselves in such a way as to engage general support for the system whose custodians and guarantors they are’ (Bull 1968, 1987, 143–50, 214, emphasis added). The racial etiquette practiced by Hedley Bull becomes more pronounced in his statement that the ‘Third World’s lack of power, including military power – its sense of impotence and vulnerability in relation to the Western countries’ makes it rail against the existing international nuclear order (1987, 201–2, emphasis added). It is with an inquisitorial insistence that he demands they articulate an ‘alternative conception of world order’ to be taken seriously (191). A similar tone of authority persists in the text of Joseph S. Nye as he writes in the last decade of the Cold War. Nye undertakes a purposeful investigation of the ‘logic of inequality’ in the nuclear order (1985, 123). The sincerity of his undertaking is belied by attributing theatrics to those claiming to harbour grievances against the existing nuclear order prior to the investigation being completed. At the very outset of this investigation, he describes the allegations of discrimination, hypocrisy and failure to live up to commitments levied by the diplomats of non-nuclear weapons states against the superpowers as a ‘drama’ (123). Nye then suggests that there is a ‘basic intuitive compact underlying the NPT’ and describes the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) itself as an ‘imaginary compact’ (1985, 124, 129) He then stipulates that ‘under certain conditions’ and ‘other things remaining equal’ nuclear inequality is acceptable (124–126). This reluctance to engage with historical circumstances and insert ceteris paribus clauses to advance abstract conditions of arguments is a questionable exercise. According to Akeel Bigrami and Priya Chacko this reluctance exhibits a ‘technological mindset’ that ‘fosters an abstract view of the world and relies on an understanding of truth as cognitive rather than as lived moral experience’ (Bilgrami 2003, 4164; Chacko 2011, 191). Nye deliberately insists on investigating the logic of inequality only as a technical problem susceptible to failure and denounces any investigation of the problem as embedded in racial roots. He emphatically insists that, ‘nuclear inequality has nothing to do with racism on the part of weapons states or with the irrationality that some claim to see in Third World leaders’ (Nye 1985, 126). This impatience to denounce charges of racism is coupled with fearful portents that questioning the logic of inequality could lead to the possibility that ‘deterrence will fail’ (126). The failure of deterrence it is argued ‘is likely to be much higher in most regional situations because of the shaky political conditions found in most states seeking nuclear weapons as well as their limited experience with nuclear command and control systems’ (126). The existing inequality is further justified on grounds that with ‘new proliferators’ the threat of breaking ‘nuclear taboo becomes that much more likely’ (127). The reference to ‘shaky political conditions’ belies an element of suspicion and uncertainty of a stabilized and legitimate influence in these regions that fuels the need for assertion of hegemony in the nuclear order. There is little effort to balance these observations with acknowledgement of the risks that the possession of nuclear arms by Western powers has exposed to the world (Sagan 1995). The maintenance of inequality is further proposed in the following terms, ‘under many circumstances the introduction of a single bomb in some non-nuclear states may be more likely to lead to nuclear use than the addition of a thousand more warheads to the US and Soviet stockpiles’ (Nye 1985, 128, emphasis added). This particular statement reveals the entrenched psyche of fearful discrimination and reignites the racial trauma of colonization in the subaltern that is to be severely penalized should even a single, rusty weapon be discovered in its possession by the colonizer (Memmi 1967, 93–4). Nye is confident in his assertion that, ‘nonproliferation is not an inconsistent or hypocritical policy if it is based on impartial and realistic estimation of relative risks’ (Nye 1985, 127). But he is oblivious to the consideration that the power to make calculations pertaining to risk of failure of deterrence are all vested in the West and violation of taboo are all sourced to ‘new proliferators’ that need to be policed (Nye 1985, 131). Nye does not problematize the task of policing as a shared responsibility of all countries but reiterates that the task of policing is ‘traditionally the domain of great powers in international politics’ (131). Any resistance to this policing function perceived as ‘the domain of great powers’ is further circumscribed by polarized choices between ‘some ordered inequality in weaponry’ or ‘anarchic inequality’ an oxymoron that is described by Nye to be ‘more dangerous’ (Nye 1985, 130). Nye casually entertains the possibility that ‘third countries may hold the superpowers similarly accountable’ but fails to provide any account of how this might be undertaken as he only insists on ‘alliance guarantees’ to stem proliferation and readily concludes that the NPT’s ‘Article VI obligations cannot be interpreted as simple disarmament’ (128). The transfer of nuclear technology even for energy programmes is also to be grounded in an ‘evolutionary approach’ and susceptible to additional deliberation on a ‘region’s stability and of the susceptibility of the technology to safeguards’ (130). It is this entrenched mindset of political master and paranoia of displacement of power that is displayed by Nye four decades into the Cold War. Nye displays little desire to question the legacy of attitudes that he has inherited from those that have been revered and are woven into the traditional discourse on arms control and disarmament.

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