The invocation of disease as a threat to security paves the way for permanent warfare waged via global networks of surveillance, sanctions, and violence that constitutes a necropolitical destruction of Otherness – this is operationalized through a legacy of bio-orientalism that constantly views Others as bio-weapon – an unhygienic threat to the cleanliness of Westphalian democracy
Kong 19 – John F. and Dorothy H. Magee Associate Professor of Asian Studies and English at Bowdoin College, PhD, English Language and Literature, University of Michigan [Belinda, “Pandemic as Method,” October 2019, Prism 16(2):368-389 DOI:10.1215/25783491-7978531, DKP]
The most proximate scene of biosecurity's solidification is the post-9/11 US security state's War on Terror. The extent to which the American government came to coopt the language of disease emergence was illustrated by Donald Rumsfeld's oft-cited speech from a 2002 Department of Defense news briefing in which he observed: "There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things we don't know we don't know."24 As Bruce Braun points out, Rumsfeld's logic mimed the contemporary perception of the "virtuality of molecular life": just as biology increasingly gets articulated in terms of virtual networks of unknown and dangerous viruses that "circulate and recombine in novel ways, threatening our bodies and identities," so national security came to be couched in terms of hidden networks of sleeper cells and emerging threats.25 Melinda Cooper calls this the "biological turn" in US foreign policy after 9/11, but more than a simple rhetorical resonance, she argues that this turn reflected a fundamental phi-osophical reconceptualization of warfare by the Bush administration. Moving away from the previous geopolitical doctrine of mutual deterrence, the US government strategically "conflate[d] public health, biomedicine, and war" so as to make operative a security agenda of "full-spectrum dominance, counterproliferation, and preemption."26 The epidemiological tenets of microbial emergence, resistance and counterresistance, and humans' permanent warfare against germs were transferred over and made central to defense policy. Within this new security framework, war became integral to the very conceptualization of life, or as Cooper puts it, "as if permanent war were simply a fact of life''27 In the reverse direction, national security now propels biological research— including the creation of new infectious diseases. In anticipation of potential bio- terrorist attacks, the US government's agency for developing cutting-edge military technology, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), has been actively inventing antibiotics and vaccines for not only known pathogens but also ones that do not yet exist. In the name of biodefense, "DARPA finds itself in the paradoxical situation of having first to create novel infectious agents or more virulent forms of existing pathogens in order to then engineer a cure," thus "blurring the difference between defensive and offensive research."28 For Cooper, this ideological convergence between biomedicine and biosecurity represents the culmination of neoliberalism's politics of life, which entrenches ideas of speculative preemption and catastrophe risk so as to disable a counterpolitics. What we can further emphasize is the real geography that underlies the post-9/11 bios- ecurity imagination. Despite rather postmodern descriptions of Al-Qaeda as a fluid organization of dispersed and fluctuating networks, the actual targets of US antiterrorism measures remain fixed in Asia and Africa. As in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, Rumsfeld's invocation of "unknown unknowns" served to justify American military invasion of Iraq in the absence of evidence that it was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Concurrently, the formulation of a prototerritory of infectious disease emergence took place against the backdrop of this geopolitical theater of war.
Yet the consoll dat ion of the biosecurity posit ion predates 9/11 and can be traced back to the late 1980s and 1990s, as part of the US response to post-Cold War geopolitics after the dissolution of the USSR. As Susan Wright details, up until the 1980s, the American government mostly regarded terrorism as a "sec¬ond- or third-tier security problem—a problem that happened elsewhere," so that proponents of biological defense remained marginal in national security discus- sions.29 With the end of the Cold War, however, the former template of the Soviet threat was replaced by the discourse of hostile third-world "rogue states," and the prospect of nuclear warfare was superseded by the menace of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Before 9/11 gave a concrete context to this logic, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway provided biosecurity advocates within the US government with an early platform. This attack, they warned, represented the "index case" for contemporary acts of bioterrorism: a vital "threshold" had been crossed, a taboo lifted, and henceforth, terrorists of all stripes would follow suit by employing bioweapons on civilians.30 Bioterrorism, they argued, was "no longer the stuff of science fiction or adventure movies" but "a reality which has already come to pass, and one which, if we do not take appro¬priate measures, will increasingly threaten us in the future."31 As Wright recounts, this "alarmist" stance overtook Washington during the 1990s, and the congressio¬nal budget for counterterrorism defense soared.
Biological research benefitted directly from this political paradigm shift, as the study of infectious diseases now became a security priorlty. Significantly, a small cohort of prominent scientists was instrumental in linking infectious disease to biowarfare as coterminous national security threats. These scient ists served as key advisers in Washington, organizing research forums and participat¬ing on government panels as well as supplying successive White House admin-istrations with numerous reports on bioterrorist scenarios. They presented their views as impartial and nonpartisan extensions of scientific expertise, and their voices carried tremendous weight in determining government policy and budget allocations as well as the direction of scientific research. Two figures in particular stood out. Donald Henderson, the elder statesman of American epidemiology credited with eradicating smallpox in the 1960s and 1970s, was crucial in lending his support to the biosecurity position. At a 1998 CDC-sponsored confer¬ence on emerging infectious diseases, for instance, he categorically dismissed the objections of bioterrorism skeptics, and in a report later that year by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council, he warned that it would be a "grave mistake" for the government to delay biodefense preparations.32 In that same year, he was named the founding director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, with an earmarked $1 million in congressional funding.33 Even more influential than Henderson was Joshua Lederberg, Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist and scientific adviser since the 1950s for nine consecutive White House administrations. He organized and supervised many of the research panels at the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, and in his reports to the government, he repeatedly forecast the calamitous impact of biowarfare, even handpicking experts specifically to dramatize for politicians apocalyptic scenarios of bioterrorist attacks on American cities. He was the one who identified the 1995 Tokyo subway attack as a "threshold event," claiming that "Aum Shinrikyo has done us a favor by . . . making it obvious that there is a very serious threat; that terrorists would use any means imaginable at their disposal."34 Again, Asia enters into this history as a strategic site, this time as a "threshold" of biothreat to be held at bay, in a coordinated narrative of bioterrorism. As Wright notes, Lederberg too reaped financial benefit from his political advocacy, as he later became a board member of EluSys Therapeutics, a biotech¬nology company with a biodefense research focus.35 The intertwined interests of neoliberal and neoconservative forces with public health became entrenched in this era, even if only a handful of high-profile scientists were directly implicated in this development.
In fact, the basis for the coniunction between biomedicine and biosecurity was set already in the historic 1989 NIAID/NIH Conference on Emerging Viruses held in Washington, DC. This conference was attended by over two hundred American scientists and pubiic health experts, includ ing both Henderson and Lederberg, and it was the forum where the term emerging viruses was first coined by the conference's principal organizer, epidemiologist Stephen Morse.36 In his follow-up landmark edited volume, Emerging Viruses, Morse captured the core message of the meeting:
The problem of emerging viruses is not likely to disappear. If anything, it will increase; episodes of disease emergence are likely to become more frequent. . . . Constructive action has been paralyzed in the past by a combination of apathy and uncertainty. The AIDS epidemic is a powerful reminder of the price of apa¬thy. It is also a demonstration that infectious diseases can still be a major threat to human life. Although we cannot yet predict specific disease outbreaks, and may never be able to, we now understand many of the factors leading to emer¬gence. . . . Part of the question therefore becomes whether people will continue unwittingly to precipitate emerging diseases and suffer the consequences, as has happened throughout history, or will begin to take responsibility for these human actions.37
According to Morse, since recent human history has witnessed waves of epi¬demics culminating in the AIDS crisis, we need to understand outbreaks not as "acts of God" but within a framework of "disease emergence." He therefore coined the phrase emerging viruses to desi gnate not just new pathogens but also known ones that are "rapidly expanding their range."38 As Andrew Lakoff points out, this classification is powerfully "generative," for it unifies under one name an array of illnesses not previously linked. The term converts a "disparate set of disease threats" into a single "imperative" of biodefense preparation.39 So even if the category of EID seems "self-evident" by our time, it is a "relatively recent invention," by a relatively elite and invested group of microbiologists and epidemiologists.40
The 1989 conference laid the conceptual cornerstone for later biosecurity techniques. Nicholas King pinpoints this conference as the catalyzing moment for what he calls an "emerging diseases worldview." Not just a set of scientific explanations or policy proposals, this worldview, he argues, is deeply ideological: it "comes equipped with a moral economy and historical narrative, explaining how and why we find ourselves in the situation that we do now, identifying vil¬lains and heroes, ascribing blame for failures and credit for triumph," as well as providing "a consistent, self-contained ontology of epidemic disease" that allows for strategic intervention and management.41 As King shows, in the decade after the conference, leading scientists and health officials in the United States increasingly conjured pandemic scenarios and tied them directly to national security, helping to formalize and cement the emerging diseases worldview across multiple spheres of knowledge. Endorsing a system of global epidemic surveillance and medical commoditization, this worldview represents a model of capltallst biopower that seeks not only to be omnipresent and omniscient but to profit from sickness everywhere.42 Indeed, in his edited volume, Morse already strongly pro¬moted global disease surveillance as an "essential first step" for securing national and human health.43 He cited Henderson's proposal for creating a fleet of interna¬tional disease surveillance centers modeled on the CDC, as well as global surveil¬lance systems for early detection and rapid tracking of outbreaks, electronic data¬bases for instantaneous accessing of medical information, and the marketization of health commodities such as drugs and vaccines.44 In fact, given the advent of internet technology and the global pharmaceutical industry, Henderson's blue-print has been not only reallzed but surpassed. Current systems of syndromic surveillance, which gather real-time data from numerous sources and monitor for patterns of symptoms distributed across populations, now work to "identify potential outbreaks while they are still invisible to healthcare professionals," effec¬tively relocating disease knowledge from physicians and patients to the infor¬mation systems overseen by national security authorities.45 In turn, this disease governance template has been exported to the WHO by American CDC officials, and from there it has disseminated into the public health institutions of countries such as China, becoming ever more established on a global scale.46
Echoing King's analysis, we can also see a penchant for moral parables in the champions of infectious disease and biosecurity discourse. On their account, in a narrative that has become canonized as scientific lore, Morse and Henderson consistently portray themselves as the longtime underdogs in American public health, the unjustly ignored wise men who were never complacent, the small but marginalized contingent of microbiologists and epidemiologists who valiantly disputed the earlier era's status quo and ultimately came to be vindicated by the microbes' vengeful return. In short, they were the heroes to William Stewart's vil¬lain. Ironically, it turns out that Stewart's infamous line about "closing the book on infectious diseases" is itself the stuff of urban legends—one that, as far as the records indicate, originated in this very 1989 conference on emerging viruses, in a personal correspondence between none other than Henderson and Morse.47 Henderson had apparently heard the remark secondhand, from unnamed people who were in turn recalling a speech from memory years later, and he went on to repeat this anecdote both at the conference and in his essay for Morse's volume.48 Morse, for his part, footnoted the quotation and attributed it to Henderson in a medical textbook a few years later.49 Two journalists who attended the conference reported this line in the media, and one of them, Laurie Garrett, further popu¬larized it in her 1994 bestselling book The Coming Plague.50 But Stewart himself never made the alleged statement, and on the contrary, he expressed the opposite view on multiple occasions that "warning flags are still flying in the communi¬cable disease field" and that "we cannot turn our backs on microbiology."51 That the notion of emerging viruses was bestowed official birth at exactly the same moment as the mythic invention of the Stewart quotation, and by the same group of ascendant scientists, intimates just how essential the fable of a benighted villain is to the founding legitimacy of the infectious disease paradigm, as if the latter must create its own dark prehistory to claim an epochal birthright.
Finally, if we trace the NIAID/NIH 1989 conference and its ideological roots further back, we arrive at the Cold War as another vital scene of pandemic dis¬course's emergence. Before Morse coined the term emerging viruses, microbiolo¬gist Rene Dubos was the first to use emergence in the 1950s to describe the behav¬ior of microbes. According to Dubos, microbial evolution was far from stable or linear but radically unpredictable and disruptive, and since humans are locked in an unremitting coevolving ecology with microbes, there can be no final overcom¬ing of them. Cooper sees in Dubos's germ theory "an alternative vision of warfare and a counterphilosophy of disease" that would ultimately culminate in the post- 9/11 biosecurity credo of permanent, preemptive, speculative warfare.52 Along with his proteges, Dubos developed models of disease ecology in these early years of the Cold War.53 As Lakoff contends, this was the period of the decisive rise of an "ideology of preparedness" in US politics and public health. Toward the end of World War II, some US military strategists argued against demobilization, main¬taining that the country needed to remain prepared to respond to new enemy threats such as a nuclear attack. They campaigned for "military and civilian readiness, in peacetime, for an anticipated future war," in effect projecting a state of "permanent mobilization for total war."54 This preparedness model was transferred over to natural disaster management beginning in the mid-1950s, when defense officials started to treat environmental disasters and modern warfare as bearing "a close affinity."55 It also led to the founding in 1951 of the CDC's Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) by Alexander Langmuir, the father of infectious disease epidemiology and Henderson's mentor. Langmuir advocated an approach of "hypervigilance" against epidemics, of "continued watchfulness" on a global scale, and he proposed a global network of centers that would provide around- the-clock surveillance and early rapid detection for both natural and unnatural outbreaks.56 Henderson's later template of global disease surveillance was consciously modeled on Langmuir's. As he noted in his essay for Morse's volume, the contemporary issue of infectious disease surveillance is not unprecedented but had been raised "at least once before"—in 1950, at the start of the Korean War, when fears of a biological attack on civilian populations prompted the creation of the EIS.57 In this essay, Henderson vividly resurrected the Cold War language of permanent total war, writing that "the world is increasingly interdependent, and .. . human health and survival will be challenged, ad infinitum, by new and mutant microbes, with unpredictable pathophysiological manifestations."58
The 1989 conference, then, had a direct lineage in Cold War epidemiological frameworks, with its presiding scientists pushing for not just a revival but permanent normalization of Cold War biosecurity techniques. Again, this history is anchored in a US geopolitics in which Asia figures repeatedly and strategically as the site of multiple forms of potential biothreat, requiring exceptional modes of power to be mobilized at home. Infectious disease discourse therefore epitomizes the insufficient deimperialization of contemporary conditions of knowledge. So far, I have used pandemic as a prism for a geopolitical archaeology. Now I turn to pandemic as a method for diagnosing contemporary bio-orientalism and tracing it to one particular historical formation.
Pandemic as Bio-orientalism
As a theory of the ways politics captures biological life into its domain—as "pow¬er's hold over life," in Michel Foucault's original formulation, "the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a livfng befng"59—biopolitics seems ideally suited as a framework for analyzing the operations of disease governance. Indeed, disease plays a paradigmatic, one might say narratively indispensable, role in Fou- cault's history of power. Most famously, the plague inaugurated for him projects of disciplinary power, exemplified by mechanisms of panoptic surveillance and control, but this plague template was also preceded by leprosy's "rituals of exclu¬sion." As Foucault underscored, different diseases gave rise to different "ways of exercisfng power over men" and different "pofitfcal dream[s]": "The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure . . . those sick of the plague were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning . . . the great confinement on the one hand; the correct training on the other. The leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations."60 Yet, as epidemics were superseded by endemics, "illnesses that were difficult to eradicate ... affecting a population" as "something permanent," so too did sovereign and disciplinary power structures give way to a contemporary "'biopolitics' of the human race," represented by a modern "med¬icine whose main function will now be public hygiene, with institutions to coor¬dinate medical care, centralize information, and normalize knowledge."61 Later, Foucault would call this last type of power security: where sovereignty excludes as in the case of leprosy and discipline quarantines as in the case of plague, secu¬rity inoculates as with smallpox.62 Each biopolitical moment has its correspond¬ing disease. Philipp Sarasin calls this recurrent motif a minor "trace of infection" in Foucault's writ ing,63 but we can flip the order of priority here and postui ate that the history of Western disease governance has been that which underlay the inception of contemporary biopolitical theory.
To be sure, for later theorists, the most telling scenes of biopower will change. For Giorgio Agamben's models of sovereign power and bare life, the intractable historical prototype would be the Nazi death camps; for Achille Mbembe's necro- power, slavery and colonialism; and for Brian Massumi's ontopower, the post-9/11 War on Terror. What these subsequent articulations make ever more visible is that biopolitics becomes conceptually relevant not merely when there exists a politicization of any life but when the life to be excluded, surveilled, disciplined, detained, stripped bare, subjugated, slain, or preempted entails some form of otherness, whether racial, colonial, or geopolitical. Yet biopolitical theories often take recourse in an abstracted language of space, however real and acknowledged the historical referents, whether it is Foucault's panopticon or "spaces of security";64 Agamben's "state of exception," "zone of indistinction," or "camp as nomos";65 or Massumi's "prototerritory."66 Mbembe is perhaps most explicit and steadfast in reversing this intellectual movement from history to theory when he moves instead from imagined geographies back to historically politicized ones. For him, the colony is "the location par excellence" for not just particular variants of biopolitics but also the accumulated operations of it: the colony, as with the plantation system and the apartheid regime, has been a consummate site for the "concatenation of biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege." And "crucial to this concatenation," he emphasizes, is "race."67
Following Mbembe, I would suggest that Asia, akin to the colony, has been the rationale for the concatenation of multiple manifestations of Western bio- power; as such, it has occupied a key place in the geopoiitical history, if not the conscious theorizing, of biopolitics. As we saw, over the course of the past century, Asia has been variously and strategically cited within US discourses of infectious disease and biosecurity as the threshold of bioterrorism as well as the biological other that justifies preemptive biodefense. A more recent example of the nexus between Asia and global biopolitics centers on the 2003 SARS epidemic. As the new millennium's first pandemic, with its origins in southern China, SARS incited deep anxieties and fears about the contemporary world and its breakdown of the boundary between first-world health and third-world contagion.68 The Chinese communist government's initial cover-up of the outbreak at home further fueled age-old orientalist tropes of China as the site of exotic and unhygienic culinary traditions as well as authoritarian secrecy, a lethal combination for global health security.69 It was partly in the context of these orientalist perceptions that the WHO began to act routinely beyond its jurisdiction in response to SARS, bypassing and sometimes overriding state authorities to issue travel advisories, collecting disease data from nonstate sources, and disseminating this information to other countries without the consent of affected governments. Most controversial among these measures was WHO's unprecedented global travel advisory for Hong Kong and Guangdong, a move calculated not just to safeguard global health but also to pressure the Chinese government into compliance. In 2005, the World Health Assembly would go on to revise the International Health Regulations to formalize these powers for WHO and to grant it additional authority, from everyday surveillance and intelligence gathering to crisis management. David Fidler argues that SARS radically transformed global health governance into a "post-Westphalian" paradigm, which centralizes medical authority and regulatory power on a global scale more than ever before.70 If for Mbembe colonialism and slavery are the historical forms of life that enact theories of biopolitics, we might say that bio-orientalism similarly haunts global biopolitical history.
Contemporary pandemic discourse further sustains this biopolitical history. In popular culture as much as public health arenas, Asia is frequently depicted as the birthplace of one wave of infectious disease after another. A 2004 issue of Time magazine typifies this bio-orientalist pandemic imagination: the cover image shows a giant egg about to be hatched, with a bird's beak poking through a crack in the shell, while the headline poses the ominous question, "Bird Flu: Is Asia hatching the next human pandemic?" As the article goes on to assert, the avian flu was the "latest scourge to emerge from Asia." Barely a year after the containment of SARS, the bird flu was already "spreading with alarming speed through Asia's poultry farms," with outbreaks in South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand. Though the virus was not yet virulent among humans, "the great fear of health officials around the world is that the virus could, like SARS, jump the species barrier, mutate into a deadly and highly contagious form and set off a worldwide pandemic." This "next deadly global epidemic" would be what epidemiologists call "a slate wiper," but what endangers the world is not just the virus itself but "dissembling and stalling by local governments [that] have already allowed the pathogen to spread in Asia—not only in birds but also among the men and women who raise them for a living and the kids who gather eggs or simply kick up infected dust in their vill ages."71 Given the combination of Asia's dishonest and corrupt governments, the poor hygiene and general level of medical ignorance of its rural residents, as well as the rapidity of international travel enabled by globalization, Asia stands to jeopardize public health the world over. The expertise of health officials and epidemiologists is summoned, and even the experts, the article declares, are afraid. As Priscilla Wald has demonstrated, cultural narratives of disease outbreaks follow formulaic conventions, one of which is a "geography of disease" where "timeless, brooding Africa or Asia" is imagined as "the birthplace of humanity, civilization, and deadly microbes." Infectious diseases are constructed as third-world problems "leaking" into the global North, in a one-way traffic of emergence.72 The underlying message of the pandemic orientalist narrative seems to be that, while we may lament the loss of Asian lives to deadly microbes, we should not slacken our vigilance toward Asian bodies precisely because they may host those microbes—if not every single body in actuality, then the collective Asian body in potential.