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Scenario planning is hijacked and militarized which makes global war inevitable

Carr 10. Matt Carr is a writer and journalist living in Derbyshire. His latest book is Blood and Faith: the purging of Muslim Spain 1492–1614 [“Slouching towards dystopia: the new military futurism,” 2010, URL: http://www.thecyberhood.net/documents/papers/carr10.pdf]//vikas

Abstract: In recent years, the military establishments of the US and the UK have produced a series of reports that attempt to ‘think the unthinkable’ in imagining future threats to the security of the West. A new genre of military futurology has emerged which owes as much to apocalyptic Hollywood movies as it does to the cold war tradition of ‘scenario planning’. Often outlandish and bizarre in its prophecies, and always dystopian, this new military futurism sees threats to the western way of life emanating not only from rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism but also from resurgent nationalism, conflicts over dwindling resources, migration, disease, organised crime, abrupt climate change and the emergence of ‘failed cities’ where social disorder is rife. This article provides a survey of the genre, showing how the grim predictions of the military futurists provide a justification for endless global war against enemies that may never exist. Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. Donald Rumsfeld1 Downloaded from  at SUNY AT BUFFALO on March 1, 2010 14 Race & Class 51(3) There was a time when the future was considered a subject for prophecy and science fiction rather than empirical analysis. From Jules Verne and H. G. Wells onwards, science writers have combined fantasy with a serious examination of what the future might contain. But it was not until the last decades of the twentieth century that futuristic speculation began to transcend the category of entertainment, with the emergence of the discipline variously known as futurology, futuristics or future studies. Defined by the Encarta Dictionary as ‘the study and forecasting of the future, with predictions based on the likely outcomes of current trends’, futurology first emerged as a popular non-fiction genre in the early 1970s, with Alvin Toffler’s best-selling Future Shock and the Club of Rome’s environmental wake-up call Limits to Growth. In 1972, the University of Houston established the first graduate programme in futurism and today a plethora of university departments, thinktanks and research centres across the world are dedicated to ‘foresight’ and the study of ‘probable and preferable futures’, such as the Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies, the UK Horizon Scanning Centre, Foresight International and the World Future Society. The military has also shown a keen interest in the study of the ‘possible future’ in the early twenty-first century, particularly in the United States. In 1997, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) published Global Trends 2010, the first of three reports in its ambitious 2020 Project that aims to predict the ‘forces that will shape our world’ over a two-decade period. In 2001, the prestigious US Air Force thinktank, the RAND Corporation, established the Frederick S. Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition. Since 2000, the US Joint Forces Command has published two studies of the international military and security environment over the next two decades and its implications for the military. Military and national security research institutions such as the US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) regularly stage conferences and symposia on ‘Long Range Planning and Forecasting’, ‘Scenario Planning’ and ‘Projecting Future Battlespaces and Scenarios’. These studies are not limited to purely military concerns. Military futurists also devote considerable attention to more mainstream futurological subjects, such as social and economic transformation, demographics, urbanism, cultural trends and climate change. What explains the military’s interest in the future and what does this fascination tell us about the present? Military futurism is not a historical novelty in itself. Armies have routinely engaged in contingency planning ever since the German armed forces pioneered ‘long range planning’ in the late nineteenth century. Military futurism really came into its own during the cold war, when the RAND Corporation began conducting regular war games and simulations to predict the likely outcomes of nuclear and conventional military confrontations with the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s, RAND luminaries such as Herman Kahn, Leo Roster and Albert Wohlstetter built illustrious careers around ‘scenario planning’ and ‘systems thinking’, which attempted to provide US policymakers with the conceptual tools to anticipate ‘alternate’ or ‘surprising’ military futures by ‘thinking the unthinkable’. By the 1980s, forecasting, war-gaming and scenario planning had become routinely integrated into US military practice. While studies such as Innovation Task Force 2025 (1988) and AirLand Battle 2000 (1982) considered the transformation of the armed forces or rehearsed NATO war plans against the Warsaw Pact, others continued to explore the outer limits of the unthinkable future. One report published by the Department of Defense in the early years of the Reagan presidency imagined a nuclear war in which the White House, the Pentagon and much of civilisation were destroyed, but computers continued in the aftermath ‘to run a war no human mind can control’, directing space satellites, nuclear weapons and armies of robots ‘that can gallop like horses and walk like men, carrying out computerised orders as they roam the radioactive battlefield’.2 Cold war military futurism also spilled over into the private sector. In 1961, Herman Kahn founded the Hudson Institute, a conservative thinktank and research centre which aspires to provide ‘global leaders in government and business’ with the tools to ‘manage strategic transitions to the future’.3 In the 1970s, Royal Dutch Shell pioneered the corporate use of scenario planning in the oil industry in response to what was perceived as a new climate of uncertainty and unpredictability following the OPEC oil embargo. This overlapping nexus between the military and corporate futurism has continued ever since. Not only do the US military and the private sector share the same concern with geopolitical and international developments pertaining to US national security and the future of the capitalist world economy, but private companies and institutions specialising in scenario planning and risk management also work closely with the military in developing futuristic analyses. The Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis produces regular studies for the military on the ‘critical variables’ and ‘nonlinear forces’ affecting international politics.4 Both the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security have also commissioned futuristic studies from scenario planning specialists such as the Global Business Network (GBN) and the giant management consultancy firm Booz Allen Hamilton. In 2006, Booz Allen won a $32 million contract to provide the Pentagon’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with war-gaming materials and simulations, whose aim, according to the company spokesman, was to ‘write the history of the future’ and provide the Pentagon with a ‘picture of the world between 2001 and 2025’.5 All this is in keeping with the tradition developed by Kahn and his RAND colleagues but the new military futurism is also strikingly different from its predecessors. Where the cold war futurists were primarily concerned with the Soviet Union and scenario planning for nuclear war, twenty-first century futurists are concerned with very different ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’. One of the most prolific producers of futurological studies is the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA), an obscure but influential thinktank run by the veteran RAND intellectual and military futurist Andrew Marshall. Each year, the ONA commissions dozens of studies from academics and thinktanks like the Hudson Institute and private consulting companies. Most of these reports are classified but the  website recently used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain an index of ONA publications. These include titles such as Pandora’s Boxes: the mind of jihad (June 2007), Why they Won’t Know What Hit Them: are Arabs thinking about the consequences of another 9/11 (July 2006), Europe 2025: mounting security challenges amidst declining competitiveness (September 2008), Role of High Power Microwave Weapons in Future Intercontinental War (July 2007) and even German Liberals and the Integration of Muslim Minorities in Germany (December 2006).6 These titles are an indication of the new concerns of contemporary military futurism. The new military futurists also differ from their predecessors in their generally grim perspective on the future. In Rethinking the Unthinkable (1963), Herman Kahn attempted to demonstrate that a nuclear war might not be survivable and therefore ‘thinkable’. This scenario was intended to be positive – albeit from a hawkish foreign policy perspective – but contemporary military futurism is often extremely pessimistic in its depictions of the twenty-first century ‘security environment’. Such pessimism is partly a reflection of the prevailing mood in the US national security establishment. Ever since the end of the cold war, US security analysts have argued that the US was vulnerable to attack by elusive and unpredictable enemies that were potentially more dangerous than the former Soviet Union. Such predictions appeared to be confirmed by the catastrophic events of September 11. On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks were ‘predictable’, in the sense that an attack of some kind had been expected. At the same time, the attacks constituted what futurologists call ‘wild cards’, ‘discontinuities’ or ‘surprising events with huge consequences’, which force a new set of expectations about what the future might contain. Some US security analysts have since added the Iraq insurgency to the category of ‘strategic shocks’ and attributed the failure to predict it to the same ‘failure of imagination’ that helped make the 9/11 attacks possible. The result is a new willingness amongst the US national security establishment to consider further ‘strategic shocks’ by ‘imagining the unimaginable’ – a tendency which has generated imaginative scenarios that sometimes owe more to apocalyptic Hollywood movies, manga comics and science fiction than they do to sober analysis. Faced with a future that seems fraught with unpleasant surprises, the Pentagon has embarked on some outlandish and even bizarre attempts to try to reduce the element of uncertainty and unpredictability. One ongoing project aims to recruit social scientists to compile a computerised database of cultural, religious and political beliefs in every country in the world that will supposedly enable the military to predict which countries are most likely to succumb to unrest, insurgency or terrorism. In 2002, the Pentagon’s cutting edge Defense and Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) came close to introducing a ‘terrorism futures market’ based on the financial futures market, which invited bets on when and where terrorist events were likely to occur in order to predict them beforehand. This scheme was abandoned when it was pointed out that some organisations might deliberately carry out attacks in order to profit from them. In 2007, DARPA awarded Lockheed Martin a contract to develop an ‘Integrated Crises Early Warning System’ (ICEWS) that its designers claimed will ‘anticipate and respond to worldwide political crises and predict events of interest and stability of countries of interest with greater than 80 percent accuracy’ in the same way that meteorologists predict the weather.7 These initiatives cannot be attributed simply to an overzealous desire to protect the US ‘homeland’ from ‘another 9/11’. The broad scope of contemporary military futurism is partly a consequence of changing concepts of warfare in the early twenty-first century, with its new emphasis on ‘asymmetric’ warfare, terrorism and insurgency across the global ‘battlespace’ rather than conventional wars between states. The commitment to ‘fourth generation warfare’ is fuelled by a new sense of the fragility and instability of the international state system, coupled with the belief that the nation-state in the early twenty-first century is increasingly vulnerable to global economic turbulence, civil and ethnic conflict and the violent activities of ‘non-state actors’ – all of which are perceived to pose threats to global security and even the future of globalisation itself. The ‘uncertainty’, instability and risk that military futurists project onto the future not only emanates from nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’ or ‘non-state actors’, however. A recurring theme in military futurist scenarios concerns the possibility that the emergence of China, India and Brazil as major economic powers may be accompanied by a decline in US – and western – global hegemony and that the ‘unipolar world’ of the post-cold war era may be drawing to an end. With the demise of the Soviet Union, US military thinking has been dominated by the concept of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) – a term used to describe periods of history in which one particular military power or group of powers outstrips all potential rivals. The display of US technological firepower in the first Gulf War convinced many military planners that this position is now occupied by the US. But this belief is often accompanied by a realisation of the limitations of US military power and anxiety that the RMA may not be permanent. The notion of the US RMA is often attributed to the Pentagon’s ‘futurist-in-chief’ Andrew Marshall at the ONA. Celebrated as a visionary genius by his admirers and denounced as a paranoiac by his enemies, Marshall is a long-time associate of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, and was given a major role by Rumsfeld in the preparation of the 2002 Quadrennial Defense Review, which the US Armed Forces use as a medium-range planning guide to justify its budget requests to Congress. That same year, Marshall commissioned an 85-page monograph for the ONA from Booz Allen Hamilton entitled Military Advantage in History, which studied some of the most successful military conquerors of the past for lessons on how the United States ‘should think about maintaining military advantage in the twenty-first century’.8 Though the study identified the United States as the ‘dominant military power in the world’, it nevertheless warned that such dominance might not be permanent and that ‘barring a more innovative approach the process leading to its substantial erosion has already been set in motion’. To contribute to this process of innovation, the report sought inspiration from imperial conquerors such as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and particularly from Rome, whose 600-year dominance, the authors argued, ‘suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop counter-capabilities’.9 Stripped of its anachronistic application of contemporary military jargon, its shallow scholarship and its unproblematic comparisons between the United States and previous empires, this document was essentially a variant on ONA futuristic studies such as Preserving American Primacy (January 2006) and Preserving US Military Supremacy (August 2001). The same objectives are shared by the neoconservative thinktank Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in its 2000 call for US military transformation, Rebuilding America’s Defenses. The PNAC couples a boyish fascination with sci-fi weaponry with a strident insistence on the need to preserve US ‘primacy’, ‘geo-political pre-eminence’, ‘dominance’ and a ‘global security order that is uniquely friendly to American principles and prosperity’.10 This determination to shape, control and ‘dominate’ the turbulent and conflict-prone twenty-first century in the foreseeable (and unforeseeable) future is a key component of the new military futurism. On the one hand, military futurism is a by-product of the megalomaniac military doctrine of ‘full spectrum dominance’. At the same time, its predictions about the future express very real fears amongst the US ruling elite that the United States is inextricably connected to a world that may be slipping out of its control. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the new military futurists are often considerably more pessimistic than their predecessors and tend to paint a very bleak future of an unsafe and unstable world that demands a constant military presence to hold it together. From Yevgeny Zemyatin’s We to Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, twentieth-century writers have used dystopian visions of the future as a warning or as a satirical commentary on the often lethal consequences of twentieth-century utopianism. The dystopias of the new military futurists have a very different purpose. The US military often tends to perceive itself as the last bastion of civilisation against encroaching chaos and disorder. The worse the future is perceived to be, the more these dark visions of chaos and disorder serve to justify limitless military ‘interventions’, techno-warfare, techno-surveillance and weapons procurement programmes, and the predictions of the military futurists are often very grim indeed.

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