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Grove’s move is totalizing, preemptive, and cedes the present to fascists

Benjamin Tallis 20, Researcher at Institute of International Relations Prague, “Un-cancelling the future,” New Perspectives 1–18, 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2336825X20937580

Timeless pessimism, hopeless critique Hope is a Form of Extortion. (Jairus Grove, Savage Ecology, 2019: 25) Both Rutger Bregman (2014) and Franco Berardi (2011) have written extensively on this pessimism. In different ways and with different aims, they argue that despite the huge and real (although highly uneven and inequitable) progress that we (in this case, many of us who live in the West) have made in helping more people live longer, healthier, happier lives, we no longer believe we can improve further. We have become collectively disappointed by the failures of political and technological vision; shocked by the downsides of modernity, stunned by the scale and complexity of our challenges – and by the pace of change. As Jonathan Meades (2014) observed, change itself has changed: for many in the West, it used to mean change for the better2 but for too many people that is no longer the case. This fear of change itself has exacerbated the problem, leading to a stasis of ideas, a lack of daring, deficit of vision and vacuum of purpose. Even faced with the existential crisis of climate change, our responses have been piecemeal and incremental. Too often even the bolder proposals have been mealy mouthed or, worse, have framed human life itself as the problem (e.g. Sparrow, 2019; Wilkinson, 2020). A pious puritan streak in the environmental movement seems to relish in the idea of a future of less, a restricted and spartan life, purged of joy. It has not been widely embraced. Both Bregman and Berardi note that majorities or significant minorities of people in richer countries have long believed their children will be worse off than they are (see, e.g. Pew, 2019) – but they don’t wish to actively spur this process along. There has been no credible positive vision of radical change to countervail this negativity and so we drift, seemingly helpless as well as hopeless in the interregnum of ideas. As Bregman puts it: the real crisis of our times, of my generation, is not that we don’t have it good, or even that we might be worse off later on. No, the real crisis is that we can’t come up with anything better. (Bregman, 2014: 22) He goes on to note that we have become so wary of positive visions of progress that: today we stamp out dreams of a better world before they can take root. Dreams have a way of turning into nightmares, goes the cliche´. Utopias are a breeding ground for discord, violence, even genocide. Utopias ultimately become dystopias; in fact, a utopia is a dystopia. (Bregman, 2014: 23) Examples of this way of thinking are plentiful but, for convenience, one need to look no further than Jairus Grove’s scintillatingly pessimistic keynote at the Hamburg Sessions (forthcoming as an essay in NP and based on his 2019 book, Savage Ecology).3 It is not that Grove doesn’t make compelling critical arguments – he does and in brilliant, imaginative ways – but that they lack balance. And balance matters, whether we are reckoning with horrendous pasts or trying to boldly imaging new futures. To see, or certainly to dwell on, only the bad in what we in the West have collectively done (however, Grove or anyone else defines who we are), over the entire course of our past and present is grossly unfair. It also amounts, in effect, to a counsel of despair, however much Grove protests to the contrary or claims to eschew nihilism. In his keynote, having written off our past and present, Grove also explicitly urged us in Europe and the West to stop imagining better, progressive futures, arguing that this has led to precisely the problems he identified. Grove’s critique thus not only leaves us out of time (without an avowable past, present or future) but also leaves us without space for contesting negative, regressive and repressive political trends. In his book, he laments the ‘debilitating stupor’ in which the work of thinkers like Theodor Adorno and Giorgio Agamben leaves us (Grove, 2019: 238). But Grove’s own pessimism, if we took it seriously, would leave Europeans without a political leg to stand on. It would leave us in just such a stupor – or worse – with no solid ground and no lever: no way to move the world and no platform for positive, progressive change. Why bother, if everything we do only makes things worse? However much harm we Europeans and Westerners have done, we haven’t done, don’t and won’t only do harm. The real danger of Grove’s type of timelessly pessimistic and literally hopeless critique is that (again, if taken seriously) it breeds only damaging inertia, inaction and resentment – its hopelessness makes it a debilitating critique; its timelessness offers no possibility of salvage, let alone progress. It cedes the ground of action to those who many of us (including Grove) would explicitly disagree with – whether to exponents of ‘traditional’ approaches to IR who are more than happy to offer policy advice or, worse, to authoritarians and populists in practical politics (as ably described in Johanna Sumuvuori’s essay in this issue). Critical scholars too rarely see it as their task to construct positive visions of better worlds. Instead, too often they content themselves (if no one else) with evermore thoroughgoing deconstructive critique – including of other critical academics. Whether totalising or parasitic, even some of its leading proponents admit that IR’s critical project has, thus far, had insufficient impact on the world at large (Austin, 2017, 2019). Few critical scholars will thank me for this comparison, but, in their pessimistic, misanthropic zeal, they echo what French President Emmanuel Macron called the ‘sad passions’ of the author Michel Houellebecq4 (Carre`re, 2017). They may not share Houellebecq’s politics, but many critical scholars certainly share his exhaustive (and exhausting) disenchantment with contemporary (neo)liberal societies, the state of Europe and of the West. Too often they also share his miserabilist outlook on the impossibility of change for the better and the futility or harm of even trying to improve things. Grove does propose several forms of political action: micro-kindnesses, however vague (e.g. ‘the impossible generosity and affirmation of deconstruction’, 2019: 231); resistant acts by brave individuals (e.g. ‘William ‘‘Fox’’ Fallon, who sacrificed his prestigious position as head of [US Military] Central Command because he would not go along with the plan to attack Iran’, 2019: 232); embracing entirely new ‘forms of life5 ’; or welcoming apocalypse as driver of change (2019: 229–248). Grove will not be confused with Goldilocks anytime soon – these forms of action each seem either too little or (much) too much. Few of us would question the value of and need for kindness and, indeed, the most hopeful part of Grove’s book is the touching introduction where he details many of the kindnesses he has himself benefitted from, mainly from people in the West where he has spent most of his life. There is also, clearly, a role for resistance and for the kinds of acts that Grove notes have prevented executions and even nuclear war. Yet without a wider programme, without a bigger positive vision, kindness and resistance cannot sufficiently change our world for the better. Apocalypse, on the contrary, changes too much, junks too much that is good and is rarely likely to be an appealing option, or something we can all get behind. The apocalyptic aspect of Grove’s position, like that of many critical scholars, seeks to inflict destructive harm on Western institutions rather than constructively reform them – something Houellebecq would also relish. Apocalyptic change also smacks of the recklessly callous, negative sides of early 20th-century futurism (Marinetti, 1909), as Grove acknowledges when asking ‘How do we go wild without the cruelty of indifference?’ (2019: 280). Again, a more balanced approach to boldness would help. To be clear, major change is needed – that was the whole point of the Hamburg Sessions and the motivation behind giving it the theme of ‘Un-Cancelling the Future’. I’ve argued elsewhere that the kind of socio-economically regressive, technocratic, defensive liberalisms that have dominated large parts of the last 40 years in the West have a lot to answer for (Tallis, 2018). So too, of course, does the type of narrowly, teleological individually atomising (neo)liberalism that neither saw (Fukuyama, 1992) nor allowed (Fisher, 2009) alternative visions of politics, societies and economies. Mark Fisher (2009), echoing the artist Gerhard Richter (Elger, 2009), called this myopic liberalism ‘Capitalist Realism’. You don’t have to be a Marxist or even a leftist to see that a mandated lack of alternatives and a commensurate narrowing of possibilities and horizons is a bad thing. As noted above, both climate change and sociotechnical upheavals in the ways we work and live need bold visions to address the challenges they pose while also seizing the opportunities they present. It is, however, eminently possible to recognise the full horrors of Europe’s (colonial) pasts and presents without immediately discounting the possibility of improvement coming from the West, from Europe. Similarly, one can recognise the myriad problems that Europeans have caused while also celebrating the many positive things they have also achieved. Moreover, it is possible to use those achievements as inspirations for better ways of doing things – as catalysts to new, progressive creativity and to positive visions of the future. Just as Kraftwerk did in the fragile yet fertile Germany of the second half of the 20th century when they acknowledged the abyss yet still sought a better future, including as atonement for that past. The cancellation of the future William Gibson recently tweeted ‘‘In the 1920s, the phrase ‘the 21st Century’ was already popubiquitous. How often do we see the phrase ‘‘the 22nd Century’’, now?’’. And it’s true – we don’t have these dates anymore. As a boy, as a young man, I had mental pictures of the 21st Century. But I don’t have any sense of 2050 or 2100 – except as a deterioration or a collapse. (Simon Reynolds, Hamburg Sessions 2019, see essay in this issue) I return to Kraftwerk below but first, a little more is needed on the ramifications of contemporary hopelessness. Rather than striving to create new and compelling positive, progressive visions, many thinkers content themselves with critique (Austin, 2017) while others, like Grove, see positive, progressive visions and futures – especially those coming from Europe or the wider West – as being necessarily harmful in themselves. This is postmodernism as hangover. The depressed – and depressing – aftermath of the shortcomings, broken promises and unintended consequences of modernisms of different kinds, in which strange connections are made and selective, guilty memory runs amok (Fisher, 2014). Forgetting the good, it fuses the bewitchingly pertinent aspects of the post-positivist critical project (which influenced many of us, myself very much included), with more zealously (self-)destructive and paralysing tendencies. As Fisher puts it: ‘Deconstruction [is] a kind of pathology of scepticism, which induced hedging, infirmity of purpose and compulsory doubt’ (2014: 16). In this mode, scholarship no longer seeks to invent the train but fixates on the train crash or even pre-empts and precludes the train’s invention for fear of the seemingly inescapable imagined train crash to come. Like Grove’s denunciation of the future, many of the critiques of (popular) modernisms are not so much wrong as imbalanced (although some are wrong of course, others not even). They take insufficient account of modernisms’ multiple and meaningful successes (there’s no time here, but see, e.g. Fisher, 2014: 22; or Meades, 2014, for a flavour). This leaves us in an odd situation where many of the scholars, commentators and others who criticise neoliberalism, capitalist realism and so on, find themselves in de facto agreement with its notion that there should be no alternative. In this view, we simply shouldn’t do big vision politics because our ‘schemes to improve the human condition’ have not only ‘failed’ but will always, inevitably, do more harm than good (Scott, 2008). This approach, all post and no modern, will take us nowhere, even as it fast-forwards the academic careers of its exponents. The future visions that are left, on the left, tend to be Marxist ones (see, e.g. Grove, 2019: 198– 202). Tarred not only by the brush of the communisms that actually existed (and their distinctly less balanced ledger than that of modernism more widely) they understandably fail to inspire mass enthusiasm. Many of their proponents are still really more interested in explaining the failure to bring about the inevitable (full communism) in the past and present than in imagining new futures that go beyond the narrow world view and limiting subjectivity of too many Marxist approaches (see, e.g. Scribner, 2003; Sˇitera, 2015). This has done little to address the crisis of hope or to countervail prevalent contemporary pessimism. The loss of the belief in the progressive future – that tomorrow can be better than yesterday and today – and the related erosion of faith in our ability to positively shape our own destiny are what Berardi (2011: 13) called ‘the slow cancellation of the future’. As Simon Reynolds noted in his Hamburg Sessions keynote (included in this issue of NP), the cancellation may have started slowly in the 1970s, but, by the 2000s, it had picked up speed and its effects could start to be seen. The first of these – its more (neo)liberal variant – was the feeling of living in an endless present. For a lot of people in the West, this has been comfortable in many ways (although often unevenly and unfairly) and has had distinct advantages over the past (the extension of rights and opportunities to broader swathes of the population) but without much hope, optimism or greater purpose. Unless it provokes the nostalgic responses outlined below, this endless present can lead to a sense of ennui, a lack of direction and loss of momentum. The second, more overtly sinister, variant that fills the vacuum left by the dearth of positive, progressive visions for the future takes the form of darker re-enchantments focused on the (imagined) past (e.g. Campanella and Dassu`, 2019). Whether ‘making America great again’, ‘taking back control’ in the United Kingdom or claiming to offer an ‘alternative for Germany’, these movements are fundamentally premised on a backward-looking politics of nostalgia. The pessimism about the present and worries about the future on which these movements have each capitalised have given rise to an increasingly defensive politics of closing down and protecting, at the expense of opening up and integrating. Nativism and pessimism tend to go hand in hand: shrinking pies bring narrowed horizons and hasten the circling of wagons around exclusive and chauvinistic visions of national communities. Too often, this retro-rightism has been met only with retro-leftism or a tired centrism that merely seeks more of the same, to smooth the endless present. But that can change ...

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