New biosecurity measures solve
Berger et. al. 18 - Associate Director of the Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and Ph.D. in in genetics and molecular biology at Emory University AND** Senior Research fellow at National Defense University, and PhD in biology from the University of Delaware AND** interdisciplinary biologist with a BA summa cum laude in chemistry from Harvard and a PhD in biochemistry from Stanford AND** former Program Director for Health Strategies at Parsons Federal Business Unit, and PhD in Biochemistry and two master’s degree, one in Pharmacology and the other in Toxicology (Kavita M. Berger, Diane DiEuliis, Corey Meyer, and Venkat Rao, “Roadmap for Biosecurity and Biodefense Policy in the United States,” Gryphon Scientific, 2018, Accessed Online at http://gryphonsci.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Full-Report_Roadmap-of-US-Biosecurity-and-Biodefense-Policy_2018.pdf, Accessed Online on 6-22-22)
During the analysis of U.S. biosecurity and biodefense policy, several capability, implementation, and infrastructure gaps were identified. That is, goals which are plainly stated in biodefense legislation, presidential directives, or other policy instruments, are found to be associated with few implemented programs or actions. These gaps include: • Capability Gaps: o Microbial forensics is an underinvested field in the United States and internationally, but could be enhanced by leveraging technologies such as bioinformatics and next generation sequencing. Two U.S. government policies highlight the need for microbial forensic capabilities: HSPD10/Biodefense for the 21st Century (2004) and the National Strategy to Support Research in Microbial Forensics Attribution Investigations and National Security (2009).(56, 57) These strategies, along with recent reports completed by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine and the Government Accountability Office can help define nearterm recommendations for addressing this gap. Leveraging new biotechnologies may enhance capabilities for microbial forensics at a lower overall cost and/or higher throughput than traditional forensics methods. o Systems for scanning scientific advances that could lead to new technology developments exist in offices that support or conduct research and advanced development. However, end-users often do not have access to these systems or have similar systems of their own, which limits field application and relevance to biodefense activities. o Despite significant investment in biosurveillance approaches and platforms, the underlying data used to develop effective early warning methods is highly variable and uncertain. This challenge suggests a gap in robust approaches for generating reliable, curated input data. In addition, this challenge highlights the lack of communication and interaction between scientific experts and policy-makers, which may be needed to ensure that existing, verified data is included in the decision-making process of preparedness activities and potential emergency situations. o The increasing convergence of scientific disciplines, changing funding paradigm, and expansion of biotechnology practitioners suggests that greater attention is needed on evaluating the security implications of biological and biotechnological advances and applications that are not only focused on pathogens and toxins. In 2014, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, FBI, and United National Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute published a report on the national and transnational security implications of Big Data in the Life Sciences. This report acknowledged the increasing production of genomic data by research, clinical, and direct-to-consumer organizations throughout the world; the continuously advancing computational and data science capabilities; and the frequency of cyberattacks of health care and insurance databases. This combination of factors led the FBI and others to evaluate more closely the potential national security risks presented by these activities and approaches for reducing the risks while not adversely affecting commercial, research, and clinical innovation. • Infrastructure Gap o Despite investment on basic research on pathogens, the academic research sector, including the biocontainment laboratories, are not considered a critical infrastructure and therefore, have little to no external financial or expert support to prepare for, respond to, and recover from potential events. However, the basic knowledge about pathogens are generated by this sector and the capabilities to identify newly-emerging or never-beforeseen pathogens are resident within this sector. o Very few policies and programs exist for promoting resiliency in the biodefense, health, and research sector. But, resiliency is a local issue, which suggests that the federal government role may be in facilitating preparedness, planning, and recovery efforts. No policy appears to include outreach efforts to the scientific community to promote resiliency. o Although the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 includes a section on support for applied biosafety, very little, if any, funding has been appropriated for research to generate the data needed to evaluate effectiveness of biosafety measures. • Implementation Gap o Several sectors and organizations do not have sufficient funds to support compliance with biosecurity regulations so they choose not to participate in activities involving restricted agents. The most significantly affected sectors are public health and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, which require external funding and technical support to maintain compliance with the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Regulations. o The continuous changes to the BSAT Regulations have resulted in significant challenges and delays in federal implementation and local compliance. Although federal regulators previously have met with the regulated community to discuss changes to federal BSAT policies, these outreach activities seem to have ended. Instead, the Federal Select Agent Program directors have initiated new efforts that involve interaction and engagement with local Federal Bureau of Investigation Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinators. o Practical resources for enabling program managers, research reviewers, and scientists to assess the risks and benefits of research do not exist. These resources would ensure that science and technology investments for promoting biodefense and health security objectives can be leveraged maximally while risks are addressed adequately. o Annual and inconsistent investment in nonproliferation activities, specifically for cooperative threat reduction programs, limits long-term sustainability of partnerships and outcomes. Threat reduction or bioengagement programs require long-term planning, engagement, and funding to increase the likelihood of sustainability of activities (e.g., through financial support of the recipient country), enabling an exit strategy for U.S. government funding. o Effective measures for evaluating biosecurity policy implementation have not been developed. Members of the scientific and security community routinely have stated that the development of measures are not feasible because measuring the absence of an event (i.e., measuring a negative result) is impossible. Conversely, measures for evaluating some biodefense investments do exist, each different from another. This variability highlights inconsistencies that may arise from the different, often ad hoc evaluation metrics used to assess biodefense investments. o No analytic framework currently exists for assessing opportunity costs of biosecurity policy. Often direct costs are calculated in advance as part of regulatory impact assessments. But, indirect costs and downstream consequences, which represent opportunity costs of a policy, resulting from these direct costs are not calculated. However, many in the regulated community use arguments about opportunity cost when engaging in policy discussions, highlighting the importance of considering costs downstream of direct time and financial investments.